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7. SIMULACIÒN DEL BANCO HIDROCICLÒN UTILIZANDO

7.9 Trayectoria del fluido

Up to 1989 commentators only provide brief digressions on the issues of

human rights and when they do they often underline the pragmatism and lack of

missionary zeal of the EEC and its member states compared to the US approach.

The EEC and its member states never raised Chinese domestic and political

issues in those years. Little attention seems also to have been paid by European

officials to China’s internal political situation tout court.

As it is noted by Baker, between 1985 and 1989 only four documents relating

to China and human rights can be found among policy statements on European

foreign policy, and these are all questions in the European Parliament on issues

as varied as Taiwan, Tibet, mass execution and the situation of Chinese Catholic

priests. 9 Although a few International Non-Governmental Organisations

monitored the human rights and democratic situation in China, little heed was

paid to their reports.

This reflected the EEC’s lack of any competence in such areas of external

relations and the divisions of its member states. The EEC’s policy in support of

human rights and the rule of law acquired a mature shape only in the early

1990s with their inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, and even more importantly

8

David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 4. 9

in the EC’s development assistance. Similarly, divergences among the member

states on the best way to deal with China, due to their historical legacies and

ongoing concerns, must not be underestimated. For example during the 1980s

the United Kingdom had an outstanding issue with China: the return of Hong

Kong.

Besides the institutional shortcomings and the internal divisions between the

EEC and its member states, another factor cannot be overlooked. Deng’s

economic reforms were viewed positively in the West and overshadowed

problems in the field. 10 Interestingly, against the backdrop of future

developments, the European Parliament was one of the institutions most

supportive of China’s rise and reform. As has been shown, the Cold War

constraints led the EEC to see Beijing as leverage over Moscow, therefore

overlooking any conflictive issue.11

Things apparently changed in 1989. The Tiananmen massacre woke the

international community, the EEC and its member states from their quiet

slumber. Within days, the European Council issued a joint declaration which

condemned the bloodshed and was immediately followed by the adoption of

diplomatic and economic measures.12 Most significant were: (i) raising the issue

of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora; (ii) interruption

by member states of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with

China; (iii) suspension of bilateral ministerial and high level contacts; (iv)

postponement by the EEC and its member states of new cooperation projects.

10

Interview 33. 11

Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese foreign relations: defining and defending national interest, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002, p. 67.

12

The Tiananmen events took place during the French Presidency of the European Community. On 6 June the Twelve meeting in Madrid issued a joint statement condemning the violent repression and suggesting that the continuation of repressive action would greatly prejudice China’s international standing.

The politicisation of the human rights issue on the EEC agenda on China was

not conflict-free. The member states were not all on the same wavelength in

applying sanctions to China because of their different strategic, economic and

ethical interests. The UK’s ongoing discussions with China over the Hong Kong

handover represented a strong motive against the use of harsh sanctions. For

Germany and Italy it was rather the pressure of business lobbies which hindered

the pursuit of a critical stance. As for France the arms embargo was damaging

its arms industry, already badly affected by the end of the Cold War. The

division was also deep between the Nordic member states, which were

traditionally in favour of a strong stance on the promotion of human rights and

the Southern member states, which were more inclined to embrace a softer

approach.

These differences were already present during the negotiations for the Joint

Declaration issued by the Council in 1989 and the sanctions decided against

China. Some analysts and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) pointed

to the document as a mildly-worded statement. Similarly, the sanctions adopted

were criticised for being of a mostly symbolic nature and for not including any

real material cost to the Chinese government.13 Strikingly, considering the

already significant level of EEC-China economic interaction and the leverage

that the EEC possessed at that time, trade sanctions were not imposed. More

specifically trade and investments were not even mentioned among the possible

future sanctions under consideration by the member states.14

13

The document was regarded by many as too timid. In particular Members of the European Parliament pointed out that divisions soon emerged on the sanctions to be adopted within the Council. See Question no. H-153/89 (EFPB document no. 89/204) as quoted in Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, p. 50.

14

In fact, most EEC countries’ trade with China did not suffer any setback and in some cases even grew.

As argued by David Shambaugh “the sanctions were never intended to

inhibit European businesses from continuing their projects or starting new

ones”.15 Although most of the sanctions had been lifted by 1991, with the

notable and thorny exception of the arms embargo, from 1989 the issues

connected to China’s internal political arrangements, such as human rights,

democracy and the rule of law, had entered into the EEC’s debate and more

importantly become a point of concern in the EEC-China relations. However the

next section will ask how this new concern coexisted with the increasing

economic interests of some member states and how the divisions were

composed within the EEC, which was soon to become the EU.

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