Una nueva sociedad: ¿realidad o mito?

Following a classic tit-for-tat logic, the Palestinian demonstrations and attacks provoked harsh Israeli responses, prompting further, more violent attacks from the Palestinians, in turn giving Israel an excuse to revive its policy of “targeted assassinations.” And with a new, right-wing government in Israel set on ending the intifada rapidly and with violent means, and a Palestinian leadership unwilling—and probably unable—to crack down on its own population for the sake of Israeli security, the violence spiraled out of control (Caridi 2010, 147).

On the Palestinian side, Hamas was the first to up the ante, moving from popular demonstrations to military activities. On October 30, 2000, just over a month after Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, Hamas carried out its first suicide operation in two years. The bomber set off his explosive belt in a piazza in Jerusalem, killing 15 and injuring some 130 (Singh 2011, 60, 139). Then, on January 1, 2001, Hamas carried out a second suicide operation, followed by three operations in March 2001, two in April, one in May, and two more in June. This trend continued for the rest of 2001. In total, Hamas carried out 19 suicide operations that year, killing 80 Israelis and injuring 907 more. And in the five years the al-Aqsa intifada lasted,³³³ Hamas carried out some 50 suicide operations, leaving over 2 000 injured and 325 dead (Singh 2011, 137–41).

Other Palestinian movements also took active part in the uprising and carried out suicide operations. It is particularly noteworthy that tanzim, a Fatah-organization largely made up of

333 Whereas the first intifada ended with the signing of the DOP in September 1993, there is no agreed upon end date of the second intifada. However, by 2005 the intensity of the conflict had abated to such an extent that it makes little sense to talk about an uprising anymore (Baroud 2006, 120–21).

veterans from the first intifada and Fatah’s Shabiba youth movement was allowed—at least implicitly—by the PA and Fatah leadership to fight in the intifada.³³⁴ Although Fatah’s loose and incoherent organizational structure makes it difficult to accurately map out its command structure and specify the relationship between its different sub-units and associated organizations (Usher 2000), the tanzim played a prominent role during the early years of the second intifada. Furthermore, many of the activists from tanzim later joined the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, another Fatah-associated militia established to fight in the intifada (Bloom 2004, 78).³³⁵ Other factions playing prominent roles in the intifada included Islamic Jihad, the DFLP, and the PFLP.

Israel was of course the common enemy to all the Palestinian factions taking part in the uprising, prompting cooperation between them even across the previously important secular-religious cleavage (Caridi 2010, 147). According to the details in the list compiled by Singh of the 50 suicide operations Hamas carried out throughout the second intifada, seven were collaborations with either Islamic Jihad and/or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (2011, 139–

42). However, given the nature of suicide operations, it is often difficult to ascertain who was actually responsible for a given operation after the fact. During the second intifada, as is common also elsewhere, these difficulties were exacerbated because different Palestinian militias at times claimed responsibility for the same operation (Bloom 2004, 73–75).³³⁶ In total, the Palestinian militias carried out 138 suicide operations from 2000 to 2005, killing 657 and injuring 3 682 (Brym and Araj 2006, 1970).³³⁷ And while it claimed responsibility for only 50 of these, it was Hamas that apparently capitalized the most from the intifada.

Throughout the period, Hamas saw its popularity rise to unprecedented levels, from around 10 percent in 2000, to almost 30 percent by the end of 2005. Although the polling data from PSR shows that the popularity of the various movements fluctuated somewhat, the trend in Figure 7 below is clear; Hamas inched closer to Fatah throughout the period.³³⁸

334 Shabiba translates roughly to “youth,” whereas tanzim means “organization” in Arabic.

335 It is assumed that the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade fill the same role for Fatah as the al-Qassam Brigades does for Hamas, i.e., that of a clandestine armed wing, operating largely independently from, but still in accordance with, the goals and priorities of the political leadership.

336 In 2011, the al-Qassam Brigades claimed that they had carried out a total of 87 “martyr operations” since the establishment of Hamas (Al-Qassam Brigades 2011).

337 As would be expected, there is no consensus as to how many Israeli and Palestinian lives were claimed by the second intifada, with estimates varying quite widely (see e.g., JPS 2004). Most sources, however, indicate that for every Israeli killed, three to four Palestinians were killed. One source deemed trustworthy is Milton-Edwards and Farrell, who estimate that 1 080 Israelis and 3 570 Palestinians were killed from 2000 to 2005 (2010, 107).

338 Consult the methodology chapter for a discussion of the polling data used. The pollsters from PSR

Figure 7: Factional support in the occupied territories, 2000–2005

(Source: PSR 2011).

Hamas’s prominent role in the second intifada was not the only reason for this increase in popularity.³³⁹ For one, Hamas’s politico-religious message had come to resonate well among Palestinians. Although difficult to measure accurately, there are strong indications that religion came to play an increasingly important role in Palestinian politics from the mid-1990s onward (Hilal 2006).³⁴⁰ And as Hamas was established as a religious alternative to the secular PLO, it was well positioned to capitalize politically on this trend.³⁴¹

Hamas also benefited from the PA’s shortcomings. Even if the failures of the PA in part can be explained by its circumscribed mandate, continued Israeli aggression, and a steady stream of

speculated that “Hamas’ loss of support [in late 2004 and early 2005] may be due to the fact that the Islamist movement had decided to boycott the upcoming presidential elections while the increase in support for Fateh might be explained by the appreciation people have for the way Fateh dealt with the succession issue [following the death of Arafat]. A bandwagoning [sic] effect may have also helped Fateh as new supporters might be expecting gains from supporting the faction that is most likely to win the upcoming elections” (PSR 2004).

339 See Abu-Amr (2007, 169–71) and Hilal (2006) for detailed accounts of Hamas’s rising popularity.

340 Polling numbers and student council election results from the 1980s indicate that this trend of increased religiosity among Palestinians already began then. See in particular Smith (1982), Shadid and Seltzer (1988a, 1988b, 1989), and Robinson (1997, 19–27).

341 This tendency even led the staunch secularists in Fatah to adopt a religious language in an attempt to retain support from the increasingly religious Palestinian populace (Frisch 2005; Løvlie 2014).

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

0%

10%

20%

30%

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50% Hamas Fatah All others combined

Year

Support

impossible to fulfill demands from the international community, the PA did default on its contract as a welfare and security provider for its constituents, and it did suffer from rampant mismanagement and widespread corruption.³⁴² By filling the welfare vacuum created by the PA’s failure to provide for its constituents, Hamas gained new followers from most segments of society. In addition, disappointment and disillusionment with the Palestinian leadership had become a fixture in the minds of Palestinians within the occupied territories. The corruption and mismanagement on part of the Fatah-PLO-PA nexus thus indirectly lend credence to Hamas’s claim for credibility, and many Palestinians came to consider the movement as the only viable contender to the incumbent regime. Naturally, this materialized as gains in the polls for Hamas (Hroub 2004, 22). And finally, Hamas profited from Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005—a move perceived by many Palestinians as a victory for Hamas’s resistance strategy over the negotiation strategy of the PLO (Milton-Edwards 2005, 131).

It should be noted that it was not only Hamas that gained in popularity during the second intifada. As indicated in Figure 7 above, Fatah likewise became more popular throughout the period. Support seems to have flowed to both from the “All others combined” category, which is mainly made up of different leftist factions and independents of various ideological hues.³⁴³ This is taken to indicate that the Palestinian political system developed in a bipolar direction.

While the Palestinian party system since the early 1990s most closely resembled the predominant party system as described by Sartori (1976, 173–74), by late 2005 it had for most intents and purposes turned to a polarized two-party system (Hilal 2006).