As is indicated earlier, the thesis is divided into three sections. The initial section of this thesis contains three chapters: (1) the Russian Experience in LIC: Afghanistan and Chechnya; (2) the American Experience in LIC: Somalia and Afghanistan; and (3) the Iraq War of 2003: the Coalition’s Experience in LIC. These conflicts have been analysed because: (1) within each there are aspects of LIC; and (2) they are contemporary. Phases of each of these conflicts correlate with LIC. Moreover, the analysis of LIC examines aspects of military capability that are in common with generic modern war. Furthermore, contemporary conflicts enable analysis of modern weapons, military structures, principles and strategies. Each of these chapters mentioned above has a dual function. First, each individual conflict is analysed separately. Second, lessons are drawn from each conflict. The lessons from each of these conflicts are then analysed collectively in the subsequent two chapters.
The central chapters of the thesis are a collection of normative realities and prescriptive requirements. The doctrine and military force chapters analyse and collate policies, procedures and tactics that have been proven in practice. The doctrinal chapter draws on empirical examples of LIC, including those analysed in the first three chapters of the thesis. The doctrinal chapter consists of two
sections: (1) the phases of LIC are analysed to enable a clear understanding of the subject; and (2) the principles for a successful counterinsurgency are examined. LIC is a complex and challenging form of war. Hence, the doctrinal chapter presents a comprehensive and task specific set of principles relevant to the containment of insurgency. The initial section of the chapter, structures the incomprehensible nature of LIC into a phased array of violence. The components of this phased array are as follows: (1) organisation (cadre/support); (2) terrorism; (3) guerrilla warfare; and (4) mobile operations. The significance of the phased array is that individual phase threats can be countered by precisely targeted strategies. In doing so, all aspects of the insurgency will be defeated. The latter section of the chapter outlines four principles that the counterinsurgent must apply in LIC. These principles include the control of international interference, the provision of internal security, the application of civil operations, and the installation of a unitary command. These four principles form a holistic approach to defeating an insurgency. This holistic approach is applied by four force elements: civil, military, police and intelligence. The purpose of uniting these four force elements is to gain the support of the civil population, who in turn will provide the intelligence required to defeat the insurgent. A prerequisite for this holistic approach is an Expeditionary Civil Service, or functional equivalent. The function of such an organisation is to ensure the civil elements are operationally effective and integrated with their military counterparts.
Military force is the core counterinsurgent element in providing security in LIC. Moreover, counterinsurgent military force has a dual purpose in LIC. The counterinsurgent’s military force elements must concurrently overcome the insurgent and win the hearts and minds of the population. In accordance with this dual function, the military force chapter analyses and makes recommendations on the organisation of counterinsurgent forces. The military force chapter is based on the case studies of the thesis, and other empirical examples of LIC. The chapter analyses the following topics: doctrine; infantry; armour (armoured vehicles); artillery; helicopters; aircraft; command, control, initiative, communications and intelligence (C2ICI). The chapter also examines military principles that are critical for the counterinsurgent to apply in LIC and bind the aforementioned topics together. These military principles include: doctrinal precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, restraint,
combined arms, joint force, integrated communications, and accurate human intelligence. These principles and topics form the foundation of effective counterinsurgent military force in LIC.
The latter two chapters analyse the implications of LIC for the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces. The chapters concomitantly make recommendations concerning the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces’ approach to counterinsurgency. The sections of these two chapters correlate with the core elements of counterinsurgent military force in LIC, as analysed in the doctrine and military force chapters. Some of these core elements of military force are as essential to conventional warfare, as they are in LIC. However, there are a number of sections in these two chapters that are distinct to LIC. These chapters conclude that the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces are relatively effective in LIC. Due to the irregularity of LIC, however, there are a number of areas where both Defence Forces could improve their respective counterinsurgency capabilities. Principally, both Defence Forces need to: improve joint LIC doctrine; enhance command and control, communications and intelligence elements and processes; and direct more resources towards civil- military affairs. These requirements for capability development may be derived from the principles identified and analysed in the research.
Notes
1
Francart, L, Brig., & J. Patry. 2000, ‘Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational Military Strategy’, p. 1, Naval War College Review, vol. 53, no. 3.
2
Van Creveld, M. 2001, Defence of Israel, Rothberg International School, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
3
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 2004, The Special Operations Forces Posture
Statement, p. 9, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense.
4
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 2004, The Special Operations Forces Posture
Statement, p. 113, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense.
5
Australian Army, 2002, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 1, p. 22, Australian Army, Canberra.
6
Smith, R. 2004, Violence, Politics and Morality: Ethical and Political Issues in War and Peace, Fourth Edition, Hillcrest Books, Hamilton.
7
Smith, R. 2004, Violence, Politics and Morality: Ethical and Political Issues in War and Peace, Fourth Edition, Hillcrest Books, Hamilton.
8
Waltz, K. 2004, ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, p. 2, Journal of Politics & Society, vol. 15, no. 1.
9
Waltz, K. 2004, ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, p. 2, Journal of Politics & Society, vol. 15, no. 1.
10
Buzan, B. & E. Herring. 1998, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.
11
Von Clausewitz, C. 1943, On War, trans. O. J. Mathias Jolles, Random House, New York.
12
Sun Tzu. 1993, The Art of War, trans. General Tao Hanzhang, p. 19, Wordsworth Editions Ltd, Ware.