Introduction
Ibn Taymiyyah implements a critical method in the course of his discussion on Åanbalj jurisprudence and its general principles. He scrutinises the various contributions of the different Åanbalj scholars in these two fields and establishes that there are several opinions held by these scholars which are founded upon weak or incorrect evidence.1This will be elaborated upon in due course.
Even the founder of the Åanbalj School, Imam Aåmad, is subjected to this form of critical study.2 Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of the Imam is, however, considerably less than his criticism of the Åanbalj scholars who succeeded him.
In addition, Ibn Taymiyyah tends to find excuses for the Imam, vindicating him for his incorrect opinions. For instance, he would argue that Aåmad was unaware of certain disagreements that existed among scholars because the root of the disagreement was not known at the time of the companions and only became known during the Imam’s time.3 Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that if one opinion of Aåmad regarding a particular issue was weak, one would usually find another opinion in his jurisprudence which was in conformity with the correct one.4
Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of some of the Åanbalj scholars who succeeded the Imam covers various issues of jurisprudence and general principles within the Åanbalj School. The first Åanbalj scholar after the Imam to be criticised by Ibn Taymiyyah was the eminent scholar al-Khallhl (d. 311/923). Ibn Taymiyyah states that al-Khallhl failed to mention in his book al-Jhmi‘ a considerable number of Aåmad’s Mash’il.5Al-Khiraqj (d. 334/945) also received criticism from Ibn Taymiyyah on a number of issues;6 Ibn Taymiyyah held him responsible for several incorrect rulings within the Åanbalj School of law that, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, were subsequently attributed to Imam Aåmad.7
Abu Ya‘la (d. 458/1066), who was the leader of the Åanbalj School in his time, is the individual whose opinions were studied and discussed by Ibn Taymiyyah at the greatest length. On several points, Ibn Taymiyyah formed the conclusion that Abu Ya‘la’s opinions were either weak, incorrect, in need of re-examination, not comprehensive or simply not good.8 In certain instances, Ibn Taymiyyah
demonstrates how Abu Ya‘la issued contradictory opinions on a single issue.9 Occasionally, however, he would extrapolate from Abu Ya‘la’s views,10 and on other occasions he even voiced his appreciation of them.11
Ibn Taymiyyah is also recorded to have commented upon other Åanbalj scholars, such as Abu ’l-Khaƒƒhb,12 Ibn ‘Aqjl13 and Ibn Qudhmah.14 He even commented, on occasions, on some of the opinions of his grandfather, al-Majd,15 and others.16
Ibn Taymiyyah’s critical study of the Åanbalj School of law, its jurisprudence, general principles and scholars exerted a significance influence on the School.
This may be demonstrated clearly by considering the clarifications and correc-tions made by Ibn Taymiyyah to various issues covered within the School. In some of these matters, Ibn Taymiyyah clarifies that the predominant opinion of the School is in reality contrary to the words of Aåmad. In others, he illustrates the existence of contradictory opinions in the words of the Åanbalj scholars. This chapter will demonstrate this point. We will explain in detail, the role of Ibn Taymiyyah in the correction and clarification of various important issues related to the principles of the Åanbalj School of law.
It was concluded in Chapter 2 that Ibn Taymiyyah concurs with Aåmad on the general principles of law. Nevertheless, it can be shown that Ibn Taymiyyah played a strong role in developing the ruling principles of the Åanbalj School of law through various means. This was partly achieved through his clarification and correction of several important points related to the principles of the School.
These corrections and clarifications were aimed at other Åanbalj scholars and not targeted at Ibn Åanbal’s own words. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah often asserts that his opinions and views on these issues better reflected the real position of Aåmad. In making these corrections, therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah demonstrated his respect for Ibn Åanbal’s principles and sought to bring the School back in line with them.
The following section illustrates some important corrections Ibn Taymiyyah sought to make to the principles of the Åanbalj School.
IbnÅanbal and consensus (ijma‘) as a source of law
Jurists have made various attempts to define the term ijmh‘. Amongst the definitions available, we shall use the one offered by the leading scholar of ußul al-fiqh, al-Hmidj: ‘The agreement of all recognised and qualified scholars who belong to the community of Muhammad (peace be upon him), in a certain period of time, on a ruling about a certain incident.’17
It appears that an accurate definition for this source of law ought to contain five important constituents:
1 unanimity
2 amongst the Muslim scholars
3 in any particular age
4 after the death of the Prophet
5 on a matter which can be included under independent reasoning.18
Various narrations emanating from Ibn Åanbal indicate his denial of consensus as a source of law. He states in several narrations that whosoever claims there is consensus amongst the scholars on any issue is lying, because some scholars may differ without his being aware of that. In another narration, Ibn Åanbal is reported to have said that the most that can be said is that there is no known disagreement amongst the scholars concerning a particular issue.19Nevertheless, Ibn Åanbal himself made reference to consensus on various occasions.20 This apparent contradiction has caused uncertainty over Ibn Åanbal’s actual position on consensus.
Scholars affiliated to the Åanbalj School do not deny the validity of consensus.
Some of these individuals offer no explanation for contradiction present in the narrations from Aåmad.21 Others, however, have offered some interpretations.
Abu Ya‘la in al-‘Uddah offers two possible explanations for Ibn Åanbal’s apparently anti-consensus statements. First, when Aåmad uttered these statements, he did so upon the platform of piety. This means that he preferred not to deliver a judgement concerning consensus because of his concern that he might commit a mistake. Therefore, he did not deny the authority of the consensus in real terms. Second, when Ibn Åanbal asserted that whosoever claims that there is a consensus on an issue is lying, he referred to those people who do not command an extensive knowledge of the disagreements and differing opinions amongst the scholars. This denotes that Ibn Åanbal did not reject the claims of consensus offered by those who command a wide knowledge of the differing opinions of the scholars.22
These two explanations were also affirmed by the Åanbalj scholar Abu
’l-Khaƒƒhb, Abu Ya‘la’s disciple.23
Ibn Taymiyyah, however, offers a different explanation. He says that consensus is of two types:
1 An explicit consensus 2 A tacit consensus.
The first type of consensus denotes an agreement amongst the scholars transmitted explicitly via a mutawhtir chain of narrators, or by an action. The second type of consensus is similar to the first; it contains no confirmation of the absence of any opponents,24 but only a statement of the narrator that no disagreement has become known to him.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, it was Aåmad’s view that the first type of consensus was not valid after the period of the companions had elapsed, or after them and their followers, or these two generations and the third generation of Islam.25 This means that Aåmad restricted the acceptance of this type of
consensus to these three generations at most and rejected the possibility of its existence thereafter. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Aåmad formed this opinion because it is very unlikely that the non-existence of opponents could be irrefutably proven in a ruling issued after the time of the first three generations of Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah explains that he arrived at this conclusion after he had thoroughly investigated the use of explicit consensus by Aåmad.26
Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that Ibn Åanbal did not employ this type of consensus as a source of law, except where such consensus was attributed to the afore-mentioned generations.27
Although Ibn Taymiyyah does not clarify Aåmad’s position concerning the second type, he asserts that it is a proof whose establishment is not restricted to a specific period of time. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this form of consensus does not lead to certainty but only to probability, which means that it can be set aside in favour of a stronger proof.28
The use of ∂a‘jf and mursal åadjth by Ibn Åanbal
The use of weak åadjth
It has been mentioned by several scholars that Aåmad employed weak åadjth as a source of law. Amongst these scholars are Abu Ya‘la in his treatise al-‘Uddah, Abu ’l-Khaƒƒhb in his book al-Tamhjd, Ibn al-Jawzj in his book al-Manhqib and Ibn Qayyim in al-I‘lhm.29
SomeÅanbalj scholars have attempted to explain the nature of the weak åadjth which were implemented by Aåmad as a source of law. For instance, Abu Ya‘la states that the weak åadjth used by Aåmad are deemed weak according to the classification of åadjth scholars, rather than that of jurists. He explains this statement by saying that åadjth scholars considered the mursal åadjth, al-Tadljs and the transmission of additional information not given by other narrators as examples of weak åadjth. These types of åadjth are not, however, considered weak according to the method of classification employed by the jurists.30 This assertion is corroborated by his disciple, Abu ’l-Khaƒƒhb, in his book al-Tamhjd.31
Ibn Taymiyyah disagrees with the explanation offered by Abu Ya‘la and Abu
’l-Khaƒƒhb concerning what is intended by weak åadjth as employed by Aåmad as a source in Islamic law. Ibn Taymiyyah’s interpretation of Aåmad’s position concerning this issue is based upon his thorough knowledge of the methodology of the science of åadjth, in addition to his investigation of Aåmad’s employment of weak åadjth in his jurisprudence.
In relation to the methodology of the science of åadjth, Ibn Taymiyyah states that the reference in every science should be sought amongst its people, that is, its specialists.32 Therefore, the reference when determining the authenticity of a åadjth ought to be to scholars learned in the sciences of åadjth and rijhl.33He also asserts that the chains of narrations are of great importance, and whosoever cites
a narration must be conversant with its chain before basing a ruling upon it. If he is not, his citation concerning even an unimportant matter will not be acceptable.
This being the case, how can the citation of a narration on issues pertaining to matters as grave as ußul be accepted without evidence of the status of its chains?34 Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that the term ‘weak åadjth’ mentioned in Ibn Åanbal’s sources of law does not carry the same meaning as that given by later scholars of åadjth. He bases this assertion on the fact that the division of åadjth into three categories, namely, ßaåjå, åasan and ∂a‘jf, only appeared when al-Tirmidhj (d. 279/892) introduced it. Before this period, scholars classified åadjth into only two categories:ßaåjå, and ∂a‘jf. The latter category itself includes two kinds of åadjth:
1 Those åadjth that contain a weakness but whose weakness is not so serious as to render the rulings contained therein invalid.
2 Those åadjth that contain a serious weakness to the extent that the rulings contained therein are invalidated and cannot be implemented in Islamic law.
This second category of weak åadjth is sometimes termed al-whhj (feeble).35 Ibn Taymiyyah goes on to assert that Aåmad would not transmit a tradition from any narrator who was known to lie, but narrated only from those whom he considered to be trustworthy narrators.36
One can conclude from Ibn Taymiyyah’s interpretation that the ‘weak åadjth’
that constituted one of Ibn Åanbal’s sources, was not the åadjth classified as weak in the fully developed science of åadjth from after the time of al-Tirmidhj. Rather, it was classified as weak as opposed to being termed ßaåjå. It includes both åasan åadjth and weak åadjth without fatal defects (al-whhj). Ibn Taymiyyah also provides an explanation for Ibn Åanbal’s oft-quoted statement that he refers weak åadjth to the use of reason. He emphasises that Aåmad was referring here only to those åadjth classified as åasan, and not to åadjth which contained a serious weakness.37
The position of Ibn Taymiyyah in relation to the implementation of weak åadjth by Aåmad in Islamic law was adopted by several later Åanbalj scholars, such as Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Badrhn and al-Turkj.38
Ibn Taymiyyah also deals with the treatment of those weak traditions cited by IbnÅanbal, particularly in what is known as fa∂h’l al-a‘mhl (virtuous actions).39
Ibn Taymiyyah states that no matter can be claimed to be meritorious or acceptable in Islamic law without a shar‘j evidence. Therefore, it is not acceptable to approve of an action founded upon a weak åadjth. Despite this, Ibn Taymiyyah defends Aåmad’s employment of weak åadjth in the field of ‘virtuous actions’, claiming that Aåmad would cite only those åadjth when the general ruling itself was based upon an acceptable åadjth. The weak åadjth were cited only by reason of the additional information they supplied, such as the reward for a particular action. This is acceptable, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, provided that the scholar does not know that the åadjth is in fact fabricated.40
Having set out Ibn Taymiyyah’s investigation for Aåmad’s use of weak åadjth, it should be noted that the word åasan was in fact used by a group of former
scholars in the field of åadjth, such as Ibn al-Madjnj, al-Bukhhrj (d. 256/870) and even Aåmad himself. Does this, then, invalidate Ibn Taymiyyah’s claim that the term åasan was first introduced to the science of åadjth by al-Tirmidhj? This point has been studied by al-Madkhalj, who, after considerable investigation, arrived at the following conclusion: the scholars who employed the term åasan before the era of al-Tirmidhj did not intend by its use what later became the alternative terminological meaning of this word. Rather, they intended various meanings which differed from one scholar to the next.41Thus, the earlier usage of the word does not invalidate Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument.
The use of mursal åadjth by Ibn Åanbal
As mentioned previously, weak and mursal åadjth constituted the fourth category of IbnÅanbal’s sources of law.42Ibn Taymiyyah notes that scholars have differed con-cerning whether a mursal åadjth is acceptable as a proof or not. He believes that the correct opinion is that such åadjth can be accepted, rejected or set aside, depending on the type of mursal in question. The mursal åadjth that is acceptable as a proof in Islamic law is one reported by a narrator who is known for his narration of mursal åadjth from trustworthy narrators. The type of mursal åadjth that is rejected as a proof in Islamic law is the åadjth reported by a narrator who is known to contradict the narrations of trustworthy narrators. Judgement on the acceptability of a mursal åadjth from a narrator who occasionally narrates his mursal åadjth from trustworthy narrators and at other times from untrustworthy narrators is suspended.43 Also, when mursal åadjth are narrated through so many chains that it cannot be supposed that any forgery has taken place, they are to be taken as authentic.44
Ibn Taymiyyah clarifies another important point related to the mursal åadjth. He states that some Åanbalj scholars, such as Abu Ya‘la, Abu ’l-Khaƒƒhb and Ibn
‘Aqjl, claim that there is no difference between the mursal of the earlier genera-tions (the companions, their followers and their followers in turn) and subsequent generations, in their validity as a proof. Abu Ya‘la states that this is the implicit meaning of Ibn Åanbal’s words because he does not differentiate between the mursal of one generation and another.45
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the acceptance of the mursal from all generations is not the true opinion of Ibn Åanbal. Ibn Taymiyyah supports his assertion by stating that IbnÅanbal was known not to accept the mursal of his contemporaries and that he would always request the isnhd (‘chain’) from them. Ibn Taymiyyah further supports his view by saying that he had traced the mursal used by Ibn Åanbal as a source of law and found that he did not use any mursal from after the first three generations.46
The existence of metaphor within the Arabic language
There exists a strong link between the Arabic language and the science of ußul al-fiqh, for this language is the means by which the texts of the Lawgiver can be
understood and comprehended. Accordingly, agreement on the nature of the language has an important impact upon ußul al-fiqh and will have implications for jurists’ understanding of the texts of the sharj‘ah. Amongst the linguistic issues that have the most significant bearing upon ußul al-fiqh is the question of whether metaphor exists in Arabic. The scholars who have authored works on this subject claim that the Arabic language is divided into two parts: literal and metaphori-cal.47 The greater portion of Åanbalj scholars were of this view,48 which they support with certain proofs.49Indeed, it is said that the majority of scholars of ußul are of this opinion. Ibn Taymiyyah, however, insists that this is an inaccurate opinion and asserts that metaphor does not exist in Arabic. He studies and discusses this issue from two perspectives:
1 What is meant by the expression ‘the majority of scholars,’ and who is claimed to subscribe to the opinion that there is a division in the language?
2 What evidence is there that the Arabic language is divided into two parts, literal and metaphorical?
Who is included in the expression
‘the majority of scholars’?
In discussing the identity of ‘the majority of scholars,’ to whom this opinion was attributed, Ibn Taymiyyah considers that the scholars of ußul may have meant
● Those individuals acquainted with the science of ußul al-fiqh from both the predecessors (salaf ) and later generations (khalaf ). Ibn Taymiyyah attests that this particular science was known in the earliest generations, long before al-Shhfi‘j set it down in writing.50
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that if this is what is intended by ‘the majority of the scholars’ it is not correct to claim that the majority believe that metaphor exists in the language, but he seeks to show most of them do not subscribe to this opinion.51
● Those individuals who are aware of the sources of law in general, are able to differentiate between the shar‘j proofs and other types of evidence (e.g.
● Those individuals who are aware of the sources of law in general, are able to differentiate between the shar‘j proofs and other types of evidence (e.g.