2. Teor´ıa cl´ asica y primera cuantizaci´ on 29
3.2. Segunda cuantizaci´ on
3.2.1. Universos unidimensionales
The literature on mission command is extensive and yet there are variations in how mission command is described. For example, definitions of mission command range from the organizational (e.g., a system, model, doctrine, or technique) to the sociological
50 Donald Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the U.S. Army Make it Work?” The Land Warfare Paper Series, February 2013, Association of the United States Army, accessed February 21, 2015,
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Pages/default.aspx, 11.
(e.g., a philosophy, lifestyle, or culture).51 Bungay maintains that mission command is based on the principles of auftragstaktik, a German military term that loosely translates as task or mission-focused execution as compared to befehlstaktik or execution of direct orders.52 Nelson’s delineation of auftragstaktik captures the nuance, namely that:
…auftragstaktik was an extraordinarily broad concept, holistically embracing aspects of what today would be called a theory of the nature of war, character and leadership traits, tactics, command and control, senior-subordinate relationships, and training and education. In addition these aspects were organically consistent, mutually reinforcing, and inseparably interwoven.53
Mission command is the English interpretation of the term auftragstaktik, the translation of which might explain some of the variations in description and application by non-Germanic militaries.
Six principles have been chosen by the U.S. Army to describe mission command in current doctrinal publications. Each of these principles will be used as a framework for further evaluation of the organizations in the case studies. These six principles are: 1) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; 2) create shared understanding; 3) provide a clear commander’s intent; 4) exercise disciplined initiative; 5) use mission orders; and 6) accept prudent risk.54 These principles could be viewed as a series of steps that build on one another (although the fourth and fifth steps could be switched). As an example with the third principle, “provide a clear commander’s intent,” Shattuck and Woods examined how remote supervisors (leaders or commanders) impart their presence by communicating their intent.55 Their research examined the communication of intent in
51 Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion,” 11; Shamir, Transforming Command, 3; Jochen Wittmann, Auftragstaktik, Just a Command Technique or the Core Pillar of Mastering the Military Operational Art (Göttingen, Germany: Miles Verlag, 2012), 15; Bungay, The Art of Action, 58.
52 Stephen Bungay, “The Road to Mission Command: The Genesis of a Command Philosophy,” The British Army Review 137 (summer 2005): 26.
53 John T. Nelson, II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters 17, no. 3 (1987):
27.
54 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command.
55 Lawrence Shattuck, and David Woods, “Communication of Intent in Military Command and Control Systems,” in The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, ed. Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau, 279–292 (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000).
military command and control systems by simulating commander orders and gaging subordinate actions when event anomalies occurred. Results of their simulation indicated that even though there are specified methods to communicate intent within the military, subordinate leaders were able to match their commander’s intent only 34 percent of the time.56 Explanations for the results are discussed in terms of a path versus state framework, flexibility versus synchronicity, language ambiguity, and leader communication as a means of imparting presence.
Stewart argues that commander’s intent can be contrasted as either problem bounding or problem solving.57 Problem bounding directives, a quality of mission command, are less detailed by a factor of three to one than problem solving directives which are issued by commanders in a more hierarchical, top-down organization.58 Shamir, Stevens and Smith, and Storr all provide comparisons of mission command with more authoritative or hierarchical styles of command.59 These authors are advocates for mission command; however, Shamir and Storr both express concern that there are organizational obstacles that must be overcome in order for mission command to be effective.
The U.S. Navy embraces “command by negation,” a style of leadership that shares most of the attributes of mission command, namely decentralization and initiative at the lowest levels of the organization. Command by negation was born out of the difficulty that naval vessels had in communicating during battles at sea or when traveling around the world. On-scene commanders are expected to take all available action to complete a mission until “reined in” by a senior commander.60 On an individual leader
56 Ibid.
57 Keith Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 4 (2009): 50–59.
58 Ibid.
59 Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): 645–672; Patrick Stevens, and Mark Smith, A Proposed Framework for Managing Catastrophic Incidents (Franktown, CO: Mission-Centered Solutions, 2011), 17; Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age,” 128.
60 Larry Legree, “Will Judgement Be a Casualty of Network-Centric Warfare?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 10 (October 2004): 54–57.
level, Marquet describes a type of mission command philosophy, technique he calls leader-leader and that was utilized to transform a poorly performing crew assigned to a nuclear submarine into the most improved ship in the Pacific Fleet.61 Through discussion and practice, he created an environment where the need to give orders was minimized and subordinates prefaced every action with statements such as “I intend to . . ., I plan on . . ., I will . . ., and We will . . .”62 The impact of this change in protocol was to shift passive followers into “thinking obedience” through empowering thought and language; a prime objective of mission command.