Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Private respondents miserably failed to convince the Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
60. Shell Philippines Exploration v Jalos GR 179918 September 8, 2010
Facts:
In 1990, Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for exploration and extraction of petroleum in Northwestern Palawan. In 1992, Shell discovered natural gas in Camago-Malampaya area and installed a pipeline from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas, spanning 504 kilometers and crossing the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
In 2003, Efren Jalos and 77 other individuals filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC alleging that their livelihood as substinence fishermen was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. As a result, their average net income per month fell from P4,848 to only P573. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that it is a pollution case and should be filed under the Pollution
Adjudication Board pursuant to RA3931.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication Board
Ruling: Yes, the Pollution Adjudication Board has primary jurisdiction over the instant case. Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does not use the word pollution in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shells pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the coastal areas. The pipeline, they said, greatly affected or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters natural function as fishing grounds. Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et als claim for damages, the proper tribunal must determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters properties and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB. Jalos, et al had, therefore, an
administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts. The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition of the term pollution itself connotes the need for specialized knowledge and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters.
61. Pimentel Jr v Senate Committee of the Whole GR No. 187714 March 8, 2011 Facts:
On September 15, 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson, through a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!”, called attention to congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act the P200 million appropriated for construction of C.P. Garcia Ave. Ext. from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in
Paranaque City with double entry leading to Senator Villar. P.S. Resolution 706 was introduced by Senator Madrigal to investigate on this issue. However, due to accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. Said motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. et al, however, filed a petition with the Supreme Court assailing the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondents contend in their Comment that petitioners failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort
Issue: Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction Ruling:
No, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable to this case. The Court has ruled that if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. As for respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court held that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is a duty imposed on the Court by the Constitution and that it would be remiss in the performance of that duty if the Court declines to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
62 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999
FACTS:
Respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) and petitioner Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) participated in a certification election conducted to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of respondent Social Security System (SSS). The certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378 votes, SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes.
The SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or motion to annul the result of the certification election. The Bureau of Labor Relations denied the protest and/or motion. The SSSEA also filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the SSS Regional Office, the petition was also denied and ACCESS was declared the winner in the certification election. ACCESS was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with the latter. A motion for reconsideration was filed but eventually denied. The petitioner then filed to the Court a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order to nullify the result of the said certification election.
ISSUE:
Is the resort to Court through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 a proper remedy? HELD:
NO. The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because of the pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with the bureau of Labor Relations.[8] Petitioner further contends that no certification election was held in the regional offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner of the election.
Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.[9] Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.[10]
63. Zabat v. Court of Appeals 338 SCRA 551 Facts:
In 1977, the NHA conducted a census of residents and discovered that two (2) structures, one owned by plaintiff- appellant Marylou Zabat and the other by the Mauris, were constructed on the controverted lot. Nonetheless, Marylou Zabat was included in the census as owner of a structure and given a tag number for the purpose.
Subsequently, in 1981 a census verification was conducted again by the NHA which found that the structure owned by the plaintiffs-appellants was being rented out to a certain Conrado Briones and on the basis thereof, plaintiffs-appellants were declared as absentee structure owners and under Section 1 (a) of Memo Circular No. 13 issued by the NHA, an absentee structure owner is disqualified from a lot award. The lot was subsequently awarded to Mauris.
Marylou Zabat raised the matter on appeal to the Awards and Arbitration Committee )of the NHA on March 15, 1983 but was denied. Eight (8) days later or on August 24, 1985, the lot was awarded to the Mauris and a conditional contract to sell was executed by the NHA in the formers favor.
On October 22, 1992, plaintiffs-appellants filed for Injunction with Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants-appellees and the persons working under them to refrain from demolishing the structure of the plaintiffs-appellants. But TRC denied her motion. The CA affirmed RRTCs Descion.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can File for injunction. Held:
As a rule, injunction is not granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party to be placed into that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[11] In our view, petitioners have not clearly and unmistakably shown why they were entitled to co-own the lot with the Mauris. .
Additionally, it should be stressed that the remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated.[12] In their complaint before the trial court and in the present petition, petitioners pray that the NHA be enjoined from evicting them and from demolishing their structure. What they truly and ultimately desire, however, is to overturn the award of the lot solely to the Mauris.[13] This, in our view, is not legally feasible. The award of the lot has already been accomplished. The NHA awarded the subject lot to the Mauris on August 24, 1985, while petitioners complaint for injunction was filed only on October 22, 1992.A span of seven years has intervened. Injunction here would just be an exercise in futility.[14]
Moreover, the long period which has elapsed, from the time of the award of the lot to the Mauris in 1985 to the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction in 1992, has made petitioners claim upon the subject lot a stale demand. Laches already set in. Petitioners failed, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. Their negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that they have either abandoned or declined to assert it..
Here we find applicable the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Before a party mayseek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes.[20] A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court.
64. INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs. HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et al., respondents-appellees. G.R. No. L-29171 April 15, 1988
NARVASA, J.: