Kurds in Iraq
The Kurds’ struggle within Iraq is not religiously based but rather a matter of identity. The defining characteristic of Kurdish politics is ethno-nationalism (Kurdish: Kurdayati); the idea of self-rule based on belonging to the Kurdish ethnic group (Kurdish: Kurd bun). Kurdayati is the common motto of all Kurdish political parties of whatever persuasion and, in the context of this research, of all the Kurdish political elites. Kurdayati predates the establishment of the ‘nation-state’ of Iraq. Kurdish revolts armed, political or civilian, were in response to the imposition of Iraq’s boundaries in the period 1917-1920 by Great Britain, and also in response to the imposition of an
Arab identity which sought to eradicate their Kurdish identity by Iraqi central authorities in the years 1960-1990 (see Chapter 1). This history has manifested in the Kurds’ quest, post 2003, to protect their identity through building Iraq’s democracy. In other words, Kurdish politico-cultural identity is the core value that Kurds want to serve with the idea of democracy. The primary political goal of Kurds is self-rule, in the form of federalism, with greater autonomy for the Kurdish region within Iraq.
The Kurdish political elite are secular in their interpretation of the ideal of democracy. Although they are Muslims, they do not see themselves as involved in the Sunni-Shia sect divide; their pursuit is one of ethnic identity. Therefore, democracy from a Kurdish perspective, by default, includes the notion of Kurdayati. Within Iraq, they favour an ideal of democracy which reflects their ethno-nationalist quest.
This section, in a process similar to that adopted in previous ones, analyses the views of the Kurdish political elite with reference to the theoretical framework, in particular Dahl’s method in understanding democracy as an ideal (see chapter chapter 3 section 3.4). Throughout this section, the hypothesis that the Kurdish political elite are more likely than members of the Shia and the Sunni elites to support consensus democracy is tested. The confirmation of this hypothesis will be dealt with at the end of this section. Initially, however, an illustration of the value that they want to serve with their idea of democracy and the goals that they want to achieve are investigated.
Defining Democracy: The core value
In defining democracy, as accepted by Kurdish leaders, reference is made to discussions with Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, and to relevant parts of an interview with Jala Talabani, the President of Iraq.102
Talabani believed strongly in the consensual ideal of democracy, and further regarded proportional representation as more democratic than a system of plural representation. Barzani, similar to Talabani, defined the ideal of democracy as consensus and a form of power-sharing. Barzani’s and Talabani’s views on democracy are shared by all those in the Kurdish political elite.
102 Note: they are the leaders of the two main Kurdish political parties, and also the two main rivals. The discussion of this divide is not the concern of this thesis, so with the divisions within the Sunni or within the Shia, here, the main concern is with the particular characters of each group that distinguishes it from the other.
Barham Salih, the former Deputy Prime Minister of the Iraqi Federal Government, the former Prime Minister of KRG, and Nechirvan Barzani, the current Prime Minister, as well as Displacement and Migration Minister, Dindar Najman Shafiq, and Trade Minister, Khairalla Hasan Babakir, all favour consensual democratic systems with proportional representation.
Kurds believe that the political, demographic and ethnic nature of Iraq requires the formation of the government on the basis of participation and consensus among different groups. From a Kurdish perspective, Iraq cannot be ruled democratically by a single segment. This stance was re-affirmed by Barzani when he stated that, ‘the rule of a particular group has failed in Iraq; therefore, the application of the principle of majority to form the government will end in failure and hinders the success of democracy.’ Therefore, the Kurds’ promotion of democracy as consensus is, in fact, based on their desire to prevent the centralisation of power which, in Barzani’s view, has created fear among the peoples of Iraq. Different parts of the population worry that only a certain group speaks on behalf of the majority and imposes itself on everyone else.
The core value which democracy could serve, for Kurds, is enabling participation and the protection of minority rights, including those of the Kurds. Taking into account the principle of power sharing and consensus among different factions, in their opinion, guarantees democracy. That is because, in Barzani’s view, if in Iraq the principle of majority is to be applied, then minorities and other segments cannot participate in the apparatus of rule and he believes that ‘does not suit the concept of true partnership, but will lead to the marginalisation of other segments.’ Marginalisation is the concept that both Kurds and Sunnis refer to when they address the implication of a majority rule; this is to say, Shia majority could potentially monopolise power. Hence, the main values by which Barzani and others of the Kurdish political elite want to serve with democracy in Iraq as a country of multiple nationalities and religions are coexistence and political action towards a common good.
Democratic Ideal: The main goals
The goals which the Kurdish elite want to achieve with the idea of democracy are partnership and power-sharing, both aimed at creating a consensus system in Iraq. Chapter 1 showed that since Iraq’s formation, the forcing of three main segments into the boundaries of the Iraqi state has resulted in a lack of a collective feeling of belonging, a view that Barzani shared. He also identified a history of coups and revenge by successive regimes that has caused intolerance and prevented coexistence. Barzani stated that the political elite need to rectify those historical mistakes by transforming the whole system to a democratic one by ensuring real participation by groups in the decision making process. That is to say, democracy is a democracy in so far as it respects consensus and, on that basis, Kurds support it.
Furthermore, Barzani favours a system of proportional representation for which he gave several reasons. First, he believed it to be closer to true democracy, as it achieves justice in the distribution of parliamentary seats based on the proportion of voters. Second, he thought that this system gives smaller parties a chance to be represented in parliament, which encourages supporters of smaller parties to exercise their voting rights and cast their votes. Without this system, he argued, the larger political parties will drown out the voices of the smaller parties. Third, adopting this system, in his view, helps to reduce wasted votes, and parliament will, as a result, reflect a better expression of the wishes of the citizens. Fourth, in countries with different ethnic, religious and sectarian groups, he believed it to be essential that all ethnic groups are part of the political process and this can only be guaranteed through a system of proportional representation.
Other minorities including, Christians and Turkmen, have preferences similar to those of the Kurds. Yunadim Yousif Kanna, former member of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003-2004, and the Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, believes that central to the process of building a democratic Iraq is a culture that promotes acceptance of others. He further augured that consensus democracy is the better choice because consensus, in his words, ‘could save the society form a majority dictatorship’. Kanna favoured an electoral system that would take into account the smaller groups, in a way that prevents their marginalisation. Likewise, Abbas al-Bayati,
General Secretary of the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkoman, argued that under the present conditions the government should be based on consensus and, similar to Kanna, he favoured proportional representation. Like the Kurds, the value that these other minorities want to serve with the idea of democracy is that of minority rights and freedoms, and their goal is to establish a democratic system that guarantees these rights and protects their freedoms through a consensus system.
The vast majority, if not all, of the Kurdish political elite, support a consensual democratic system and this is also true for the political elites of the principle minorities, the Christians and the Turkmen. Their support for such a system is primarily based on a desire to prevent a system of rule that gives one segment the right to talk on behalf of all the segments in Iraq. Kurdish views and perceptions on democracy and how it should be built in Iraq, are clear and their ideas are coherent in comparison to the Shia and the Sunni positions. This is true for two main reasons. The Kurds have more experience and they have been governing themselves since 1992, therefore, their views on what Iraq needs and what type of democracy in Iraq would serve their interests best are more specific. The other two segments view democracy through their sectarian divisions, the Shia on the issue of the compatibility of democracy with Islam and presenting a Shia version of democracy for Iraq, while the Sunnis in their vision of democracy make reference to an Iraqi identity, which for the past century has been a secular Sunni Arab identity.
Conclusion
Based on what has been argued so far, it can be concluded that the Kurdish political elite have a clear vision about their participation in Iraq’s democracy as almost all of them define democracy in terms of power sharing and support a proportional electoral system. Returning to the third part of the first hypothesis, that the Kurdish political elite, as well as members of other minorities, are more likely to define democracy in terms of consensus compared to the Shia and the Sunni political elite, the qualitative findings of this section confirm that hypothesis. The application of the theoretical framework has been helpful in identifying not only the fact that the Kurdish political elite define democracy as consensus but also in explaining why they do so.
The main reasons for their support of democracy lies in the values that they seek to protect, that is power-sharing, minority rights, and partnership, all of which being rooted in their quest for ethnic identity. The Kurds in Iraq have not adopted a sectarian approach and avoided becoming a part of the Sunni-Shia struggle. Hence, in post 2003 Iraq, they see themselves rather as stabilisers and part of the solution, not as a part of the problem, in the building of a democracy. For them, this democracy must serve the values they uphold, tolerance and coexistence, and in turn help in the achievement of their goal of protecting their identity and nourishing their kurdayati by democratic means while safeguarding their Kurd bun within the boundaries of Iraq.