In 1990, the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) offered for sale all the assets and properties of the Cagayan Sugar Corporation (CASUCO), which had been foreclosed and transferred to APT by the Development Bank of the Philippines. By virtue of which, an auction sale was conducted and the petitioner was the highest bidder. Among the properties bought by petitioner were sugar mill machineries located at the CASUCO millsite in Piat, Cagayan.
On October 18, 1990, the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan issued a "Notice of Assessment of Real Property" to petitioner covering the machineries installed at the CASUCO millsite. Subsequently, on February 8, 1991, petitioner appealed the assessment to the LBAA, on the ground that it was excessive, erroneous, and unjust.
On April 18, 1992, petitioner prepared an Appeal of Assessment addressed to the LBAA but did not file the same with the CBAA. It was only on November 25, 1992, that petitioner filed with the CBAA an Appeal of Assessment identical with its earlier appeal dated April 18, 1992. On May 17, 1994, the CBAA dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was time-barred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the protest of petitioner has merit.
Whether or not the appellate court err in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's appeal to the CBAA for being time-barred.
HELD:
1. No. Petitioner insists that its protest has merit; in view of a 1st Endorsement Letter of the Deputy Executive Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance dated May 17, 1996, directing the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan to recompute the market value of petitioner's machineries.
However, said letter referred to the protested assessment done by the Provincial Assessor. There was no reference at all to the assessment of petitioner's machineries, which was done by the LBAA, which revised and corrected the protested appraisal by the Provincial Assessor. Said letter did not find erroneous the re-assessment done by the LBAA, which was subsequently upheld by both the CBAA and the Court of Appeals. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
2. Yes. The appeal found to be time-barred is not petitioner's appeal of the Provincial Assessor's assessment to the LBAA, but the resolution of the LBAA sought to be appealed to the CBAA. As found by the Court of Appeals:
Records show that the Petitioner had already received, as of April 18, 1992, the Resolution of the Respondent LBAA dated April 1, 1992, denying Petitioner's appeal. The Petitioner, thus, had only until May 18, 1992, to appeal the questioned Resolution of Respondent LBAA. However, it was only on November 25, 1992 when the Petitioner lodged its appeal with the Respondent CBAA…By then, the thirty (30) day reglementary period to perfect Petitioner's appeal had long elapsed
Based on the records, we hold that the respondent court did not err in finding petitioner's appeal to the CBAA time-barred. The applicable provision is Section 34of P.D. No. 464, and not Section 30. Where the owner or administrator of a property or an assessor is not satisfied with the decision of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, he may, within thirty days from the receipt of the decision, appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Petitioner does not dispute respondent court's findings that petitioner received on April 18, 1992, the LBAA resolution denying its appeal and that it had only until May 18, 1992, to appeal the local board's resolution to the CBAA. Petitioner, however, only filed its appeal with the CBAA on November 25, 1992 or way beyond the period to perfect an appeal. No error was thus committed by the CBAA when it dismissed petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time and the appellate court was correct in affirming the dismissal. Well-entrenched is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failing in this regard renders the decision final and executory.
RE: PROTEST OF THE ASSESSMENT.
Manila Electric Cooperative Vs.
NeliaBarlis
G.R. No. 114231 May 18, 2001 FACTS:
The petitioner herein, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), a duly-organized corporation in the Philippines from 1968 to 1972 is engaged in the distribution of electricity, erected four (4) power generating plants in Sucat, Muntinlupa. From 1975 to 1978 MERALCO paid the real property taxes on the said properties on the basis of their assessed value as stated in the tax declarations. In 1985, the Offices of the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, upon review of the records pertaining to assessments and collection of real property taxes, discovered, among others, that MERALCO, for the period beginning 1976 to 1978, misdeclared and/or failed to declare for taxation purposes a number of real properties, consisting of several equipment and machineries, found in the said power plants as observed on its sale to NAPOCOR of its powerplant. The Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa then declared and assessed the subject real properties for taxation purposes. By virtue of such, Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon forwarded a supplemental collection notice to MERALCO, dated 31 October 1989 and a formal notice, demanding the immediate payment of their unpaid real property taxes inclusive of penalties and accrued interest.
Immediately, MERALCO filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) praying, among others, that a TRO be issued to enjoin the Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa from enforcing the warrants of garnishment against their accounts in several banks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is without authority to address the alleged irregularity in the issuance of the notices of assessment without prior tax payment, under protest, by petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. A notice of assessment should effectively inform the taxpayer of the value of a specific property, or proportion thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification, and appraisal of properties.
From the tone and content of the notices, the 3 September 1986 notices sent by former Municipal Treasurer Norberto A. San Mateo to petitioner MERALCO are the notices of assessment required by the law as it merely informed the petitioner that it has yet to pay the taxes in accordance with the reassessed values of the real property mentioned therein. The 31 October 1989 notices sent by Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon to MERALCO is likewise of the same character. Only the letter dated 20 November 1989 sent by Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon to petitioner MERALCO could qualify as the actual notice of collection since it is an unmistakable demand for payment of back taxes.
Be that as it may, petitioner was correct when it pointed out that the Municipal Treasurer, contrary to that required by law, issued the notices of assessment. However, the trial court is without authority to address the alleged irregularity in the issuance of the notices of assessment without prior
tax payment, under protest, by petitioner. Section 64 of the RPTC, prohibits courts from declaring any tax invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the assessment or collection of taxes except upon the condition that the taxpayer pays the just amount of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding. As petitioner failed to make a protest payment of the tax assessed, any argument regarding the procedure that should have been observed in the preparation of the notice of assessment and collection is futile as the trial court in such a scenario cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
RE: PROTEST OF THE ASSESSMENT.
Manila Electric Company Vs.
NeliaBarlis
G.R. No. 114231 February 1, 2002 FACTS:
Petitioner herein alleges that the September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 notices were actually tax collection notices and not tax assessment notices, thus, petitioner was not able to avail of the proper administrative remedies in protesting an erroneous tax assessment before the LBAA. The petition herein is then brought to assail the decision of the Court that RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s Petition for Prohibition to enjoin respondent Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa from garnishing petitioner’s bank deposits to the extent of its unpaid real estate taxes inasmuch as petitioner did not comply with the legal requirement of paying under protest the taxes assessed against it as provided for in Real Property Tax Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Notices are notices o assessment.
2.Whether or not the notice sent to petitioners are mere notices of collection and not notices of assessment thus depriving petitioner administrative remedies such as protest.
HELD:
1. No, The September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 notices do not contain the essential information that a notice of assessment must specify, namely, the value of a specific property or proportion thereof which is being taxed, nor does it state the discovery, listing, classification and appraisal of the property subject to taxation. In fact, the tenor of the notices bespeaks an intention to collect unpaid taxes, thus the reminder to the taxpayer that the failure to pay the taxes shall authorize the government to auction off the properties subject to taxes or, in the words of the notice, “Ipinaaala-alapolamang, angsinomangmagpabaya o magkautangngbuwisngmaluwat ay isusubasta (Auction Sale) ngpamahalaananginyongari-arianngnaaayonsabatas.” The petitioner is also correct in pointing out that the last paragraph of the said notices that inform the taxpayer that in case payment has already been made, the notices may be disregarded is an indication that it is in fact a notice of collection.
Whether or not a tax assessment had been made and sent to the petitioner prior to the collection of back taxes by respondent Municipal Treasurer is of vital importance in determining the applicability of Section 64 of the Real Property Tax Code inasmuch as payment under protest is required only when there has in fact been a tax assessment, the validity of which is being questioned. Concomitantly, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application where no tax assessment has been made.
2. Ordinarily, in the light of the foregoing facts, we would remand this case to the trial court pursuant to the basic tenet that this Court is not a trier of facts. Under the present circumstances, however, a remand of this case to the trial court would be a superfluity. Hence, should the trial court find that there has indeed been a prior assessment, petitioner’s petition for prohibition would be dismissed for failure to pay under protest and to exhaust administrative remedies. However, a finding by the trial court that there was no tax assessment made prior to the collection of taxes would render inapplicable the requirement of paying under protest and exhausting administrative remedies by first appealing to the LBAA before the trial court takes cognizance of petitioner’s petition for prohibition. Unfortunately therefore, even if the trial court can assume jurisdiction over the said petition for prohibition, there is nothing substantial left for it to do.
RE: PROTEST OF THE ASSESSMENT.
Manila Electric Company Vs.
NeliaBarlis
G.R. No. 114231 June 29, 2004 FACTS:
In 1985, the Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa, while reviewing records pertaining to assessment and collection of real property taxes, discovered, among others, that MERALCO, for the period, 1976 to 1978, misdeclared and/or failed to declare for taxation purposes a number of real properties consisting of several equipment and machineries found in the said power plants.
Thereafter, on September 3, 1986, the Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa issued three notices to MERALCO, requesting it to pay the full amount of the claimed deficiency in the real property taxes covering the machinery and equipment found in the said power plants. He warned the taxpayer that its properties could be sold at public auction unless the tax due was paid. Still, MERALCO did not pay the assessed tax, nor take steps to question the tax assessed as contained in the said notices. In such regard judicial actions were brought by Meralco. In a resolution dated May 18, 2001, the Court held that the appellate court correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner because the latter failed to first pay under protest the deficiency taxes assessed against it, as required. Moreover, the Court stated that the Notices sent by the respondent to the petitioner dated September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 were in the nature of tax assessments; hence, the petitioner should have paid under protest the deficiency tax assessed against it. Petitioner received a copy of this Court’s Decision on June 18, 2001 and filed, on July 3, 2001, a motion for reconsideration thereon. The Court, however, reversed its ruling that the notices sent by the respondent to the petitioner were notices of assessment.
It categorically stated that the notices were, in fact, notices of collection.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court’s May 18, 2001 Decision should be set aside and factual findings contained in the Court’s February 1, 2002 Resolution regarding the same case be upheld.
HELD:
Upon a careful review of the records of this case and the applicable jurisprudence, we find that it is the contention of the petitioner and the ruling of this Court in its February 1, 2002 Resolution that upheld the petitioner’s contention and ruled that the aforequoted letters/notices are not the notices of assessment envisaged in Section 27 of P.D. No. 464 which is correct.
Indeed, even the respondent admitted in his comment on the petition that:
Indeed, respondent did not issue any notice of assessment because statutorily, he is not the proper officer obliged to do so. Under Chapter VIII, Sections 90 and 90-A of the Real Property Tax Code, the functions related to the appraisal and assessment for tax purposes of real properties situated within a municipality pertains to the Municipal Deputy Assessor and for the municipalities within Metropolitan Manila, the same is lodged, pursuant to P.D. No. 921, on the Municipal Assessor.
The petitioner’s action for prohibition was not premature. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment granting the petition for certiorari of the respondent
RE: PROTEST OF THE ASSESSMENT.
National Power Corporation Vs.
Province of Quezon
G.R. No. 171586 January 25, 2010 FACTS:
Respondent herein, the Province of Quezon assessed Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant) for unpaid real property taxes for the machineries located in its power plant in Pagbilao, Quezon. Napocor,petitioner on the other hand entered into a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Agreement (entitled Energy Conversion Agreement) with Mirant, and as such was furnished a copy of the tax assessment. Napocor, not Mirant protested the assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA), claiming entitlement to the tax exemptions provided under Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC) and if not entitled therein to some other privileges. In the Court’s Decision of July 15, 2009, it ruled that Napocor is not entitled to any of these claimed tax exemptions and privileges on the basis primarily of the defective protest filed by the Napocor and found Napocor to have not filed a valid protest against the realty tax assessment because it did not possess the requisite legal standing. Napocor on the other hand posited that Mirant only possessed naked title to the machineries and they are the ones who actually has legal interest therein.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not NAPOCOR was the proper party to protest the real property tax assessment issued over its power plant in Pagbilao, Quezon.
2. Whether or not payment under protest is required before an appeal to the LBAA can be made
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court held that the legal interest should be one that is actual and material, direct and immediate, not simply contingent or expectant given the special nature of a BOT agreement as discussed in the cited case, we find Article 1503 inapplicable to define the contract between Napocor and Mirant, as it refers only to ordinary contracts of sale. We thus declared in Tatad v. Garcia that under BOT agreements, the private corporations/investors are the owners of the facility or machinery concerned.
Apparently, even Napocor and Mirant recognize this principle; Article 2.12 of their BOT Agreement provides that "until the Transfer Date, Mirant shall, directly or indirectly, own the Power Station and all the fixtures, fitting, machinery and equipment on the Site. Mirant shall operate, manage, and maintain the Power Station for the purpose of converting fuel of Napocor into electricity."
Moreover, if Napocor truly believed that it was the owner of the subject machineries, it should have complied with Sections 202 and 206 of the LGC which obligates owners of real property to:
a. file a sworn statement declaring the true value of the real property, whether taxable or exempt; and
b. file sufficient documentary evidence supporting its claim for tax exemption.
While a real property owner’s failure to comply with Sections 202 and 206 does not necessarily negate its tax obligation nor invalidate its legitimate claim for tax exemption, Napocor’s omission to do so in this case can be construed as contradictory to its claim of ownership of the subject machineries. That it assumed liability for the taxes that may be imposed on the subject machineries similarly does not clothe it with legal title over the same. We do not believe that the phrase "person having legal interest in the property" in Section 226 of the LGC can include an entity that assumes another person’s tax liability by contract.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court held that by providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in the assessment roll, the above-quoted provision implies that the local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. Since Napocor was simply questioning the correctness of the assessment, it should have first complied with Section 252, particularly the requirement of payment under protest. Napocor’s failure to prove that this requirement has been complied with thus renders its administrative protest under Section 226 of the LGC without any effect. No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax.
It was an ill-advised move for Napocor to directly file an appeal with the LBAA under Section 226 without first paying the tax as required under Section 252. Sections 252 and 226 provide successive administrative remedies to a taxpayer who questions the correctness of an assessment.
Section 226, in declaring that "any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may x xx appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals x xx," should be read in conjunction with Section 252 (d), which states that "in the event that the protest is denied x xx, the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title
Section 226, in declaring that "any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may x xx appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals x xx," should be read in conjunction with Section 252 (d), which states that "in the event that the protest is denied x xx, the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title