Universidades con las que se han mantenido programas de intercambio de alumnos 127

Yet under the collective category of the “protesting branitelji” favoured by the politically involved, a large number of individual branitelji who where not as loud or influential as their leaders were included. Attitudes and political orientation was directly or indirectly ascribed to them through the actions and statements of their leaders, something to which the branitelji themselves did not always approve of. This raising awareness of being politically manipulated became especially apparent as the popular image of the branitelji was coming under serious strain parallel to the unfolding of events. It seems that those who were “pulling the strings” in the background of the turmoil of 2000-2003 overrated the dedication and support of a large number of the branitelji as well as the public. However, now that a “moderate” HDZ was back in power, the need to distance itself from its “radical” past presented itself, thereby providing an escape route for those who had been “pulling the strings”. By its political “reorientation”, and the peace subsequently made with more radical forces within the party itself, HDZ escaped the mainstream negative reactions on the blending of politics and veterans. It was the branitelji who took the punch, through being left with reduced political

191 _{”Braniteljima vratiti stečena prava”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 21.02.2004.}

influence, a number of social and personal difficulties still unaddressed, and a drastically reduced public sympathy for these difficulties.

As exemplified in the introduction, the popular image of the branitelji has undergone drastic changes in the 17 years that have passed since the first organisations were established. It is possible to view this change as passing through three phases of the “history” of the branitelji, which is reflected, even partially constructed, through three concurrent phases in the way that Croatian media has related to them. This is not to say that the media has “controlled” and “used” their image as they have pleased; rather, by adopting a discursive approach, it is possible to view this as a process in which the media has influenced and has been influenced on how it perceives the image of the branitelji. The media is conveyor of popular sentiment, while also being influenced by the same popular sentiment.

In the first period, from 1992 up until the takeover of Račan’s government, the main weight was placed on the grievances of the veterans, with a clear sympathetic inclination towards their stance. Even the occasional sensational “desperado”, meaning a branitelj “loosing” control and consorting to criminal acts to gain attention for his problems, was reported with a clear sympathy for he who in such cases was perceived as the victim, namely the perpetrator branitelj, who was “at war with the bureaucracy”. The second period was completely dominated by the protests and efforts to oppose a great deal of the Račan government’s politics, something which stole all energy and attention from the real grievances of the veterans, many of which were still living under extremely difficult

economic and social conditions. From a clear tendency of publishing reports and articles on the individual branitelj, a “collectivisation” of the whole issue now took place, meaning that the individual was no longer reaching out in the same way as before. The third period to some extent overlapped the previous two, and saw a gradual emergence as a distinct phase. The media was becoming far more critical in their treatment of the branitelji, while still utilising the “collective” analytical angle, seemingly only rarely shifting to the individual, except for when “desperados” or “loose cannons” delivered statements or performed ill-timed actions which stimulated inclinations towards sensationalism of journalists squeezed between their own integrity and their editor’s demands for profitability.

The political manipulation of the branitelji was directly the destruction of their popular image, which is a recurrent theme in this thesis. The media were part conveyors, part influencing this process. However, the real stimulators of this process was beyond any doubt those who knowingly took advantage of the “cause” of the branitelji, the initial sympathy they enjoyed, as well as their sheer numbers, to project them as a collective and homogenous

political force which could determine the political path and thus the future of Croatia by utilising extra-governmental, and therefore principally undemocratic methods.

Two examples of typical headlines to be found from the first period, of which common sympathy towards the “cause” of the branitelji is the main characteristic: “We are unjustifiably forgotten”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 15.08.1995; and “Nobody care about us any longer”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 05.05.1998. The latter case involved the self injuring of the depicted branitelj in front of the MORH-buliding in Zagreb. Symbolic actions such as these gradually became more frequent and violent during the years.

The second period is characterised by the gradual emergence of a far more threatening tone. The first demonstration at St. Marc’s Square in Zagreb in 1996 brought by a recognition of the potential striking power inherit in the “cause” of the branitelji by veterans, politicians and citizens alike: “We are through with waiting!”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 08.09.1996; and “If our demands are not met, we will demonstrate like HVIDRA”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11.10.1996.

The third and – as of yet – final period is mainly characterised by the increasingly critical viewpoint from which the branitelji are seen. The antagonism and poor communication between the veterans and the rest of the population which manifested itself during the Račan period – and which was intensified by political manipulation by external factors as well as some aspects of the internal dynamics of the organisations: “Veterans and/or millionaires”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 01.08.2009; and “Fake disables – Organisations of HRVI’s after the sentences in Rijeka: Revise all sentenced cases of ʻDijagnozaʼ”, Večernji List, 13.12.2008. So far, only a few doctors and psychiatrists, and not a single branitelj, have been sentenced in relation to the aforementioned “Dijagnoza”-operations.

4. Internal Dynamics of the Organisations: