109 An underlying debate is one of differing world views, which has been amply debated under the headline of the ‘weak versus strong’ environmental sustainability spectrum. These world views draw from the
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discussions between neoclassical- and ecological-oriented economists (Costanza et al. 1997; Nelson 1995), between anthropocentrism and bio-centric holism in ethics (B. Becker 1997; Rydin 1999; Connelly 2007), and between prometheans (modernists) and deep greens (survivalists) in Dryzek’s typology of environmental discourses (Dryzek 1997)43. I summarise here the ‘weak versus strong’ sustainability discussion to document and explain the strong position taken by the articles in this thesis.
110 Weak sustainability posits nature as a form of economic capital, and that natural capital can be substituted by other forms of capital, namely man-made capital or human capital (Pearce and Atkinson 1993). Based on the substitutability assumption (including unconstrained elasticities in substitution), sustainability becomes positive (including for future generations) if the sum of all forms of capital increase over time. This implies that, at its more extreme sense, humanity can continue to function without natural resources since such resources will have been put to fruitful use for development, or that technology can in theory be a substitute to nature (Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005). Thus the weak position tends to portray the three
dimensions of sustainability in a compartmentalized manner, as three overlapping dimensions, where sustainability becomes a balancing act between various trade-offs and where performance in one dimension can offset reduced performance in another. For this reason, indicator frameworks that are built around the three dimensions of sustainability and that are based (often implicitly) on the neoclassic weak position typically do not attempt to weight the dimensions (which is the same as giving them equal weight).
111 Pearce & Atkinson designed a national indicator of weak sustainability, showing developed economies such as Japan, Costa Rica and the Netherlands as ‘sustainable economies’, whereas Mali, Madagascar or Ethiopia were ‘unsustainable’ (Pearce and Atkinson 1993). These results support the environmental Kuznets curve theory, whereas past a certain point of economic development, a firm, industry or a country’s environmental footprint decreases as its wealth increases. However the environmental Kuznets curve has been criticised for being applicable only to selected pollutants, at smaller geographical scales and over the short-term only, and otherwise overlooking cross-border transfers of resources use, pollutants, or wastes with long term or global impacts (Max-Neef 1995). In a study of sociological theories, York et al. (2003) conclude that evidence for an environmental Kuznets curve at national level via ecological modernisation is spurious44. These critiques lead us to the strong perspective on sustainability.
112 Environmentalists and the ecological literature deny the possibility of substitutability of natural capital (Daly 1990). The strong sustainability position suggests that some environmental assets simply cannot be
quantitatively valued, and as such, are not substitutable: they should be accounted for separately and in their own right. Proponents such as Daly illustrate the strong position by stating that human-made capital cannot replace ecological systems that are vital to human existence: no amount of fishing boats can compensate for the lack of fish; no amount of saw mills can substitute for diminishing forests; and technical fixes to climate change or biodiversity loss are not likely to be conceivable (Daly 1990; Giddings, Hopwood, and O’Brien 2002; Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005). In practice, it has been argued that both positions in their more extreme forms are absurd: for one, nobody believes in perfect substitutability (except perhaps in neoclassic economic theory). Similarly, nobody believes in keeping natural capital entirely untouched (Dobson 1996).
Connelly (2007) and Hopwood et al. (2005) provide an analysis of discourses and draw a 2-dimensional map
43 All of these positions can be traced back to the two opposing world views of Cartesian ‘man as a master of nature’
and Spinozan ‘man as part of nature’ introduced earlier.
44 This said, a scenario where economic prosperity would continue to increase and would enable humanity to resolve its global environmental challenges would prove the environmental Kuznets curve right in the very long term.
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from weak to strong with consideration for social and environmental aspects on each axis (see Figure 5). In both cases the strong position is said to be eco-centric if environmental protection is prioritised, and anthropocentric if justice and well-being are prioritised.
113 Hopwood et al. (2005) introduce a third variable, whereas higher concerns for environmental or social aspects translate into higher levels of ambition for change, from status quo at the weak end, through reform in its more mainstream discourses, to transformation at the stronger end. Both authors see eco-socialism as the political discourse representative of the strong position with equal consideration between the social and environmental dimension, and deep ecology as a particularly eco-centric discourse. Ecological
modernization and the three pillars of sustainability fall closer to the weaker end, on the border towards reform with a concern for reducing negative environmental and social impacts. In this typology, Brundtland would appear to strike a balance both between the social and environmental axis and between the reform and transform types of change expected to achieve sustainable development.
Figure 5: Mapping sustainability discourses, adapted from Hopwood et al. (2005), Connelly (2007) and Dobson’s typology of environmental discourses (1996).
114 Exploring further the notion of criticality and irreversibility of natural capital, ecological economics distinguish the following four types: renewable resources such as forests or fish from within the biosphere;
non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels and other mined resources from the lithosphere (i.e. extracted from under the Earth’s crust); eco-systems and the services they produce such as biodiversity, the ozone layer or the water cycle; and natural sinks such as land, the air and the oceans. These types of natural capital all operate at different spatial and temporal scales (Holling 2001). Daly proposes sustainability principles for each type of natural capital (Daly 1990; see also Gudmundsson & Höjer 1996; or Moldan et al. 2012 for a more recent discussion). For renewable resources, Daly suggests harvesting rates should not exceed their long-term rates of natural regeneration (what he calls “sustained yields”). For the quasi-sustainable use of non-renewable resources, he states that exploitation “must be paired with a compensating investment in a renewable substitute”, so that by the end of the life of the non-renewable, the renewable will be yielding an equal yearly sustainable income (Daly 1990). For wastes and sinks, he proposes that waste emissions (hazardous or polluting substances) should not exceed the natural assimilative capacities of ecosystems. As for more complex natural capital other than the above (such as ecosystem services), he proposes the overarching irreversibility principle that human throughput be at least within carrying capacity in order to
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maintain ecological integrity. This is in aligned to the approach taken by Brundtland (see under
‘Environment’ in Table 1 earlier).
115 Presenting the economic, social and environmental dimensions as nested is controversial as it runs contrary to the widely accepted model focussed on balancing the three dimensions, and it also reverses the (often implicit) hierarchy given to economic development. The assumption however is consistent with Brundtland for the case of developed countries: it gives a general priority to safeguarding long-term ecological
sustainability and promoting intra- and inter-generational equity over satisfying aspirations for improved standards of living: “In the long term, harmonious economic development can only be guaranteed if, first, the environmental and social priorities of public projects are respected” (Joumard and Nicolas 2010:p136; see also Holden, Linnerud, and Banister 2013). In other words, the nested model makes clear that societies are dependent on the environment for their long-term survival and that, as such, they must operate within the environment’s carrying capacity. In a similar way, the economy (activities and technological development contributing to economic prosperity) in the nested model is seen as a subset of society, and therefore must respect social constraints, which I sum up in Figure 4 as the capacity to meet basic human needs and the fair distribution of benefits and burdens (equity).
116 Because of the priority given to environmental sustainability and integrity by Brundtland, I explore in more detail the dual concepts of environmental limits and precautionary principle in the next section.