“Una gran avenida para una gran capital”

from the C.S.M.A. and A.W.A.. External events gave the deliberations greater urgency. During 1947 the government was forging ahead with its plans for a re-equipment subsidy for the spinning section. One of the conditions for the receipt of a re-equipment grant would be the willingness of the firm and its operatives to introduce modern methods of labour utilization. Weaving employers hoped that a similar investment subsidy would be made available for the purchase of new looms and were anxious to proceed with the establishment of a new wage list.(66)

The Cotton Manufacturing Commission produced an interim report in early 1948. Two crucial assumptions underlay the Commission's recommendations. Firstly, that trade would be sufficiently buoyant to prevent redeployment leading to a net loss of jobs in the industry. Secondly, that automatic looms could not be produced in sufficient numbers to re-equip the industry in the near future.

Some rayon weaving sheds outside the North West area (and therefore not subject to the Uniform Lists) were able to run their Lancashire looms in complements of up to 48 per operative, but the restrictive clauses of the Uniform Lists were holding back all progress in Lancashire: "We have been told that the craft of weaving

in Lancashire is still the same in all important respects as it was half a century ago. It is hardly too

much to say that the Uniform List has seen to that.. . the Uniform Lists must go."(67)

Setting out the principles which must govern the new list, the Commission stressed that it must enable the great majority of operatives to increase their earnings, otherwise it would be unacceptable to the unions; however those currently weaving particularly well paid sorts might have to accept a reduction in wages.(68) The Commission decided to recommend a wage list based on the Shirley Institute scheme, as it was thought that the R.W.A.'s plan for a full work measurement study at each mill would have been unworkable. Several amendments to the scheme as it stood would be necessary: for instance, the guaranteed minimum wage would be retained. In a concession to expediency the rayon differentials would also continue, although at a considerably reduced level. The interim report concluded that the new C.M.C. List should be optional, with firms free to use the old lists if they or their operatives so desired. This was in sharp contrast to the Evershed proposals which involved the abolition of the prevailing lists. However, it was imperative that the C.M.C. List be speedily introduced: "We cannot wait years before the cotton manufacturing industry has its proper chance to contribute more fully to the vital needs of our export trade and of our own homes."(69)

Reaction to the Commission's report was mixed. Herbert Morrison, the Lord President of the Council, told a rally at Belle Vue, Manchester, that redeployment

would form an essential part of the industry’s production drive, while most employers Were generally favourable to its recommendations.(70) The trade union response was less fulsome. Andrew Naesmith, still general secretary of the A.W.A., welcomed the report as

"revolutionary" and predicted that the C.M.C. List would soon entirely supplant the Uniform Lists.(71) Not all of

*

Mr Naesmith’s members, particularly in rayon weaving and high wage centres such as Nelson, Colne, and Padiham, shared his enthusiasm.(72) Nevertheless the industry resolved to proceed with a number of ’notional’ experiments to find out what effect the C.M.C. List would have on wages. These experiments took several months and by January 1949 the government was growing increasingly impatient with the weaving section’s dilatory progress, threatening to set up a Wages Council to implement the C.M.C. List regardless of the industry’s attitude.(73)

The results of the ’notional’ experiments showed that (without redeployment) the C.M.C. List would reduce the earnings of rayon weavers and operatives producing mixtures and some coloured cloths by up to 25 per cent. But it was expected that these losses would be more than offset after redeployment. Underloading, especially in rayon weaving sheds, was descibed as "ludicrous". Most cotton weavers could easily take on several more looms, while rayon weavers could tend up to eight more looms without being overworked. To support their case, the Commission referred to data from ten mills which had

tried out the C.M.C. List in conjunction with a major reorganization of the work process. Output per operative hour increased by an average of 89.4 per cent, while average earnings rose by an average of 43.2 per cent. It was pointed out that these were model sheds and that such spectacular results could not always be expected.(74)

*

Dissension in the Nelson area was not quelled by these results. Nelson's employers continued to complain that they would be left "high and dry" by the C.M.C. Lists, as their weavers would not accept the

introduction of the system. They proposed the addition of a quality bonus for weavers in areas producing fine cloths and were the only group within the C.S.M.A. to vote against endorsement of the C.M.C. Lists.(75) The Nelson Weavers Association stridently opposed the C.M.C. List and warned that:

"The drive for redeployment is taking place on the old machinery. It is in many cases becoming a cover for the old pre-war rationalisation with a drive for speed-up and exploitation. It is true that in some cases the bait offered to the worker is increased earnings, but the amount of increase is not commensurate with the speed up in the work."(76)

In November 1949 agreement was finally reached between the A.W.A. and C.S.M.A. on implementation of the C.M.C. List. The A.W.A. insisted that the new list could only be introduced after a ballot of the operatives at the mill concerned, although this was not always followed in practice. It was resolved that a special enquiry should look into the question of the rayon

differentials in an attempt to placate the Nelson interest, but little came of this proposal.(77) Three years had elapsed since the establishment of the Cotton Manufacturing Commission in 1946. Negotiations had been painfully slow as a result of suspicions on both sides, and this was undoubtedly detrimental to the redeployment movement in the weaving section as a whole.

The C.M.C. system was not based on the application of work measurement techniques at mill level; therefore it could not guarantee that workers at different firms were assigned exactly the same workload. Nevertheless the C.M.C. List constituted the best approximation under the circumstances.(78) Operatives in redeployed mills using the C.M.C. system enjoyed an increase in earnings of about 32 per cent. (79) Unfortunately the new list was introduced too late for it to have had a major impact on productivity or the postwar labour shortage. Only four per cent of mills had introduced the C.M.C. List by the end of 1950.(80) Lomax estimated that between 1948 and 1952 productivity in weaving rose by a mere 1.8 per cent per annum.(81) The Cotton Manufacturing Commission's recommmendations had been far more ambitious than those of the Evershed Commission, but they had been stifled by the same environment of inertia and suspicion.

IV

"A great wealth lies dormant in the mills and sheds of Lancashire which can, by redeployment, be used for the benefit of all concerned...[but the wage lists] had conceived, brought forth and nurtured, a Frankenstein monster which, by its cloying grasp, envelops the trade, barring the way to progress".(82)