Although the argument from virtue seems like a plausible argument for why our responses to fictional scenarios could be subject to ethical assessment, it is important to note that the assessment of the responses depends on the self-referential nature of imaginings. That is, if the argument for the intrinsic value of responses to imaginings depends on the assessment of the subject’s character, these responses will need to truly reflect the subject’s character. Some fantasies might be clear candidates for ethical assessment precisely because of their egocentric nature. As I said in the introduction, however, I want to argue that our affective responses to
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fiction cannot be morally evaluated. And so, to argue for the ethical assessment of our responses to fiction, the moralist would need to show that imagining fiction is similar to egocentric fantasies at least in the relevant cases.
The virtue argument only works under the assumption that the imaginings say something about our moral character. So while it could be argued that our egocentric fantasies can be ethically assessed even when they are dissociated from action because they are revealing of our character, it is less clear that the guided imaginative engagement with fiction will be revealing of our character in the same way as fantasies are. According to the virtue argument, the assessment of our responses to fiction would require that the imaginative activity is self- referential. And so, this would mean that the imaginative activity would need to include de se imaginings for it to be subject of a character assessment.
It is contested whether the engagement with fiction necessarily involves de se imaginings. So the easiest way to argue against the claim that responses toward fictional scenarios are subject to ethical assessment is to establish a difference between fantasies, that involve egocentric imaginings, and fictive imaginings49, that do not. Noël Carroll, for example, argues that when
imagining fiction we respond emotionally from the outside. In Carroll’s view, appreciators are not participants in the fictional scenario, but merely observers (Carroll, 2001, 311). Our responses consist in “assimilating our conception of the character’s mental state into our overall response as a sort of onlooker with respect to the situation in which the character finds himself” (Carroll, 2001, 312). Peter Alward also denies that de se imaginings are necessarily involved in our experience of fiction. He argues that appreciators do not need to engage in de se imaginings to respond affectively as the work requires because they respond as one responds when hearing someone’s testimony. Appreciators simply need to take the fiction as the product of a meticulous informant and “use the information gleaned from the informant’s reports as input into his or her affective mechanisms” (Alward, 2006, 456).
If this is right and the imaginative activity does not involve de se imaginings, it is difficult to see how an assessment of the responses can be defended as an affective-practical assessment of appreciators’ characters. What appreciators are doing is attuning to the characters’ affective responses, in Carroll’s view, or attuning to the informants’ responses to the reported events, in Alward’s view. Unlike fantasies, that are spontaneous, our engagement with fiction consists in
49 I borrow the term from Brandon Cooke (2014). Fictive imagining refers to a subcategory of imagining that is
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a guided imaginative project. We do not simply respond as we would respond in an actual scenario, but we respond according to what the fiction asks of us as appreciators. And this involves not just attuning to characters’ responses, but to the prescribed perspective that guides the narration, and to the aesthetic qualities of the work. As such, it cannot be said that the responses are the result of one’s vice or virtue. And so it seems difficult to argue that our responses to fiction can be assessed according to the affective-practical conception of ethical assessment that derives from the virtue argument.
However, even if the imaginative engagement with fiction indeed involved de se imaginings, it is difficult to argue that these de se imaginings are expressive of appreciators’ character. It is important to note that even for those authors who defend de se imaginings as part of the imaginative engagement with fiction, such as Greg Currie, imagining de se does not imply imagining of ourselves as ourselves. That is, not even de se imaginings can ground the self- referential nature of imaginative engagement with fiction required for the virtue argument. According to Currie, the imaginative activity involves de se imaginings because appreciators simulate a hypothetical reader who learns about the events narrated in the work of fiction. The imaginative engagement thus consists in this role-playing in which appreciators form off-line versions of the states (or I states) of this hypothetical reader. These I states are the input necessary for emotional responses (Currie, 1997, 67-68). Imaginings de se are necessary for appreciators to take part in this role-playing; that is, appreciators imagine of themselves that they are this hypothetical reader. But the key thing is that imagining of themselves that they are the hypothetical reader does not imply that they are imagining themselves being the hypothetical reader. Significantly, Currie characterizes de se imaginings as role-playing, and this role-playing “involves a substantial departure from my normal, real-life mental set; I imagine myself not merely reading fact, but to be someone with an outlook different from my own one” (Currie, 1997, 73). Indeed this is how Currie explains what he calls “The problem of personality”, namely the problem that we “like and take the part of people in fiction whom we would not like or take part of in real life” (Currie, 1997, 65). So, even if imaginative engagement with fiction involves imaginings de se, these are imaginings of a fictionalized version of oneself.
If Currie is right, imagining fiction, unlike fantasizing, is not egocentric, as the argument from virtue requires. And so the assessment of the emotional responses to fiction cannot be grounded on an assessment of our character. The distinction between fictional and actual immorality is
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relevant after all. Fictional immorality involves the recognition by the author and audience members of the deviant nature of the prescriptions. If appreciators recognise the deviant nature of the prescriptions it is precisely because they contrast with their real attitudes, with their character. Emotional responses to fictional immorality cannot be legitimately assessed because the responses are not expressive of appreciators’ character. Deviant emotional responses to actual immorality in fiction, on the other hand, would reveal something about appreciators’ character because they would be responding to real immoral views held by real people. In these cases, however, it seems that what is revealing problematic aspects about their character is not the fact that they are responding to fiction, but the fact that they are responding to these real views. And, again, we have to wonder whether this is enough to say that emotional responses to fiction are bad to feel or wrong, as claimed by response moralism. At best, response moralism would be stating the obvious: that engaging with immoral people who hold immoral views reveals the immoral nature of our character.
Of course it could be argued that in some cases some appreciators imagine themselves while engaging with fictional narratives. But in these cases, the engagement with works of fiction should be regarded as an egocentric fantasy instead. Egocentric fantasies are revealing of our actual attitudes. What is important to note is that in these cases, the imaginative engagement with fiction would not be assessed qua engagement with fiction, but rather it would be assessed qua fantasy. Thus, the Aristotelian version of the intrinsic argument for response moralism cannot ground the ethical assessment of our responses to fictional immorality either.
It could still be objected that an argument from virtue for response moralism does not in fact need self-referential imaginings. Presumably getting pleasure from immorality in fiction is expressive of one's character, even when it does not involve self-referential imaginings. However, I want to note that it is important to distinguish between getting pleasure from imaginings that involve immorality, and getting pleasure from imagined immorality. Think again of Lady Vengeance: appreciators take pleasure in a tale of revenge that includes the torturing of the villain, but the torture scenes are still intended to them appreciators shriek. The perspective emphasizes the families’ pain from losing their children so that appreciators overlook Mr. Baek’s suffering. Getting pleasure from imagined immorality involves a perverse pleasure in imagined immorality because appreciators derive pleasure directly from immorality. Getting pleasure from imaginings that involve immorality does not involve a perverse pleasure because appreciators derive pleasure from the imaginative activity as a whole, which happens to include immorality. In the case of fictional immorality, appreciators
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get pleasure from imaginings that involve immorality, and not from imagined immorality itself. Appreciators get second order pleasure from the displeasure generated by the imagined immorality, which is why I have emphasised that appreciators acknowledge the deviant character of fictional immorality when engaging with the fictional narratives. This is not expressive of a vicious character precisely inasmuch as participants acknowledge (and are disturbed by) the immoral character of the imagined scenario. But they enjoy the narrative engagement because it is dissociated from moral concerns.
If appreciators did not experience first order displeasure from the counter-moral nature of the perspective, it would be because the attitudes prescribed by the deviant fictional perspective actually fit their own attitudes. In this case the responses would be expressive of their character even if the imaginative activity did not involve self-referential imaginings. But if this was the case, the assessment of the responses would not be an assessment of responses to fiction, but an assessment of appreciators’ actual immoral perspective that was revealed through their engagement with fiction. Again, at best, response moralism only states the obvious: that when our responses during the imaginative engagement with fiction reveal our immoral attitudes, these attitudes are subject to ethical assessment. But there is a difference between assessing actual attitudes, and the corresponding emotional responses, that are revealed and expressed during the imaginative engagement with fiction, and assessing fictional attitudes and emotional responses toward counter-moral fictional scenarios.
What does this mean for response moralism? The responses during our engagement with fiction are not directed at real entities or real events. Deviant responses to fiction do not express anything about our moral character. The imaginative engagement with fiction is in this sense dissociated from reality. And if this is the case, it seems mistaken to turn to extra-fictional criteria to assess them. Rather, it seems like the only valid evaluative criterion of affective responses to fiction is whether they fit the perspective presented by the work, as I defended on the chapter on emotional realism and the discontinuity thesis.