If emotions are not themselves basic intentional actions, it is a philosophical problem to show how this fact can be reconciled with the assumption that the very having (or lacking) an emotion, as opposed to acting upon or expressing that emotion in our overt behavior, might qualify as an ethical failing. Emotions would thus seem to violate the well-worn philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” On the version of this principle discussed in the previous chapter, it is true that a person ought to do something at a time only if, at that time, that response is itself a basic intentional action.
The underpinnings of this principle lie in a view of responsibility as accountability. According to this view, for some response to be subject to a normative requirement, the person must have had a “reasonable opportunity” to avoid violating that requirement. Principally, reasonable opportunity to avoid violating a requirement means that the person could have ensured that she satisfied the relevant requirement, but it further means that she could have avoided being subject to the requirement in the first place.41 But certain bare metaphysical possibilities, such what one could do when in the possession of super-human capacities, or capacities that one could possess only after years of practice or therapy do not suffice for having 41 Watson, 2004, 276; Levy, 2005, 3
a reasonable opportunity to avoid some violation. For example, one is not obligated to do anything which would require treading water for twelve hours. Although certain extraordinary human beings may have the endurance and strength to accomplish such a feat, ordinary human beings do not. In this way, reasonable opportunity must be understood as what was possible to avoid, given the person's intellectual and physical abilities.
Reasonable opportunity combines epistemic and practical elements. Firstly, the person must know, or be in the position where she can reasonably be expected to know, that the
requirement in question has application, generally speaking. Furthermore, she must know, or be in the position where she can reasonably be expected to know, that the requirement has
application to some particular situation, and that unless she acts to prevent that situation from coming into being, she will be in violation of the requirement. Finally, the person must know, or be in the position where she can reasonably be expected to know, what acts or efforts would be required to prevent her from being in violation, and she must have the ability and opportunity to undertake those steps.
Of course, a great deal hangs on what it means to claim that a person is “reasonably” expected to know that a norm has general application, or application to some specific situation, etc. This qualification is meant to distinguish between blameworthy and exculpating ignorance. There may have been evidence available which, when recognized by somebody meeting a certain threshold of experience and intellectual powers, would lead that person to know that the norm has application, he would be in violation, etc. In such a case, ignorance is not excuse, because the individual should have known better. Admittedly, there are numerous standards about whether some ignorance is blameworthy or blameless in particular cases, and disagreement is possible.
Given the intellectual powers and experience assumed to be possessed by those who grow up in a modern society, an adult can be reasonably expected to know that screaming “fire!” or “bomb!” in a crowded public place would be both dangerous and illegal. But these standards may be more difficult to apply to other cases, such as a thirteen year-old boy, or a recent émigré from a
radically different culture. However, disagreement over the details of those epistemic standards, as they apply to specific cases, does not gainsay a general distinction between ignorance that exculpates, and ignorance that itself is the person's responsibility as well.
The need to postulate reasonable opportunity rests on the fact that the censure or criticism of another person for having violated some norm can be regarded as having the social function of imposing sanctions upon the person being criticized or blamed.42 These reactions can, through a loss in public esteem, or in consequence, through subsequent treatment by others, adversely affect the significant interests of the person who is being censured or criticized. It could be argued that it is unfair to do this to somebody who lacked a reasonable opportunity to prevent her interests from being thwarted. This concept of criticism as the imposition of sanctions extends even to reactive attitudes, such as anger or resentment. These reactive attitudes constitute the withdrawal of good-will towards one's peers, and for this reason alone, could adversely affect the significant interests of another person. Cooperation with others is necessary to meet one's needs in society. So, to the extent that others have withdrawn their good-will, one may be hindered in one's ability to cooperate with them, and hence to meet one's needs.
Thus, the principle that “ought” implies “can” is underpinned by a conception of when it is just or fair to adversely affect the interests of another. Some may object that the fact that censuring would impose sanctions upon the person is irrelevant to whether ethical assessments 42 Watson, 2004 ibid., 279-280
are appropriate. After all, it might be suggested, person may have violated some norm even if nobody actually censures him. However, we must distinguish between when censure is actually offered, and when censure would be appropriate or correct. As I framed the issue in the Chapter I, we are especially interested in the conditions in which reactive attitudes towards another person's emotion are correct. Anger, resentment, guilt, etc., may all be correct towards an action, or emotion, even if nobody is in fact angry, resentful, guilty, etc. And insofar as the truth of the relevant judgment is what makes the reactive attitude correct, it makes sense to consider the costs that these reactive attitudes might impose on the person.
If the unfairness of censure, blame, etc., where the person lacked a reasonable opportunity to avoid violating a norm is what ultimately explains the intuition that “ought” implies “can,” then we can frame a more plausible version of that principle than the one suggested by Kant, Taylor and others. The stricter version of this principle says that the person must, at the time when censure or criticism is rendered, be able to perform some basic intentional action that would itself satisfy the relevant requirement. However, it seems that a person would nonetheless have had a reasonable opportunity to avoid violating a requirement if, at some earlier point in time, she was able to perform some basic intentional action that could reasonably be foreseen to make a difference to whether the relevant requirement was satisfied now.
There are cases which can illustrate this distinction. For example, Laura's house is burning wildly, due to sparks generated by an overloaded electrical outlet. Laura cannot, now watching in horror from the street, prevent the sparks from setting her house aflame. Yet, it was in her power, at some earlier point in time, to ensure that there was no fire. She could have reasonably been expected to know that over-loaded electrical outlets are fire hazards, and
accordingly have removed the excess cords. Thus, although the fire is not now in her ability to prevent, it was at an earlier point in time in her ability to prevent. Therefore, she may
nevertheless be fairly vulnerable to censure, criticism for the fact that her house is burning now. In the next section, I will suggest that this weakened, more plausible principle can be reconciled with the passivity of emotions. In short, this is a strategy for defending an ethics of emotion without rejecting Intentionalism.