7. SIMULACIÒN DEL BANCO HIDROCICLÒN UTILIZANDO
7.9 Trayectoria del fluido
Up to 1989 commentators only provide brief digressions on the issues of
human rights and when they do they often underline the pragmatism and lack of
missionary zeal of the EEC and its member states compared to the US approach.
The EEC and its member states never raised Chinese domestic and political
issues in those years. Little attention seems also to have been paid by European
officials to China’s internal political situation tout court.
As it is noted by Baker, between 1985 and 1989 only four documents relating
to China and human rights can be found among policy statements on European
foreign policy, and these are all questions in the European Parliament on issues
as varied as Taiwan, Tibet, mass execution and the situation of Chinese Catholic
priests. 9 Although a few International Non-Governmental Organisations
monitored the human rights and democratic situation in China, little heed was
paid to their reports.
This reflected the EEC’s lack of any competence in such areas of external
relations and the divisions of its member states. The EEC’s policy in support of
human rights and the rule of law acquired a mature shape only in the early
1990s with their inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, and even more importantly
8
David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 4. 9
in the EC’s development assistance. Similarly, divergences among the member
states on the best way to deal with China, due to their historical legacies and
ongoing concerns, must not be underestimated. For example during the 1980s
the United Kingdom had an outstanding issue with China: the return of Hong
Kong.
Besides the institutional shortcomings and the internal divisions between the
EEC and its member states, another factor cannot be overlooked. Deng’s
economic reforms were viewed positively in the West and overshadowed
problems in the field. 10 Interestingly, against the backdrop of future
developments, the European Parliament was one of the institutions most
supportive of China’s rise and reform. As has been shown, the Cold War
constraints led the EEC to see Beijing as leverage over Moscow, therefore
overlooking any conflictive issue.11
Things apparently changed in 1989. The Tiananmen massacre woke the
international community, the EEC and its member states from their quiet
slumber. Within days, the European Council issued a joint declaration which
condemned the bloodshed and was immediately followed by the adoption of
diplomatic and economic measures.12 Most significant were: (i) raising the issue
of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora; (ii) interruption
by member states of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with
China; (iii) suspension of bilateral ministerial and high level contacts; (iv)
postponement by the EEC and its member states of new cooperation projects.
10
Interview 33. 11
Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese foreign relations: defining and defending national interest, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002, p. 67.
12
The Tiananmen events took place during the French Presidency of the European Community. On 6 June the Twelve meeting in Madrid issued a joint statement condemning the violent repression and suggesting that the continuation of repressive action would greatly prejudice China’s international standing.
The politicisation of the human rights issue on the EEC agenda on China was
not conflict-free. The member states were not all on the same wavelength in
applying sanctions to China because of their different strategic, economic and
ethical interests. The UK’s ongoing discussions with China over the Hong Kong
handover represented a strong motive against the use of harsh sanctions. For
Germany and Italy it was rather the pressure of business lobbies which hindered
the pursuit of a critical stance. As for France the arms embargo was damaging
its arms industry, already badly affected by the end of the Cold War. The
division was also deep between the Nordic member states, which were
traditionally in favour of a strong stance on the promotion of human rights and
the Southern member states, which were more inclined to embrace a softer
approach.
These differences were already present during the negotiations for the Joint
Declaration issued by the Council in 1989 and the sanctions decided against
China. Some analysts and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) pointed
to the document as a mildly-worded statement. Similarly, the sanctions adopted
were criticised for being of a mostly symbolic nature and for not including any
real material cost to the Chinese government.13 Strikingly, considering the
already significant level of EEC-China economic interaction and the leverage
that the EEC possessed at that time, trade sanctions were not imposed. More
specifically trade and investments were not even mentioned among the possible
future sanctions under consideration by the member states.14
13
The document was regarded by many as too timid. In particular Members of the European Parliament pointed out that divisions soon emerged on the sanctions to be adopted within the Council. See Question no. H-153/89 (EFPB document no. 89/204) as quoted in Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, p. 50.
14
In fact, most EEC countries’ trade with China did not suffer any setback and in some cases even grew.
As argued by David Shambaugh “the sanctions were never intended to
inhibit European businesses from continuing their projects or starting new
ones”.15 Although most of the sanctions had been lifted by 1991, with the
notable and thorny exception of the arms embargo, from 1989 the issues
connected to China’s internal political arrangements, such as human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, had entered into the EEC’s debate and more
importantly become a point of concern in the EEC-China relations. However the
next section will ask how this new concern coexisted with the increasing
economic interests of some member states and how the divisions were
composed within the EEC, which was soon to become the EU.