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The Institute for College Access & Success. College InSight, http://college-insight.org. Student debt and undergraduate financial aid data are licensed from Peterson's Undergraduate Financial Aid and Undergraduate Databases, © 2013 Peterson's, a Nelnet company, all rights reserved. United States. Department of Education. Student Loans Overview. Fiscal Year 2014 Budget
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Guarantee Loans Policy Announcement Policy Effective Date
Figure I.1. Dollar-Weighted Fraction of New Federal Student Loans Originated through the Guarantee Program each Academic Year. Spring-semester years are displayed on the x-axis. E.g. 2002 represents the 2001-02 academic year.
Guarantee
Only DirectOnly Switch
Unique Schools 267 1,068 3,239
School-x-Year Observations 1,610 8,407 36,087
Avg Annual Loan Recipients 1,005 3,537 2,912
Average Annual Default Rate 9.0 7.2 6.9
Avg Freshman Loan Amount 4,786 4,663 4,725
Pct Years Direct Only 0.00 0.95 0.14
Pct Years Guarantee Only 0.95 0.00 0.82
Pct Years Mixed Programs 0.03 0.06 0.05
Four-Year Public Schools 0.02 0.24 0.14
Four-Year Private Schools 0.12 0.15 0.33
Four-Year For-Profit Schools 0.04 0.03 0.05
Two-Year Public Schools 0.22 0.10 0.22
Two-Year For-Profit Schools 0.26 0.15 0.12
One-Year For-Profit Schools 0.21 0.31 0.10
Other Sector 0.13 0.02 0.06 Undergrad Enrollment 1,825 5,401 4,950 Pct Female 0.64 0.69 0.63 Pct Asian 0.04 0.04 0.04 Pct Black 0.21 0.18 0.14 Pct Hispanic 0.12 0.12 0.09 Pct Independent 0.64 0.45 0.44
Table I.1. Characteristics of Schools by Program Participation: 2000-2011.
Notes: Schools are assigned to the Direct or Guarantee program if at least 90% of loans within a year are
disbursed through that program. A school is defined as a Switch school if it is assigned as a participant in each program for at least one year during the period. Guarantee Only schools must not have offered federal loans in 2011. Five schools (not shown) have one observation only and have mixed program participation.
Less-than-Four-Year
Schools Four-Year Schools
Sector * Year + School Fixed Effects -1.459*** -0.668**
(0.401) (0.322)
+ Time-Varying School Characteristics -1.065*** -0.220
(0.392) (0.297)
Average Default Rate: 2003-2011 9.1 4.5
Observations 18,639 16,826
R-Squared 0.679 0.835
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate regression estimating equation (1) on 2-year cohort default rates.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level and displayed in parentheses. Average default rate displayed is among Guarantee program schools. R-squared and observations are from second
specification. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.2. Estimated Impact of School Participation in the Direct Loan Program on Cohort Default Rates for Repayment Cohorts 2003-2011.
Fraction Loans in Default or Forbearance Default Share of Loans in Default or Forbearance Four-Year Public Schools 19% 25% Four-Year Private Schools 13% 27% Four-Year For-Profit Schools 25% 44%
Two-Year Public Schools 32% 44%
Two-Year For-Profit Schools 34% 66% One-Year For-Profit Schools 40% 58%
Notes: Student Loan program participation based on originating source for loans in 2003-
04 only. Fraction loans in default or forbearance is a share of loans ever reaching repayment, including paid in full, deferment or forbearance, and default. The numerator includes those in deferment, forbearance, and default.
Table I.3. Federal Student Loan Repayment Status in 2009 among Borrowers with Guarantee Program Loans.
Below Median
Default Rate Above Median Default Rate Less-than-Four-Year Public Schools Coefficient -0.347 0.206
Standard Error (0.771) (0.777) Unique Schools 423 394 Mean Borrowers 706 658 Mean Default Rate 8.1 11.3 Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -0.270 -3.026***
Standard Error (0.608) (0.842) Unique Schools 830 712 Mean Borrowers 331 432 Mean Default Rate 7.0 11.9
Table I.4. Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Baseline Default Rates.
Notes: Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted over the sample period within group. Each specification
is estimated separately by sector. Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their earliest default rate in the sample. Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of lag terms. Sectors displayed have at least 200 unique schools in the sample. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Below Median
Default Rate Above Median Default Rate
Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -3.303** 0.294
Standard Error (1.407) (0.953)
Unique Schools 358 358
Mean Borrowers 111 682
Mean Default Rate 11.2 12.3
Table I.5. Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Average Undergraduate Enrollment Size among High Default Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools.
Notes: Each specification is estimated separately by sector. Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% by average enrollment over
the period. Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of the lag terms. The sample includes for-profit schools in the top 50% baseline default rate only. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and displayed in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Low 50%
Default Rate Default RateHigh 50% Less-than-Four-Year Public Schools Coefficient -1.114 0.839
Standard Error (1.044) (1.218) Unique Schools 423 394 Mean Borrowers 706 658 Mean Default Rate 14.4 18.6 Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -1.272 -5.562***
Standard Error (0.970) (1.376) Unique Schools 830 712 Mean Borrowers 331 432 Mean Default Rate 16.4 23.7
Table I.6. Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation on Three-Year Cohort Default Rates by Baseline Default Rates.
Notes: Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted means over the sample period within group. Each
specification is estimated separately by sector. Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their earliest default rate in the sample. Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of the coefficients on the lag terms. Sectors displayed have at least 200 unique schools in the sample. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Low 50%
Enrollment EnrollmentHigh 50% Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -5.303** -2.509
Standard Error (2.572) (1.661) Unique Schools 332 331 Mean Borrowers 117 730 Mean Default Rate 20.8 25.4
Table I.7. Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation on Three-Year Cohort Default Rates among High-Default Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools.
Notes: Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted means from 2005-2011 within each group. Each
specification is estimated separately by sector. Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their earliest default rate in the sample. Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of the coefficients on the lag terms. Sectors displayed have at least 200 unique schools in the sample. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Outcome Mean
Has Only Direct Loans -0.080 -0.126** -0.095* -0.077 -0.062 0.27
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.211***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053)
Has Only Direct Loans 0.092** 0.087** 0.084** 0.111** 0.098** 0.11
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.151*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.107*** 0.101**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 2488 2488 2488 2385 2385
R-squared 0.487 0.516 0.570 0.575 0.589
School + Cohort Fixed Effects X X X X X
+Loan-specific variables X X X X
+Student Characteristics X X X
+Institution Characteristics X X
+Educational Experience X
Outcome is Any Loans in Default
Outcome is Any Loans in Forbearance
Notes: Coefficients were estimated separately for each of the two outcomes. Each observation uses the survey weight associated with being observed in
both the initial interview and final follow-up period. R-squared estimates are for Default specifications. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Outcome mean represents fraction in default or forbearance among Guarantee loan borrowers.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.8. Linear Probability Model Separately Predicting Default and Forbearance. Stacked 1996 and 2004 BPS Surveys. Less-than-Four-Year Institutions Only.
Table I.9. Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Sector.
Any Default ForbearanceAny Any Default ForbearanceAny
Has Only Direct Loans 0.066 0.076 -0.201* 0.095
(0.075) (0.067) (0.104) (0.076)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.199** 0.035 0.246*** 0.148***
(0.083) (0.074) (0.078) (0.057)
Observations 899 899 1221 1221
R-squared 0.788 0.680 0.529 0.438
Less-than-Four-Year
Public Schools Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools
Notes: Each observation uses the survey weight associated with being observed in both the initial interview and final
follow-up period. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
CHAPTER II
Estimating the Causal Impact of the CARD Act on Credit Card Ownership among Young Borrowers