Turismo y desarrollo comunitario ,

In the virtue of justice, there is a tension between the notion of striving for justice and the inequalities in the nafses of humans. Although all the atoms of creation are equal in terms of miraculousness, they are unequal in potential, status, and virtue; certain vegetables carry more virtue than others, males of any species are nobler than females, and certain types of humans (men in general, and men of certain climes) have

166_{Ghazali, 302-303.}

167_{Tusi, 120. Davani, 104-105.} 168_{Davani 95.}

more capacity for perfection than others. With respect to the science of thenafs, justice is the best virtue that exercises ultimate compassion for others in the context of real potential for achieving equity. However, it is both subjective to a person and limited by the options that God makes available to individuals, meaning that a person’s place in the hierarchy of humanity, which I describe above, also determines one’s deserts in terms of the justice that the most superior men dole out. Thus, given this tension between ontological equality and nafs-related inequality, the key to understanding the notion of justice is to unpack what it means for justice to be a virtue, a character trait, and not an abstract goal for society in itself.

Amina Wadud problematizes how metaphysical and ontological equality between genders in the Qur’anic texts does not translate into real life equality. She argues that equality in the eyes of God means human beings must strive for equality on earth, es- pecially because of human responsibility to be vicegerents or khalifas.169 _{The ethicists}

viewed concepts of human existence and justice as entirely distinct concepts. For them, human beings are equal in creation because all atoms and matter are equally created by God. Justice is not related to existence, but rather to freedom from burdens, op- pression, and tyranny, as well as individual deserts based on skill and ability.170

While wisdom, courage, and continence are required virtues of an ethical man,

‘adalat is his ultimate virtue because it enables him to achieve happiness and khilafat

(vicegerency of God). In the case of Tusi, all three faculties produce their respective virtues; the composite result of realizing the three virtues is an ethical man who exudes

‘adalat in his dealings.171 _{For Ghazali and Davani,‘adl comes forth naturally from the}

169_{Wadud,Inside the Gender Jihad, 32-35.}

170_{Women lose out in worldly forms of justice in Islamic philosophical ethics, not because they are} not created equal, but rather because of the underlying gendered assumptions that they are less in skill and ability because of their sex, bodies, and nature, which I discuss in detail in Chapter Three.

faculty of rationality. All three ethicists agree that‘adl is an essential means for attain- ing the ultimate goals of thekimiya-i sa‘adat andtadhib-i akhlaq, namely realizing true happiness for the self and facilitating happiness for others as a vicegerent of God and microcosm of the world. The masculine nature of the virtues and their qualities lead up to this ultimate male responsibility of creating the circumstances of ‘adl in the world. In Chapter Four, I discuss how creating justice is not just a male role, but determines ultimate masculinity, which belongs to the ruler of a sovereignty because he carries the power of creating ‘adl on a mass scale. Below, I discuss how each ethicist arrives at justice as an ultimate means to living an ethical life through particular expressions of the male nafs.

It is important to note that Ghazali does not discuss ‘adalat or justice as a corner- stone of his science of the nafs for polemical reasons. As mentioned in Chapter One, the notion of justice as one of the key virtues of philosophical ethics is an extension of Shi‘i and mu‘tazilite theology.172 _{As a Sunni, ash‘ari or determinist school thinker}

who polemicizes against philosophers earlier in his career, Ghazali does not state ‘adl

as a fourth virtue of the soul as Tusi and Davani do (even though the two differ on how the virtue of‘adl actually comes forth from thenafs.) Nonetheless, Ghazali states that equilibrium, justice, and moderation are important in achieving ethical behavior on an individual level.173 _{However, instead of a lengthy discussion of the qualities of ‘adalat,}

which we find in Tusi and Davani, in the Kimiya-i Sa‘adat Ghazali discusses the kind- ness required of an ethical man in terms of is treatment of relatives, children, friends, neighbors, slaves, and strangers.174 _{Ghazali uses terms such as kindness, responsibility,}

love, and mercy, to describe the requisite behavior from a man who is a leader of his

172_{Hourani,Islamic Rationalism, 10.} 173_{Ghazali, Vol. 2, 6-7.}

household and a leader in his community.175 _{These resemble the qualities that make}

up the virtue of ‘adalat in Tusi and Davani’s texts.

In contrast, justice is an important theological issue for Tusi, who was a Shi‘i thinker.

‘Adl is an integral attribute of God, but also an important part of man’s potential legacy and duty as vicegerent. Davani follows Tusi’s approach to tahdhib-i akhlaq and so he retains Tusi’s emphasis on justice, even though his broader theological views are ishraqi sufi.176

Tusi explains the importance of ‘adl as a virtue displayed when a man reaches the ultimate station of having a perfectednafs.177 He states that “wisdom comes from jus- tice and justice comes from wisdom, or (one my say) that what is meant by ‘wisdom’ here is the use of the Practical Intelligence in the proper manner, which is also called ‘practical philosophy.’”178 _{This not only shows that ‘adalat’s relationship to hikmat is}

circular, but that the two virtues support each other in practice and come about with the practice ofakhlaq. A man’s wise acts are the same as just and ethical acts. Further, he states that, “among virtues, none is more perfect that the virtue of justice, as is obvious from the discipline of ethics.”179 A man’s wise acts are the same as just and

ethical acts, and these are closely tied to a man’s ultimate goal of achieving happiness and vicegerency of God.

Tusi explains:

When the human reaches to this level [of perfection], that he becomes fully

175_{Ghazali, 390-433.}

176_{Davani’s sectarian identity is not clear. Some scholars claim he was Shi‘i, while others claim he} was Sunni. John Woods argues that Davani’s political discourse is distinguished by an emphasis on just leadership, as opposed to favoring the “right” sect of Islam, as Ghazali and Tusi argue in some of their works. Woods, 145.

177_{Tusi, 109.} 178_{Tusi, 110.} 179_{Tusi, 131.}

aware of the ranks of the universe, the infinite particular rules are recorded under the general rules [...] and when his practice becomes familiar [to him], such that his sayings and doings are achieved on account of strength and preferred habits, that person becomes a world unto himself, comparable to the‘alam-i kabir [macrocosm], and he deserves the right to be called‘alam-i saghir [microcosm].180

Tusi explicitly explains how the individual is the primary level for ethical knowledge and practice. Becoming ‘alam saghir (microcosm) is akin to internalizing the balance and beauty that God has endowed the world with, to the point that one’s actions are a balanced and ethical world unto themselves. Put another way, it is when a man internalizes the knowledge of the order of the world that enables him to reflect that order. This means he not only accepts the hierarchy of the prevailing cosmology of the world, but actively takes part in maintaining it. It is only then that he is able to fulfill God’s intent for his role in the cosmos:

Thus he becomes the vicegerent of God most high among God’s creations, among God’s pure saints, a complete and absolute human. Complete and absolute is one who has permanence and persistence, is blessed with the benefits of eternal happiness and sustained mercy, and is fit to receive his God’s abundance.181

According to Tusi, the ultimate goal of the ethical training is for the human to better himself and his world, as part of God’s work.

Davani argues that the “intelligent man” will find that his simpler model achieves the virtue of equity more readily than in Tusi’s model.182 _{Davani quotes Ghazali’s}

definition of “al-‘adl” from the Ihya’ Ulum ad-Din in support of his model of the human soul: “Equity is a state of thenafs, its power overtakes ghazb andshahwat and guides them according to wisdom, and orders them when necessary during their exertion

180_{Tusi, 70-71.} 181_{Tusi, 71.} 182_{Davani, 78-79.}

and contraction.”183 _{Again, according to Ghazali equity is an important principle of}

moderation for thekimiya of thenafs; it is not a fourth virtue as in Tusi and Davani’s works. In adding this definition of ‘adl to his discussion of ‘adalat as virtue, Davani holds that the virtue of justice comes from within the balanced intellectual mind, rather than as a composite or resultant virtue.

Like Ghazali and Tusi, Davani explains that the first faculty must overtake the second. He also describes the human being’s responsibility to program his nafs in order to fulfill the purpose for which God created him. In the introduction, which he titles matla‘ (sunrise), as well as the in the last lam‘ah (“flash” of light) of the treatise before the conclusion of the treatise titled maghrib (sunset), Davani discusses humanity’s ultimate goal: “The end of the human, which is the essence of the worlds and the eye of eyes, the selected one of the world, is the vicegerency of God [...] Mankind’s right to the title of vicegerent is because of the perfection of his potential.”184

This vicegerency is completed through the administration of just governance, as I discuss in Chapter Four,185 _{but is also carried out by “the common men” through the}

equitable distribution of money and resources, which are in the hands of men in their capacity as “citizens” and “men of reason and discernment [who] realize that wisdom and justice make up the conditions of aptitude for such rank.”186 Tusi explains this is

because “money is the equalizer of diversities” though it is in the hands of men to dole out.187 _{Thus, when discussing justice or fairness in real life situations on the domestic}

and societal levels, at times Tusi and Davani speak of men enacting justice in monetary

183_{Ghazali quoted in Davani, 78. The quotation is in Arabic. In its footnote on the same page, Arani} notes that there are several words in this quotation that are different across various manuscripts of

Akhalq-i Jalali.

184_{Davani, 57.} 185_{Davani, 223.} 186_{Tusi, 134 and 136.} 187_{Tusi, 135.}

or economic terms.188

Both Tusi and Davani define the virtue of justice as “fairness and equitability.” They agree on its 12 elements: “friendship, affinity, loyalty, compassion, care of kin, requital, good companionship, good judgement, affection, submission, trust, and devotion.”189

These can be divided into two categories, what is within the individual man’s power, and what is beyond it. Gender is not explicit in the text, but still present in that the ethicists could mean to include or exclude women from male-male relations.

Sadaqat (friendship) is the true love for a friend, enough to drive a man to put everything he has toward providing relief for his friend.190 Davani elaborates that in

accordance with a hadith, a man should dislike for his friend what he dislikes for himself and desire for his friend what he desires for himself.191 In other words, treat a friend as

an equal. Ulfat (affinity) is cooperation between two distinct groups who share opinions and beliefs on the regulation of daily life.192 _{Wafa (loyalty) is staying committed to}

charity and aid of others.193 _{Shafaqat (compassion) is the awareness that bad luck}

can befall someone and the willingness to do what one can for that person.194 _Davani

elaborates:

to the masters of clarity and people of perception it is evident and true that all the atoms of the universe are construed with existence from the true Living Unity and all the possible creations sucking milk of discipline from breasts of Divine guidance are equal in spirit and close in station and destination, especially human beings who according to clear commands of

188_{Tusi, 206-207 and 307-308. Davani, 184-185 and 263-266.}

189_{Tusi, 111, 115. Note that Ghazali does not discuss specific qualities of‘adl as discussed above.}

190_{Tusi 115. Davani, 88-89.} 191_{Davani, 89.}

192_{Tusi, 115-116. Davani, 89.} 193_{Tusi 116. Davani, 89.} 194_{Tusi 116. Davani 89.}

the book have a strengthened unifying spiritual affinity [...].195

Divine guidance and discipline are metaphors of the nourishing maternal body. The powers of giving life and sustenance are clearly seen as feminine and, as I discuss in the next chapter, are also the essential aspects of motherhood that afford it respect from the ethicists. The feminine powers of God sustain and give wisdom to all creation, of which every atom is equal. It is by virtue of their ontological equality that human beings treat each other justly. Further, the kinship established by spirituality ensures ontological equality.

Despite this equality, compassion has grades and degrees, depending on what one perceives from others around him. Davani provides an example of a ninth-tenth century sufi, Shaykh Shibli, to explain the line between imagination and reality: “The marks of the stick with which he hit an animal appeared on his body parts.”196 Without arguing

whether this miraculous event occurred in reality, Davani states that, “imagination acts upon natural affairs” like when one’s teeth feel edgy at the thought of eating sourness or like the fear of heights when walking across a high wall as opposed to an equally narrow stretch of land.197 _{In the context of compassion, this means that one’s feeling}

of compassion for others is situational and dependent upon perception; one can feel compassion if one uses one’s mind to perceive another’s hardship.198

Sila-i rahim (care of kin) is allowing one’s family and associates to share in one’s worldly possessions.199 Additionally, Davani defines moral and spiritual kin relations as

195_{Davani, 89.}

196_{Davani, 90. Davani is most likely referring to Shaykh Abu Bakr Shibli (d. 946).} 197_{Davani, 90.}

198_{This ethics of compassion allows one to use one’s imagination and accounts for emotions such} as sympathy in determining how what treats others. I will pick up the idea that ethics accounts for emotions and feelings in the conclusion.

people with whom one has spiritual affinity. The spiritual kin of have greater rights on an individual than family.200 Mukafat (requital) is paying back kindness done to one with more than what was given to one and retaliating an evil with a lesser evil than done to one.201 Husn-i shirkat (good companionship) is being considerate of others’ natural inclinations during transactions and avoiding offending one’s partners. Because of Tusi and Davani’s use of the term transaction, husn-i shirkat refers to one’s work or business relationships, not domestic ones, although one can argue that because the

nikah is a transaction, good companionship with partners also includes one’s wife.202 Husn-i qada (good judgment) is repaying someone without regret or grudge and keeping oneself free from favoritism or blame.203 Finally, tawaddud (affection) is seeking love of virtuous men and peers, those with continence and fair speech.204 Davani adds that

one may bestow kind words, favors, or gifts upon such men.

The remaining three elements of justice account for matters out of the individual’s control, namely when to deploy power of subverting or maintaining the status quo.

Taslim (submission) is happily accepting those actions which are solely taken for the Creator’s pleasure and abiding by the commands of God.205 Tusi includes submitting

to those against whom opposition is not possible, even if it goes against one’s natural inclination.206 This implies that seeking justice is limited by the amount of power one

has against an oppressor. The ethicists teach selflessness but only insofar as one can

200_{Davani, 91.}

201_{Tusi 116. Davani, 91.} 202_{Tusi 116. Davani, 91.} 203_{Tusi 116. Davani, 91.}

204_{Tusi 116. Davani, 91. In Chapter Four, I explore the ways in which this love is homosocial, and} not either sexual nor referring to love between spouses.

205_{Tusi 116. Davani, 91.} 206_{Tusi 116.}

maintain the ability to be good and do good for others. For instance, taking an action, however right, that would result in danger or one’s incarceration would be ill-advised according to this code of ethics.207 Accordingly, they discuss the element of tawakkul

(trust in God) as follows: “In acts that are not entrusted to the power or capacity of the humans and which the opinions and knowledge of creation have no ability to control, do not seek to create benefits or harm or hastening or delay, and do not incline against the way things are.”208 _{Men should surrender to the reality of extant power structures as}

the will of God.209 _{This speaks to the practicality of ethics, while standing for justice.}

The last element of justice, ‘ibadat (devotion or worship), reinforces awareness of God as essential for reaching the ultimate goal of happiness. To be just, one should be devoted to one’s Creator and:

those close to His presence such as angels, prophets, imams, and saints (peace be upon them) and following and obeying them, and submitting to the commands and prohibitions of the people of the law. One should cover and clothe oneself in the things that complete and perfect in meaning the concept oftaqwa [consciousness of God].210

Davani adds that one should be devoted to the Creator regardless of any prior benefits one has received from God’s blessings, which shows a continuous awareness of God is necessary in order to maintain justice.

Finally, Tusi and Davani outline the vices related to false or poor expression of the virtue of justice. Because justice does not come directly from discipline of a particular faculty of the soul (arguably it comes from rationality), Davani explains the results of having too much or too little emphasis on the virtue itself, rather than too much or too little expression of a particular faculty. Tusi defines the opposite of justice as

207_{Tusi, 315.} 208_{Tusi, 114.} 209_{Davani, 91.} 210_{Tusi, 114.}

tyranny. In financial terms, tyranny is “obtaining of the instruments of livelihood in reprehensible ways” and suffering as “enabling the seeker of a livelihood by means of violence and plunder, complying with seizing it without just claim.”211 The impostors

of justice “favor people who are not marked by the path of merit” or squander wealth accumulated through the hard work of predecessors.212

To summarize, justice is a virtue composed of ethical actions: acts of worship, acts