In addition to the consent argument and the limiting argument against the principle of fairness, there is a third argument, which I call the utility argument. This is associated with mainly M. B. E. Smith. We can also find the general idea of the utility argument in Nozick and Simmons. Those who make the utility argument place emphasis on the worth of benefit in proportion to the cost. They
are more interested in the utility of (non-)cooperation than fairness itself. Against the utility argument, there are two kinds of defence: criticism of the reduction of fairness to utility (Lyons and Dagger); and the greater utility of the fairness obligation (Klosko).
1.4.1.Objection: no benefit, no harm, no problem
Smith‟s basic idea is simply that „the obligation of fair play governs a man‟s actions only when some benefit or harm turns on whether he obeys‟ (Smith 1973: 957). According to this idea, it is fair even to free-ride if the compliance with the rules of a cooperative scheme does not benefit other members of the scheme, or if the non-compliance does not harm others, i.e., if cooperators are not made worse off by the non-compliance. Dagger calls this idea „no benefit, no harm, no problem‟ (Dagger 1997: 70). The following is from Smith.
Surely, the fact that A has benefited from B‟s submission does not give B
the right to insist that A obey when B‟s interests are not affected. A may in this situation have an obligation to obey, perhaps because he has promised or because his disobedience would be unfair to some other member; but, if he does disobey, he has surely not been unfair to B
(Smith 1973: 956).
To follow this utility argument, it is not fair to obligate free-riders if their compliance does not benefit others, or if their non-compliance does no harm to others. It is fair for free-riders to be obligated to the rules of cooperation only if being obligated benefits others, or if not being obligated does any harm to others.
It is noteworthy that the utility argument is different from utilitarianism as it is understood as a moral or political theory. Utilitarianism holds that actions are right when they produce „the greatest happiness of the greatest number‟. That is, the greatest possible number of individuals should be happy to the greatest possible extent. However, the utility argument as it is understood in the context of the debate over the principle of fairness maintains that free-riding is not unfair when/because it does not diminish the existing overall benefit enjoyed by cooperators. The utility argument against the principle of fairness should be distinguished from utilitarianism in general.
1.4.2.Defence: no concept of fairness
As it would be expected, the utility argument is accused of lacking a concept of fairness. Smith does not say that free-riding with no harm or no benefit to others is fair, but not unfair. For him, if free-riding does no harm, it is not unfair; if the compliance makes no benefit to others, the non-compliance is not unfair. This involves no concept of fairness such that a burden should follow a benefit or that there should be equal distribution of burden between beneficiaries. For this reason, Smith overlooks „the consideration that itself underlies the notion of fairness: the conviction that everyone involved in a practice is to be treated as an equal‟, according to Dagger (1997: 71). Dagger continues:
this holds even when the interests of the parties involved are not affected, directly or indirectly, for one may be wronged (deceived, treated unfairly) without being harmed. Those who refuse to cooperate in a practice while they accept its benefits are acting unfairly and wronging those who do
cooperate‟ (ibid. 71, his parentheses, my italics).
As mentioned earlier, according to Klosko, cooperators complain about an action of free-riding not because a free-rider is harming them but because he is behaving unfairly (1992: 42). „We need not suppose that unco-operative (or unfair) behaviour is not harmful‟, Lyons points out, and „it can be disastrous in its long-range effects‟ (Lyons 1965: 172). As Simmons‟ example of a free-rider shows, Jones who, without consent to join the cooperative scheme for a public well, takes some water from the well that has been dug by other cooperators, does not harm other cooperators by taking water from the well. The reason why he is accused of unfairness, nonetheless, is that he takes the benefit without contribution while other cooperators have put in their effort to obtain the water.11
1.4.3.Objection: no obligation more than benefit
There is a weak utility argument against the principle of fairness. According to Nozick, it is not fair to impose an obligation on an individual, which is heavier than her benefit (Nozick 1974: 94). To take his PA example: if your one day‟s service in your turn is more valuable than the days you enjoy from others‟ service, you are not to be bound to take your turn. In other words, it is not fair for you to be required to pay more than you benefit.
11
I do not get involved in rejecting the utility argument until Chapter 6, where I offer a fuller reply to the utility argument.
1.4.4.Defence: benefited enough to be obligated
Klosko dismisses Nozick‟s examples because the benefits in the examples are only discretionary goods that are „desirable but not presumptively beneficial‟ (Klosko 1992: 44). He points out that the benefits in Nozick‟s examples are „nebulous or relatively insignificant or not of great value‟ (ibid. 44-5). The principle of fairness is not concerned with the goods that are desirable or not simply according to the preferences of beneficiaries. If benefits are public goods that are indispensable for all, Klosko believes, it is worth being obligated in order to obtain such goods. As long as public goods are indispensable, you cannot pay more than you benefit because they are worth the cost of them.
Klosko does not present his own version of the principle of fairness. However, putting emphasis on the indispensability of benefit, he sets out three conditions for the principle (1992: 39);
The principle of fairness is able to generate powerful obligations to contribute to nonexcludable schemes if three main conditions are met. Goods supplied must be (i) worth the recipients‟ effort in providing them; (ii) „presumptively beneficial‟; and (iii) have benefits and burdens that are fairly distributed.
Having concentrated on the characteristics of the goods in question, Klosko tends to derive the fairness obligation from the idea that an obligation should follow the receipt of the goods, not from the fair relation between beneficiaries and cooperators. As regards conditions for the principle, condition (ii) indicates our condition 6: the indispensability of benefit, while condition (iii) reminds us
of our condition 3: the justice of a cooperative scheme. Against the utility argument that the benefit may not be worth the cost, Klosko puts condition (i) holding that presumptive beneficial public goods are worth the cost, or the cost is cheaper than the value of the loss of the public goods. With the indispensability of benefit in mind, he says that „because of their enormous value, these goods justify significant sacrifices on the part of all community members‟ (Klosko 1992: 54). For example, even though a soldier faces some risk in his military service, „this is less than he would face if national defence were not provided‟ (ibid. 55). At any rate, „with condition (i) not satisfied, they [beneficiaries] would not have the fairness obligations to serve‟ (ibid. 55). Klosko thus presents another condition for the principle with regard to the relationship between benefit and the cost of it:
Condition 7: Benefit being worth the cost of it
1.4.5.Summary
The strong version of the utility argument rejects the fairness obligation unless the compliance with the rules of a cooperative scheme benefits others or the non- compliance harms them. The weak version claims a reduction of the fairness obligation to the extent that beneficiaries benefit from the scheme. The strong version is accused of lacking a conception of fairness because it reduces fairness to utility. The weak version is told that public benefits are so valuable that beneficiaries cannot be obligated more than they benefit.