The existing body of literature on migrant smuggling, which emerged in earnest in the mid-1990s, has variously conceptualised migrant smuggling as part of the illicit migration sector, as economic and social processes in response to increased migration control, and an altruistic service underpinned by human rights and protection needs. Salt and Stein’s seminal work on migrant smuggling in 1997 involved the depiction of smuggling as one aspect of the illicit side of international migration business. Smuggling is conceptualised as a profit-driven activity within a broader business system, whereby the smugglers’ main motivation is profit and the common point of intersection with migrants is financial (Salt and Stein 1997). Salt and Stein’s model heavily favours the depiction of smugglers who are involved in delivering a service through the “exploit[ation of] legal as well as illegal methods and channels of entry” (Salt and Stein 1997, 484). Smugglers are described as ‘helping’, ‘servicing’, ‘facilitating’, and ‘providing’, although Salt and Stein note that “little information is available on whether it is more common for migrants to seek out [smugglers] or vice versa” (1997, 479). Financial motives are central to the business model concept proposed by Salt and Stein (1997), and are consistent with the final formulation of the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which was finalised in 2000. This has the effect of excluding those who assist people to gain illegal entry into a country without financially (or materially) benefitting. Indeed, some argue that a broader definition of smuggling incorporating those who operate without personal gain is required to adequately encompass refugee smuggling (Doomernik 2001; van Liempt and Doomernik 2006). Rather than a law enforcement framing or the business model concept, this broader definition would also incorporate the altruistic smuggler who helps people to safety (Salt and Hogarth 2000). The ‘altruistic’ smuggler is a common theme in the literature, especially in so far as it relates to the smuggling of asylum seekers and refugees. There also exists an uneasy tension conceptually when the smuggler acts to profit from forced migrants. As Koser notes (2011; 258):
Helping people escape violence can be considered an invaluable service for which it is justifiable to charge a fee. From another perspective, charging a fee might be viewed as exploiting the situation of a desperate person.
Migrant smuggling research and analysis has, in large part, remained either generic in nature incorporating all modes of transport (Gallagher 2001; Salt & Stein 1997; Tamura 2010; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis 2012) or highly specific examining one mode of transport in a particular corridor/region (Andreas 2001; Antonopoulos & Winterdyk 2006; Gathmann 2008; Icduygu & Toktas 2002; Koser 2008; Smith 1997; Spener 2004). There has been little research into irregular maritime migration as a discrete phenomenon, with some notable exceptions. Monzini, for example, has argued that from a transnational crime perspective maritime smuggling of migrants pivots on two main points: the much lower cost of maritime smuggling services compared with land and air; and the service gap it fills for those with more ‘urgent’ irregular migration needs, particularly those caught up in social or security upheavals (Monzini 2004, 3). Monzini applies Salt and Stein’s analytical model of smuggling as a business, arguing that maritime smuggling is lower in cost thereby enabling people with more ‘urgent’ migration needs to access routes. Monzini refers to ‘clandestine’ and ‘open’ landings— the ‘clandestine’ landings involve migrants entering a country via a maritime border crossing undetected, and ‘open’ landings involve abandonment of vessels in territorial waters (Monzini 2004, 3). Monzini does expand on his comparison with smuggling via air and land routes other than in relation to cost, although we can see that outside of cost and in relation to border management practices, Monzini’s differentiation between clandestine and open landings highlights the particular issues that maritime borders
pose. It is possible (and for air travel, relatively easy), for example, for authorities to refuse entry of a detected irregular migrant who arrives by air or land. Borders along a land-based geography facilitate non-entry and the physical border allows a person refused entry to remain in the initial country—the main issues, therefore, are focused on prevention of undetected land border crossings, such as through the use of physical barriers, which may prove extremely difficult (such as in remote jungle or mountainous terrain).
While Monzini argues that there is a link between the ‘urgency’ of migration and ‘lower cost’ irregular maritime migration, this is at odds with the application of migrant smuggling as a business, as ‘urgent’ services in both licit and illicit sectors necessarily involve increased fees to clients. In contrast, I propose that irregular maritime migration involves to a very significant degree a shift away from ‘clandestine smuggling’ in order to achieve undetected landings and therefore entry to a destination country, and much more to a model of irregular maritime migration that involves more straightforward ‘delivery’ of asylum seekers to authorities of a destination country—smuggling to gain entry, unlike for land and air, is desirable but not crucial. In many irregular maritime migration corridors, interception by authorities rather than evasion is preferred including because it is easier for smugglers and necessary for migrants, lest they perish on remote and hostile coastlines. That migrants are asylum seekers or refugees is an important aspect that has been exploited by smugglers, who have relied on destination countries accepting people prima facie as asylum seekers—abandonment of vessels by smugglers is not only based on the assumption that people will be rescued by authorities but smugglers have sought to emphasise that entry will be permitted (and asylum claims processed). This exploitation of aspects of a complex interaction of various national and international systems has been recognised in the context of rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Gallagher argues that “a state that is willing to do a bit better than others, for example by rescuing migrants in distress at sea, will inevitably incur a disproportionate burden” (Gallagher 2015, not paginated).
The definition of smuggling is particularly relevant to the evolution of irregular maritime migration as a form of ‘illicit delivery’ rather than ‘clandestine smuggling’, particularly as international law and academia discourse turns on entry. For example, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air defines smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Article 3). Equally, migrant smuggling in the academic literature assumes entry to a country. Examples include:
…individuals need to hire a smuggler if they wish to migrate, e.g. the destination country has very restrictive immigration policies so that migrating individuals cannot enter it legitimately. Our analysis is limited in the sense that migrants do not choose between illegal entry by themselves and entry arranged by smugglers. (Tamura 2010, 542)
[smuggling] ought not to be considered simply as a form of illegal migration, for traffickers clearly exploit legal as well as illegal methods and channels of entry…(Salt & Stein 1997, 484)
…the border control strategy implemented since 1993 has raised the cost of illegal entry for a large proportions of migrants. Fees charged by coyotes—the professional people-smugglers who guide migrants across the border…—have doubled, tripled or quadrupled, depending on the entry corridor and the services offered. (Cornelius 2001, 667).
In the case of migrant smuggling by maritime means, however, entry is not necessarily a required outcome, including because of the international obligations on States in relation to rescue at sea. The exact relationships between irregular maritime migration, migrant smuggling and asylum seeking are further limited by a lack of data that accounts for conceptual overlaps. For example, EU’s Frontex reports on the number of people intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea (disaggregated by different corridors or routes) but does not provide information on the number or proportion who were smuggled, nor the number of proportion who sought asylum. Likewise, UNHCR, Eurostat, the US Office of Immigration Statistics and others provide data on the number of asylum applications lodged and/or granted (including in some cases by the claimants’ country of origin, age, and/or sex) but information on the number or proportion of those smuggled, those who arrived irregularly and/or the number or proportion who lodge claims at the border are not provided—these data issues are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
While not wishing to over-generalise, and noting that all forms of irregular movement would involve considerable challenges and difficulties for migrants, the ability to undertake land border crossings (however perilous) is likely to involve a reduced level of organisation and logistical support compared to maritime migration. Firstly, maritime migration usually involves groups of people rather than individuals and so requires at least a basic level of organisation. Secondly, infrastructure in the form of a
sea-worthy vessel is required to make the journey, involving logistics and cost. Land border crossings, on the other hand, can be undertaken by individuals and do not require the same level of infrastructure and organisational support. Smugglers, therefore, are particularly important in many irregular maritime migration corridors (Hugo et al 2014; McAuliffe & Koser 2015; McAuliffe & Laczko 2016; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis 2012). In addition, and as discussed above, a certain level of organisational capability needs to be in place to support irregular maritime migration, and while this may act as a constraint, it may also enable/encourage the expansion of unregulated actors (e.g. organisers, smugglers and corrupt officials). That said, proximity clearly dictates the type of vessel used—small inflatable boats have been commonly used in the short journeys between Turkey and Greece in 2015 whereas large migrant ships transporting hundreds of people have been used for long journeys open sea journeys between, for example, Sri Lanka and Canada as well as between Turkey and Italy (Danai & Triandafyllidou 2016; McAuliffe & Koser 2015; Watson 2009).