CAPÍTULO I: MARCO TEÓRICO
1.2. Bases teóricas
1.2.5. Turismo educativo
Attitudes towards out-groups and their members are not motivated by economic or material self-interest only and may be driven by a desire to protect the social welfare and certain defined cultural symbols of the in-group (McLaren, 2003: 916). Perceived threats to group national identity and culture are intrinsically of a collective nature. Prejudice stemming from symbolic factors is a form of resistance to change to the status quo, guided by “moral feelings” that out-groups are responsible for undermining traditional in-group values (Kinder and Sears in McLaren, 2003: 916). As previously discussed in Chapter Three, perceived threats to “Dutch” values from Islam in particular may for example stem from the incongruity of an overt and externalised religious presence in secular Dutch society; the threat of a “patriarchal culture” to the principle of gender equality; or from the clash between a “cohesive”, communitarian group identity and the highly-valued spirit of individualism in the Netherlands. Therefore, though stereotypical and misinformed perceptions of “otherness” and difference contribute towards tension between a Dutch majority and Muslim minority, there are nevertheless fundamental and very real points of division around particular values (Sniderman et al., 2004: 47). The extent to which identity concerns and symbolic threats influence issues related to immigrants and immigration is said to be dependent on the “prominence” of group distinctiveness, which promotes perceptions about intrinsic cultural identity differences along the lines of those cherished group values, morals, beliefs and symbols that make up a particular “worldview” (Sniderman et al., 2004: 36, 37; González et al., 2008: 669; Zárate, 2004: 100).
Sniderman et al. (2004: 47) write that culture is essentially a “concentration of shared convictions”: a collective understanding of what is morally right or wrong and what should be protected and prioritised, or outlawed. The perception that an out-group promotes a contrasting worldview to that of the in-group is considered threatening to a supposedly “coherent” dominant cultural identity. The in-group consequently fears the displacement of an “established” and given way of life, prompting negative reactions towards the out-group (González et al., 2008: 669; Zárate et al., 2004: 100; Coenders et al., 2008: 272). Studies have shown the connection between perceptions of threat to in-group values and more hostile attitudes towards immigrant and minority out-groups (González et al., 2008: 669). McLaren‟s (2003) study on 17 European countries, for instance, revealed that perceived threats to national and cultural identity were associated with anti-immigrant attitudes among the in-group. Schneider‟s (2008: 53, 63) cross-national study on 21 European countries revealed that immigrants‟ non-Western background contributed more to
133 average levels of perceived ethnic threat than the economic status and educational levels of immigrants: lack of familiarity and fears about clashing values and culture offered a more plausible explanation for the relationship between size of the out-group and anti-immigrant attitudes, than economic and social competition between groups (Schneider, 2008: 53). Similarly, Sniderman et al. (2004: 43) found that concerns surrounding Dutch national identity and culture had a more significant impact upon ethnic attitudes and behaviour than economic concerns, and immigrants‟ lack of cultural integration was of considerably greater significance than a lack of economic integration with regards to evoking opposition to immigration.
Identity issues are at the heart of many ethnic conflicts and anti-immigrant attitudes globally, and during relatively good economic conditions, concerns about conflicting group identities and values may overshadow economic and material concerns (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). Several studies have revealed that concerns about national identity have increased substantially in the Netherlands since the turn of the millennium, with the majority of public discussion surrounding threats to Dutch identity and culture focussing on Islam in particular, which has come to be identified as a symbol of the challenges associated with ethnic minorities and cultural diversity (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). As mentioned in the previous section, the economic marginalisation of the Muslim minority in the Netherlands and their social deficits vis-à-vis the majority Dutch population suggest that Muslims represent less an economic threat in terms of competing over scare resources such as houses and jobs, and more a symbolic and cultural source of competition. Therefore, there is not so much evidence of economic competition between an ethnic Dutch majority and Muslim minority, as there is evidence of cultural conflict over norms and values and concerns about identity (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 4).
The research of Sniderman et al. (2004: 45, 46) on the Netherlands similarly found support for the hypothesis that cultural conflict is the main factor in inducing negative responses to immigrant minority out-groups. Though economic threats at both the personal and national level were a significant source of hostility towards all immigrant groups, concerns about national identity and perceived threats to Dutch culture were substantially stronger predictors of hostility and exclusionary responses towards minority groups, regardless of whether the group was Muslim or not (Sniderman et al., 2004: 40). The data used for these analyses were however gathered between 1997 and 1998, before September 2001 and the murders of van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn – events which were influential in steering the Dutch immigration and integration debates in a more restrictionist direction, centring greater attention on Islam and Muslims.
134 According to the 2008 TTI survey, the Dutch were the most optimistic about the cultural potential of immigration (72%) to improve Dutch society via exposure to new ideas and customs. Over the course of the first year of the financial crisis however, Dutch perceptions about the positive cultural influence of immigration decreased markedly: 60% of respondents evaluated immigration‟s cultural influence positively in 2009, after which the level of these attitudes remained stable, at 59% in 2010 (TTI Topline data 2010). This finding does suggest, interestingly, that economic conditions may well have an influence on cultural evaluations of out-groups. This trend also largely appears to mirror the aforementioned shift in Dutch sentiments about whether immigration presents more of a problem or opportunity: a strong decrease in positive evaluations from 2008 to 2009, after which the period from 2009 to 2010 does not see a marked shift in attitudes. In 2009, of those considering immigration more of a problem than opportunity (45%), a majority (58%) considered immigration to impact Dutch culture negatively, suggesting that the majority of those with anti-immigration sentiments are motivated by perceptions of cultural threat (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 985). The implication is that the Dutch public‟s perceptions of immigration in general are closely connected to cultural evaluations of this process. Perceptions about the cultural credentials of out-groups are important not only for overall evaluations of immigration, but also for understanding changes in the extent to which immigration is perceived in a positive light, or with greater scepticism. The negligible change in perceptions about the impact of immigration on the Dutch labour market from 2008 to 2010 (in terms of immigrants‟ perceived impact on wages and the employment opportunities of natives), thus lends credence to this possibility that the shift towards greater Dutch scepticism vis-à-vis immigration during the financial crisis is associated more with less favourable cultural evaluations of immigration, than less favourable economic evaluations of immigration.
Whilst this discussion has distinguished between the material and non-material determinants of negative group sentiment, threats to cultural identity and economic self-interest are not mutually exclusive and considerations of material and non-material threats are very much “entangled” (Sniderman et al., 2004: 41). It has been suggested, for instance, that perceptions of threat to the national economy have a “strong symbolic component”, where an essentially economic sense of threat can translate into a threat to national identity (Sniderman et al., 2004: 42). Material and non-material concerns occupy a dynamic place in public discourse and are constantly shifting: whereas a particular period may result in public prioritisation of non-material and symbolic concerns related to national identity and culture, other circumstances may see material and economic concerns hold greater sway over attitudes towards immigrant out-groups and immigration. The relative importance of economic and cultural threats in contributing to negative perceptions is therefore context-dependent. Sniderman et al. (2004: 47) found that when the issue of culture assumes heightened significance, it generates as powerful a response proportionately among those
135 least concerned about a threat to Dutch culture, as it does among those most concerned about this issue. This demonstrates the mobilisation potential of cultural and symbolic concerns in Dutch society generally, even among those for whom the issue is not a perpetual concern. Even in the context of economic recession in the Netherlands, where public prioritisation was indeed accorded to issues pertaining to the national economy, perceptions of immigrant out-groups and immigration appear to be dominated by a cultural logic.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter therefore finds some support for the Realistic Group Conflict Theory hypothesis insofar as perceptions of cultural and non-material threat are concerned. The economic dimensions of this theory however are less relevant to the Netherlands under the circumstances of the global financial crisis: despite the less favourable economic conditions in which attitudinal shifts towards immigration and immigrants were observed, there is not much evidence from the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration studies to suggest that immigrants have been perceived as a greater economic threat to in-group interests. This implies that the considerably more negative sentiments towards immigration witnessed from 2008 to 2009 were not motivated by perceptions of material threat. As questions pertaining to immigration and integration in the Netherlands appear to be evaluated more from a cultural than economic perspective, an association between economic conditions and cultural evaluations of immigration and immigrant out-groups is more likely. The “failure” of Islamic groups to integrate into the Dutch labour market, for instance, is considered a question of cultural difference. From this perspective then, the economic marginalisation of Dutch Muslim reflects unsuccessful cultural integration patterns (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 984). This possible association between less favourable economic conditions and heightened perceptions of cultural threat is deserving of greater exploratory analysis.
136 Chapter 6. Conclusion
6.1 INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the debate surrounding immigration and integration in the Netherlands, especially where this concerns Muslims and Islam, are questions about norms and values. Indeed, Akkerman (2005: 346) comments that “the extent to which the debate about integration and immigration in the Netherlands has been dominated by the Enlightenment framework is remarkable”. This “Enlightenment lens” was already developed in 1991, when Frits Bolkestein, then-leader of the VVD, attacked the political correctness of the Dutch left and warned against the denigration of enlightened Western principles. This framework for approaching integration and immigration topics was employed more dominantly when the LPF took the reins of this discourse (Akkerman, 2005: 346). Research has consistently shown that the Dutch are among the most concerned Europeans about cultural integration issues, and immigrants‟ subscription to national values and norms is prioritised over all other preconditions for citizenship. This chapter offers a discussion of some of the core liberal values espoused and cherished by Dutch society and concludes with a consideration of liberal democratic political culture in the Netherlands in this age of cultural diversity.