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Trastornos Neuromusculares - Mo- Mo-tores

In document Programa Oficial y Libro de Resúmenes (página 44-54)

The close association between the rulers, regional elites and the temples is explicit in the Angkorian period temple inscriptions (e.g. Mabbett 1978: 32). According to the Temple Hierarchy model (Hall 1985),’22 the Khmer state was integrated through a network of temples linking local village temples to larger ones, referred to as central temples by Sedov (1967:

183-95; see Appendix 2). 23 These were themselves linked to state temples. Temple deities were linked by the symbolic sharing of part of their revenue and through the participation by their clergy in state temple rituals. These amalgamations (miśrabhoga, etc), whereby the produce or the administration of temple lands were declared to be merged, have been interpreted as serving both ideological and economic functions (Ricklefs 1967; Sedov 1967:

183-86; Hall 1985: 151; Vickery 1998: 155-8).

In Hall’s (1985) analysis of Angkor, Khmer temples both integrated the society through religious symbolism and functioned as economic centres. This is similar to what investigators of South Indian temples have observed in the close association between rulers and religious centres, where rulers sometimes subsidised temples and invested in irrigation in their villages.24 In the Vijayanagara period of the 14th–17th century, Hindu temples were major participants in the social, economic and political development of the state, playing a major role in the expansion of craft production and urbanism (Sinopoli 2003: 94-97) [see also Stein (1984; 1984a) and Heitzman (1987)].

Many of the Khmer religious foundations are older than the inscriptions which refer to them.

However, even the earliest permanent religious structures are thought to post-date contact with India, being the work of minor rulers using foreign-inspired symbols to enhance their legitimacy (Section 1.3.1). In the Pre-Angkorian period, the foundations were not purely religious, but were also economic units organised by local elites (e.g. Vickery 1998: 278).

Religious construction continued on a grander scale through the Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian periods: the material evidence for this in Cambodia is so great that Wheatley (1975: 252) has described the landscape as resembling ‘one huge oblation’. However, building output varied over this time and there were periods when construction was dominated either by rulers or by officials. During an extended period of social, political and economic changes between the early 10th and late 12th centuries, a ‘zone of imprecision’ (Stern 1951: 659), officials were

22Hall’s ‘temple hierarchy’ resembles both his Indian ‘Cōla Age Marketing Hierarchy’ (Hall 1980: 129) and his Rice Plain States three-tiered Marketing Model (1985: 16) designed for early Java. The latter, as noted by Grave (1995: 12), corresponds to Smith’s (1976: 316-319) solar central place regional model (Appendix 15).

23 Some have not been identified (Michael Vickery 2006, pers. comm.).

24There is however no epigraphic evidence that local road construction and irrigation were subsidised by the centre, as was sometimes the case in India, and some inscriptions, such as K. 235B/ 1052 and K. 254B/ 1126, support the idea that secondary roads were financed locally.

responsible for some of the construction and the majority of inscriptions. This period is most discernible in the reign of Sūryavarman I (1002-1050) (Vickery 1985: 228).

Angkorian period inscriptions often describe how members of the elite, having received the sanction of the ruling king, constructed religious foundations provided with lands, livestock, trees, personnel, etc. The temple supported construction and rituals, and thus ‘reinforced the role of the elite as patrons of the temple deity and the source of prosperity in the eyes of the local inhabitants’ (Hall 1985: 137). Endowment of temples was an important means whereby rulers too could enhance their legitimacy and integrate the society through a temple hierarchy.25 Temples also acted as centres for the redistribution of ‘symbolic capital’, since non-material religious merit could be accrued by making donations and offerings to temples (ibid., 160). In other words, the different strands of society were integrated through ‘limiting and disguising the play of economic interests and calculations’ (Bourdieu 1977: 172 n. cited by Hall 1985: 138).

In addition to helping to integrate the state, the private religious foundations benefited the founders and their families. Land, albeit sometimes in outlying areas, was given to them by the rulers as ‘reward’ or ‘payment’. Rulers often provided the workforce, by ‘giving’ over whole villages and livestock for the establishment of the foundation. An incentive to establish a foundation, one available to religious institutions in many parts of the world, past and present, was exemption from taxes, corvée and other impositions (Sedov 1967: 169; Sahai 1977b:

133-4; 1978: 122).

For a state to function, it must control a supply of resources to provide: food or payments for the army, bureaucrats and corvée labourers; reserves; and valuables for trading and rewards.

These are obtained through direct extraction, tribute or taxation. According to Sedov (1967:

201-2; 1978: 122), some commodities were produced for the state by specialised industries managed by the religious foundations. Hall suggests that the state was supported by the small quantities of provisions passing up through the temple hierarchy, and that in fact the state could acquire revenue without needing a complex bureaucracy (Hall 1985: 137; 156).

However, following the earlier work of Sedov (1967: 191-192), Hall (1985: 164) also stresses that these were insufficient to serve as tax.

We do not know how the village communities assigned to work for religious foundations were taxed, or even what proportion of those working for the temples resided with their families in

25This practice is not unusual.In Vijayanagara,according to Stein (1984b: 177), since the administrative organisation of the state (other than for military organisation) was loosely integrated, allocations to temples were important ways state resources could be transferred for economic purposes.

villages.26 The officials who collected taxes and otherwise imposed on the population seem to have been both state and local appointees, though Sahai (1977b) does not draw the distinction, and other writers simply refer to the very many officials of the bureaucracy. This may compare with Pagan, Java and some medieval Indian states, where tax systems were, in the main, decentralised (e.g. Wisseman 1977: 199; Hall 1980: 57; Wisseman Christie 1983:

18-19; Aung Thwin 1985: 108-10; Morrison and Sinopoli 1992: 343; 1998: 364; 366; Sinopoli 2003: 4-5).

Hall’s Temple Hierarchy model, depicting temples acting as centres of religious and economic management, has not been discussed critically. Nevertheless, it offers insights into aspects of the Khmer political economy and has suggested several questions for this study. It highlights issues of state revenue collection and the nature of the administration, in particular the relationship between the centre and the numerous titled officials seen in the inscriptions. Hall focuses on the purported redistributive economy based on the views of Polanyi, but does not consider important aspects of the operation of the system, such as interactions between the centre and the regions, and regional development associated with temples. Evidence on society and ‘state finance’ is derived largely from inscriptions (e.g. Smith 2004: 87), but the Khmer texts are less than explicit on such matters. While this model offers a framework for the political economy, it would need to be elaborated to depict how processes were implemented, how they were integrated and how they varied. The temple hierarchy and its role in tax collection will be investigated in Chapter 8 in an examination of the relationships between the state and the Khmer temples and the association between amalgamated temples and their deities. This will support the idea that a network of temples was a vehicle for the transmission of state ideology and that while the temples likely had little direct involvement in taxation, they had strong links with state and local officials.

2.5 2.5 2.5

2.5 Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion

In the study of empires and large states, processes rather than typologies are important. The control over resources is a key consideration in the nature of interactions within and between empires and large states.

In order to describe a state’s political economy, models need to take account of the interdependencies of political, economic and ideological processes, as well as their temporal and spatial variability. Various models outlined in this chapter — the AMP; Core-periphery and WorldSystems; Loosely Integrated States;Networks; Territorial-Hegemonic; Processual; and Temple Hierarchy — highlight distinctive elements of the societies for which they were

26 Vickery (1998: 310) points out the male/female imbalance in Pre-Angkorian temple lists, suggesting these were not natural communities.

developed, or offer perspectives on particular stages of development. Each model suggests key features for studying the Khmer Empire: two of them have been elaborated specifically for Angkor, the Processual model, highlighting the need to investigate how central power was exercised, and the Temple Hierarchy model, indicating aspects of the production and allocation of resources that should be explored. The communications system of the Khmer Empire is studied in this thesis from the perspective of a Networks model, using nodes and connectors to depict links between sites. The Territorial-Hegemonic model helps to inform analysis of spatial and temporal variability of features to offer insights into the way the state administered its territories. The study evaluates data at a variety of scales — site, inscription and object or human action.

The issues for investigation in the thesis are the interrelated processes important for Angkor’s long duration as an empire. The epigraphy and other data will be investigated to show how the nature of Angkor’s control varied over space and time and how wealth was accumulated and distributed. A number of issues for Angkor which have emerged from the discussion in this chapter are:

• the role of the communications network for control and acquisition of resources, including foreign trade;

• spatial and temporal variations in the degree of administrative control from the centre;

• strategies for maintaining the support of provincial elites;

• the power relations between rulers and other elites;

• the role of redistribution of resources in the economy;

• the degree of economic control by the centre;

• the means of acquiring wealth from imperial territories;

• the establishment of state sponsored production;

• Angkor’s participation in a world trade system;

• the relationships between the state and the temples: their respective roles in the economy and in implementing state ideology;

• the evidence for and function of a hierarchy of temples linking royal temples with those in regional areas;

• stages of development of the Khmer Empire;

• the long-term consequences of the strategies for exercising power.

Many of these issues concern the interactive factors which helped to sustain the Angkorian Empire. Further issues are raised by the discussion of Angkor’s resources in Chapter 3 and its material economy in Chapter 4. Following the analyses in Chapters 6 to 8, the results of the study are synthesised in Chapter 9 and five categories of interrelated processes and strategies are derived. These do not necessarily correspond with those of other empires, nor, as has been pointed out, are they necessarily its most important, since this study relies on

available sources of data. They are considered to have helped provide Angkor with the resilience to maintain its integrity in the face of changing circumstances — as indicated by concurrent political cycles of dominant royal and of non-royal expressions of power, and of territorial gain, consolidation and loss.

The form of Angkor’s political economy was significantly shaped by the varying capacity of its elites to manage its underpinning resources — be they physical, biological, infrastructural or social. An understanding of such assets is important for appreciating how they contributed to the sustainability of the Khmer Empire.

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