explanation of an observed phenomenon
―When examining normal science…we shall want finally to describe that research as a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by a professional education.‖ (T. S. Kuhn, 1970, p. 5)
53 See also Latour (1987) for a similar approach to science. He presents a critique of the framing whereby a science is seen as consisting of knowledge, as compared to irrational beliefs held by those outside the science. Knowledge may be based on the particular perspective, and ―irrational belief‖ may be rational if seen in the right context.
―The conventionalist view stresses the organizational function of theories: theory construction is undertaken to organize a complex of facts into a coherent whole. In the words of philosopher Joseph Agassi, theories are "mathematical systems which serve as pigeon-holes within which to store empirical information". In this view, theories are again neither true or [sic] false, but are posited for a time as being true by convention, given consensus within a community of scholars. The primary conventionalist criterion of theory choice is simplicity: the simpler theory organizes the facts better. But only revolutionary conventionalists try to find ever simpler theories; conservative conventionalists attempt to preserve existent theories by building onto them ever more elaborate (critics would label them ad hoc) peripheral systems.‖ (Caldwell, 1980, p. 367)
In the first chapter of his economics textbook, Eugene Silberberg attempted to show ―the powerful nature of the economic paradigm‖ (Silberberg, 1990, p. 9). He took as an example the rise in women‘s labour force participation in the generation up to 1990, seeking an economic explanation. He referred to constancy of tastes as a simplifying assumption in the neoclassical economic paradigm. Moreover, ―to accept (changed tastes) as an explanation of observed events is to abandon the search for an explanation based on systematic, and therefore testable, behavior‖ (Silberberg, 1990, p. 7). Hence, ―We reject out-of-hand any explanation based on changes in tastes‖ (Silberberg, 1990, p. 7).54
He identified, as a ―wide ranging constraint that changed during the 1960s‖, the ratio of young women to men a few years older. The post-WWII baby boom meant that there was a shortage of marriageable men for these women due to lower birth rates in the war years. Marriage was not an option for many young women, and so they pursued careers.
This is plausible, assuming low rates of divorce and no change in the relative ages of marriage partners. Silberberg goes further, predicting a return to more traditional lifestyles during the 1990s as the gender imbalance disappears. The economic paradigm may be powerful, but events in the 1990s did not support his prediction. There was a
54
levelling off of female labour force participation, but no sharp drop in the 1990s, and there was increased participation by mothers.55
It could be asked why he found it so objectionable to consider the possibility of changes in tastes. They may not be unobservable, and even if they are difficult to identify, it could be wrong to disregard them simply because there is an alternative plausible explanation. The existence of one possible explanation does not exclude the possibility of others. If each generation has its own perceptions (possibly distorted56), why shouldn‘t tastes change?
Silberberg illustrates what could be called ―paradigm-based reasoning‖, whereby it is important to explain events within a particular paradigm (or frame, or analogy). The result is then considered to be sufficient, even though there may be alternative explanations. This is similar to the idea of ―consistent‖ results. For example, someone could present a hypothesis and find it supported by the data. The data could also be consistent with a wide range of alternative hypotheses, but these are not explored.57 58 Not only is the presence of alternative consistent hypotheses possible, but, according to Milton Friedman, it is inevitable59:
55 See Davis (2002). 56 see Birks (2005).
57 This point can be important in law, in that evidence can be ―consistent with‖ a proposed interpretation. While it may therefore be persuasive, there could be numerous alternative explanations of the same evidence that are not presented. An example of this point from case law is given by Robertson (B. Robertson, 2003). He explains why it was meaningless for an expert witness' to claim evidence of post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as demonstrating sexual abuse. Although PTSD is consistent with sexual abuse, ―there is no behaviour that is inconsistent with sexual abuse‖.
58 Posner is well aware of the possibility of evidence being consistent with alternative explanations, giving three alternatives for evidence of possible ―internal inefficiency‖ of administrative agencies (where they fail to minimise the costs of pursuing their goals). The evidence was: i) pursuit of seemingly trivial cases; ii) lower pay for agency personnel; and ii) personnel frequently leaving for better paying jobs in the industry being regulated. Alternative explanations of points (ii) and (iii) are based on an assumed improvement in skills and experience as a result of employment by the agency.
59 Also note:
―[A] hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted (‗frequently‘ or more often than predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its predictions are not contradicted; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction. Factual evidence
―Observed facts are necessarily finite in number; possible hypotheses, infinite. If there is one hypothesis that is consistent with the available evidence, there are always an infinite number that are.‖ 60
(M. Friedman, 1953, p. 9)
In terms of reasoning, Silberberg‘s approach allows people to cling to a paradigm (or analogy without considering alternatives until it fails so badly that it has to be rejected. This may hinder, rather than assist, understanding. It raises the bar to a level at which many theories would be virtually non-falsifiable.61 Equally dangerously, it could lead us to have an inflated view of our level of understanding.
At an extreme, it may be that a theory will never fail to the extent that it is rejected by its adherents. Lakatos, criticising scientific methodology, constructs an example to illustrate his contention that ―the most admired scientific theories simply fail to forbid any observational state of affairs‖ (Lakatos, 1970, p. 100), so they cannot be disproved. Any contrary evidence can be explained in some way that allows continued acceptance of the theory. If a planet does not follow the expected orbit, there in an unobserved planet causing the deviation, for example (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 100-101). Desai describes the difficulties in resolving disputes about theories, suggesting that the techniques available are such that it may be very difficult to conclusively show that a theory fails to fit our observations.62
can never ‗prove‘ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which is what we generally mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis has been ‗confirmed‘ by experience.‖ (M. Friedman, 1953, p. 9)
60 Despite the major increase in availability of information through new information technology, the information is finite, especially in relation to specific events or phenomena, and some necessary information may be unobservable or ―non-verifiable‖ (see p.173).
61 For many entertaining and graphic examples in a historical context, see Harper (2006), who makes this specific point on evolution, with any new species being a branch from some unknown source (Harper, 2006, p. 92). Darwin made the same point himself (Darwin, 2003, p. 159). Harper‘s point is even more strongly made if an additional requirement applies as in section 3.2.3.c, namely the alternative must be superior to the existing theory in terms of claimed (not necessarily actual) performance.
For an additional illustration, Pierson argues that supporters of intergovernmentalism63 can find some consistent explanation for various events that at first appear to contradict their theory. Consequently, ―absent a theoretically based explanation…these detailed investigations will not persuade proponents of intergovernmentalism‖ (Pierson, 1996, p. 125). That they are not persuaded without an alternative theory to adopt does not mean that they would switch were such a theory to exist. It is a possibility, however, as discussed next.