5. Metodología
6.1 Aplicación, Análisis y presentación de resultados del Pre-test
6.1.4 Unidad Didáctica N°3 “Magnitudes Directamente e Inversamente
a) reference to the fact that the remuneration of the executive directors includes a variable component and information on the way in which this component is dependent on performance assessment.
2010
2009
restated 2009
Liabilities to pensioners 1,458,253 1,698,852 1,698,852
Liabilities to personal in service 7,478,245 8,557,363 8,557,363 Provisions set aside (Note 29.) 8,936,770 10,256,214 10,256,214
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The remuneration policy for the executive members of the company’s Board of Directors involves a plan consisting of: (i) a fixed component defined in the light of the levels of responsibility of each executive director, reviewed annually, which includes the basic gross remuneration paid in respect of the period of one year; and (ii) a variable component paid the following year by way of performance bonus, taking into account the evolution of his performance based on criteria defined and reviewed annually by the Remuneration Committee, which considers the real growth of the company and the wealth actually created for the equityholders, its long-term sustainability and the risks assumed, as well as compliance with the rules applicable to the company’s business.
The variable component is allocated each year and the Remuneration Committee is charged with the constant monitoring and assessing of the performance of the directors, verifying the extent to which the proposed targets were actually met.
b) Indication of the company’s bodies competent to perform the evaluation of the performance of the executive directors.
The evaluation of the performance of the Executive Directors is performed by the Remuneration Committee.
c) Indication of predetermined criteria for the evaluation of the performance of the executive directors. The criteria established for the evaluation of the performance of the executive directors are general and are enshrined in the remuneration policy approved by the General Meeting, and there are no predetermined, objective criteria governing this matter.
d) Explanation of the relative importance of the variable and fixed components of the director’s remuneration, as well as indication of the maximum limits for each component.
The variable components of the remuneration of the executive directors takes into account the company’s performance in the short and medium term, as well as the benchmarking in comparison with other companies of similar size in similar business. Although the articles of association fix the variable remuneration of the Board of Directors only in general terms, which cannot exceed five per cent of the year’s profit, the Remuneration Committee considers that the variable component attributed to the members of the Executive Committee have been reasonable, taken as a whole, in relation to the fixed component of the remuneration.
e) Indication of the deferral of payment of the variable component of the remuneration, stating the period of deferral.
There is no deferral of the payment of the said variable remuneration.
f) Explanation of the way in which the variable remuneration is subject to continuity of the company’s good performance over the period of deferral.
Not applicable, without prejudice to the comments set out in point II.32.
g) sufficient information on the criteria on which the attribution of variable remuneration in shares is based, as well as on the maintenance by executive directors of the shares in the company that they have accesses, on the close of any contracts relating to such shares, particularly hedging or risk-transfer contracts, their limits and their ration as a proportion of the total annual remuneration.
The company neither has nor has planned any remuneration scheme involving the award of shares and/or any incentive scheme involving shares.
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3.
REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
h) sufficient information on the criteria on which the attribution of variable remuneration in options is based and indication of the period of deferral and of the exercise price.
The company neither has nor has planned any remuneration scheme involving the award of stock-option rights. i) Identification of the main parameters and grounds of any annual bonus scheme and of any other non-pecuniary benefits.
The company has no annual bonus scheme or other non-pecuniary benefits.
j) remuneration paid in the form of profit sharing and/or payment of bonuses and the reason why such bonuses and/or profit sharing were granted.
Remuneration paid in the form of profit sharing and/or payment of bonuses is detailed in point II.31 and is part of the variable component, by way of performance bonus, taking into account the evolution of the directors’ performance in the light of the proposed objectives.
l) Indemnities paid or owed to former executive directors in respect of termination of their duties during the year.
During 2010 an indemnity was paid to former director Eduardo Jorge de Almeida Rocha on termination of office, in the sum of €880,000.
m) reference to the contractual limitation stipulated for the compensation payable for dismissal of a director without due cause and its relationship with the variable component of the remuneration. There are no contractual limits to the compensation payable for dismissals of a director without due cause other than as provided for by law.
n) Amounts were paid for any reason whatsoever by other companies in a controlling of group relationship.
During 2010 no sums were paid to executive directors (or to non-executive directors) of Mota-Engil by compa- nies in a controlling or group relationship other than those divulged in point II.31.
o) Description of the main characteristics of the complementary pension or early-retirement schemes for the directors, stating whether they were or were not subject to appraisal by the General Meeting.
Some directors (founder-equityholders) benefit from a defined-benefit pension plan, which allows the beneficiaries to obtain a pension of 80% of the salary earned on retirement. It should be mentioned that this plan was in force prior to the admission to listing of Mota-Engil, SGPS, SA, on the stock market.
p) Estimate of the value of relevant non-pecuniary benefits considered as remuneration not covered by the foregoing situations.
The company does not assign any relevant non-pecuniary benefits by way of remuneration.
q) Existence of mechanisms preventing the executive directors from closing contracts calling into question the reason for the variable remuneration.
There is no mechanism preventing the executive directors from closing contracts calling into question the reason for the variable remuneration. Nevertheless, the Remuneration Committee always takes this factor into consideration in the criteria used to determine the variable remuneration.
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