his successor (Chu Chi-wen) did not take up his post for nearly
153
five months* The British Government decided to publish a Special 154
Report from the ICSC-VN dated 2 June 1962, which found that both North and South Viet Nam had committed breaches of the 1954 Geneva Agreement and accused the PAVN of giving support to the revolutionists: both the PRC and the DRVN attacked the Report* The Enlarged Geneva Conference on Laos, which had convened on 16 May 1961, reached agree ment on 21 July 1962; Chen Yi linked the future of the agreements on Laos with the future developments in Viet Nam,***** and the NFL
151* Declaration of the First Congress of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation (Hanoi: FLPH* June 1962)*
152. NCNA 24 March 1962 (SCMP 2708, p. 37).
153* Chu was appointed on 27 July 1962 (NCNA of same date: SCMP 2791, p* 29), but he did not arrive in Hanoi until 18 August (NCNA of same date: SCMP 2805, p* 34). The delays were not explained* 154. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1962 (Cmnd* 1755). 155* In his final address to the enlarged Geneva Conference on Laos,
he said: The tension in Vietnam was created by the D.S* Govern ment's refusal to assume its international obligations
under the 1954 Geneva Agreements and its perpetration of armed intervention there* This situation has already reached a point of extreme danger* We hold that this armed intervention must be stopped and that the war flames in
South Viet Nam must be put out through peaceful consultations in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements* So long
as flames of war are kept alive in South Vietnam, peace in Laos cannot be regarded as consolidated* (NCNA 21 July 1962: SCMP 2787, p* 24.)
proposed a solution to the Viet Nam question along the lines of 156
that agreed for Laos* The Chinese leaders referred to the VNWP's continuing "correct leadership" in their message for the DRVN's 17th National D a y ; * ^ at the same time Chen Yi made ascerbic
158
reference to the Soviet Union* ★ * *
On 17 September 1962, NCNA announced that a National People's Congress delegation would shortly visit the DRVN at the invitation of Truong Chinh in his capacity as Chairman of the DRVN National Assembly's Standing Committee* The delegation, headed by Peng Chen, arrived in Hanoi on 29 September and remained in the DRVN until 11 October* Speeches exchanged during the visit were not especially noteworthy, but Peng Chen seemed to give emphasis to
the virtue of relying on one's own strength in waging armed struggle,
156* On 20 July 1962, the NLF made four "emergency proposals for national salvation": the US must dissolve MACV and withdrew
its troops and weapons; the "interested parties" in the
south to cease fire in order to settle their internal affairs by themselves; a national union government to be set up to organize free general elections in the south; south Viet Nam to follow a foreign policy of peace and neutrality (as quoted in Tran Van Giau and Le Van Chat, The South Viet Nam Liberation National Front /sic7 /Hanoi: FLPH, 1962/,
pp. 37-38). __
All obstacles are thus removed on the side of the /NLF/ to bring the South Vietnamese people to accept a
solution similar to that which triumphed in Laos on June 12, 1962. (Ibid** p. 39).
157. NCNA 1 September 1962 (SCMP 2815, p. 31).
158. He said, during a reception in Peking on 1 September, that Our two countries /I*e. the PRC and the DRVN/ have never imposed our opinions on others, nor replaced comradely discussions and consultations with the method of
interfering in each other's internal affairs. (NCNA 1 September 1962: SCMP 2814, p. 27.
in references both to the anti-French war of Resistance and to the insurgency in South Viet Nam* Concerning the latter, he also emphasized that the US would be driven out, ’’after protracted and arduous struggle”, provided that the people in the south united closely under the NFL banner, that they relied on their own
strength, and that they had the support ”of their fellow countrymen in the north” as well as of the peace-loving people the world overi6^ These remarks seemed to imply that the Chinese had made a new
assessment of the situation in the south during the past four months - during the visit of the DRVN delegation to China in June, Pham Van Dong had more than once referred to the leading role of the NLF, but the Chinese leaders had made no reference to the NFL at that time - and that the pre-requisites for victory set forth by Peng Chen were reflection of this new assessment* After the return of the NPC delegation to China, a Renmin Ribao editorial hailed
the "brilliant achievements" of the Vietnamese people under the "correct leadership" of the VNWP, which had "applied creatively the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the reality in Viet Nam"«161
The first formal NLF delegation to visit China did so between 23 September and 19 October 1962, "at the invitation of the China Peace Committee and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian
159« Speech in Viet Tri (NCNA 4 October 1962: SCMP 2836, p« 47). 160« Sppech to Hanoi rally, 7 October 1962 (NCNA of same day
SCMP 2838, p. 34).
161. Renmin Ribao editorial, 13 October 1962 (SCMP 2841, pp. 37-38).
162
Solidarity1'; the group met with Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese 163
leaders for "intimate, friendly conversations", and signed a 164
joint statement with its host committees before leaving Peking to travel in China en route to Hanoi*
The DRVN leaders do not seem to have entirely approved of the PRC military action against India over the disputed border
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territory, and they tended to support the Soviet Union on the Cuban missile i s s u e * T h e Chinese took advantage of the NPL's second anniversary to draw lessons from the two e p i s o d e s , a n d
162. NCNA 22 September 1962: (SCMP 2827, p. 36).
163* On 28 September 1962 (see NCNA for that date: SCMP 2831, p* 30); the description is from the joint statement issued on 5 October (NCNA 5 October: SCMP 2836, p* 4o).
164. SCMP 2836, pp. 40-42.
165. King Chen, "North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1962- 1964", op. clt.. has identified a shift in the DRVN attitude to India in the period from late October to early November 1962, in the direction of greater reservations (p. 1025). When the Chinese announced on 21 November their unilateral
troop withdrawal, Ho Chi Minh addressed conciliatory letters to both Liu Shao-chi and to the Indian leaders (texts of
the letters - both dated 24 November - are in NCNA 25 November 1962: SCMP 2869, p. 34); and on 1 December, Chou En-lai
received a letter from Pham Van Dong which also spoke of the "correct stand" of the Chinese government (NCNA 1 December 1962: SCMP 2873, p. 40). At the same time, the DRVN did
not express approval for the earlier Chinese military advance, and avoided mentioning the USSR as an arms supplier to India. 166. King Chen,"North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1962-
1964", op* clt.. pp. 1027-1028. The Soviet reversal of decisions must have raised, in the minds of many of the VNWP-CC members, the question of the USSR's dependability as an ally in the event of escalated confrontation between the US and the Vietnamese which might occur in the future. 167. Addressing a rally in Peking on 19 December 1962, Liao
Cheng-chih said that "the struggle of the people of South
Vietnam, Cuba and the whole world" bore out three facts: first, imperialism and ail reactionaries were paper tigers, which looked outwardly strong but were in fact weak, and "so long as one slights them strategically and deals seriously with them tactically, "one would surely be able to win victory. Secondly, it was the struggle of the masses which decided
the course of history, and not weapons, atomic or hydrogen bombs. Thirdly, "no force whatever" could suppress the struggle of the oppressed nations and people for liberation. (NCNA 19 December; SCMP 2886, p. 25; also see Peking Review, Vol. V, No. 52 ß . 8 December 1962/, pp. 12-13).
the continuing intransigence of CPC attacks on the CPSU policies at the turn of the year encouraged the VNWP to make another major
168