El uso equivocado de las palabras

cooperation would be encouraged.49

In August 1948 the US government publicly sought responses from the seven claimants to the concept of a multiple condominium, stressing the importance of scientific investigation and research in the Antarctic, and the need to find a solution to the problem of the conflicting sovereignty claims.50 The United States envisaged an "extended exchange of views, consideration of suggestions, and probably reconciliation of varying viewpoints" although no formal conference was contemplated "at present" (Anon 1948b:301). Replies from all seven claimants were received by March 1949, but there was clearly no common ground among them.51

The Soviet Union made it clear that it would not countenance any domination of the Antarctic by the United States and its allies. In 1949 the semi-official Geographical Society of the USSR passed a resolution asserting that the Soviet Union had an "indisputable right ... to participate in the solution of questions concerning the Antarctic" (Wolk 1958:45) and that they had every reason not to accept or recognise any solution made without their participation.52 In June 1950 (just before the outbreak of the Korean War) the Soviet government addressed a note to the United States and six of the seven claimants53 declaring that any discussion on the future of the Antarctic should not take place without Soviet involvement, citing von Bellingshausen’s voyage and recent Soviet whaling interests.54

49. This proposal was drafted by Professor Escudero who had conducted the inquiry into Chile’s sovereignty claim.

50. Throughout this period the US had not rejected the possibility of making a claim of its own. President Eisenhower had approved a 1954 National Security Proposal that the US make a formal claim although in 1956 he revised US Antarctic policy to delete references to permanent stations and ongoing mapping programs (Shapley 1985:60-61; Beck 1986b:41). In the 1956/57 season, United States nationals deposited 31 claims in various parts of the Antarctic.

51. Argentina rejected it out of hand on the grounds of "uncontestable sovereignty". Chile again offered the Escudero Declaration as a counter-proposal. New Zealand and the UK thought it a useful basis for discussion. France and Australia saw no need to discuss the sovereignty issue at all, although they supported the principle of scientific investigation. Norway was somewhat equivocal.

52. See Wolk (1958:43). The President of the Society, L S Berg, asserted that Soviet interest in the Antarctic had always been there but that the economic and general domestic difficulties which had beset the USSR during the first years of its evidence had prevented the government from taking the necessary practical steps.

53. There were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile at the time.

54. The Soviet note also referred to the great economic value of the territory of the Antarctic and adjacent waters, as well as its scientific significance (Hayton 1960b: 381-2). Many commentaries have referred to the time lag of almost 130 years between Bellingshausen’s exploration and the revival o f Soviet interest However it is worthwhile noting that prior to the late 1920s the US had been absent (at least officially) from the Antarctic for almost 90 years, and the French claim had been based on a sighting 80 years previous, with no intervening French activity in that part of the Antarctic.

In the absence of any common ground discussions stalled in the early 1950s.55 This faltering of interest has generally been described (with hindsight) as a failure to establish a regime (Peterson 1988:50-66). However discussions in the late 1940s were little more than an exchange of views as opposed to detailed negotiations. The scope and nature of an Antarctic problem was not clearly defined among the claimants and the US. The claimants did not perceive any urgent need for an agreement among them, either in terms of benefits to be gained or losses to be minimised. Their interests were defined primarily in terms of the exercise of their sovereign rights. US presence in the Antarctic was generally accepted and, in the absence of active interest from other states, any territorial or legal challenge to the claimants’ interests did not seem imminent. While rivalry between the overlapping claimants was potentially a matter for concern, it had been contained to some extent by the Tripartite Naval Agreement.56

The only point on which there was agreement was the exclusion of the Soviet Union.57 However, in spite of Soviet pronouncements, and some concern about superpower rivalry extending to the Antarctic, the Soviet Union was not active in the Antarctic (except for whaling) and showed no signs of becoming so in the near future.

Science and politics: towards a regime

The nature of Antarctic politics changed in the mid-1950s as a result of international attention generated not by explorers nor even predominantly by diplomats and international lawyers, but by the scientific community. Concerted scientific research during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58) reaffirmed not only the intrinsic value of Antarctic science,58 but also the link between politics and science which has characterised the Antarctic since.

The International Geophysical Year (IGY), an ambitious programme of scientific investigation, began on 1 July 1957 and lasted, in fact, until the end of 1958.59 It was 55. US attention was diverted by the Korean War, and internal disagreements on US policy undermined any attempts to seek a solution with the claimants. Chilean interest in advocating the Escudero proposal was waning in part because of its forthcoming (1952) election.

56. To recall, under this agreement Argentina, Britain and Chile had agreed not to send warships south o f 60*S.

57. The intention to exclude the USSR as an unfriendly power was set particularly against the background o f the blockade o f Berlin and the Berlin Airlift of June 1948, in which both the US and the UK were involved.

58. Antarctic IGY research included investigation into the aurora and airglow, gravity, cosmic rays, ionospheric physics, geomagnetism, meteorology, oceanography, seismology and glaciology (Department of State 1964:4) and contributed immeasurably to knowledge about the region and, indeed, the planet.

59. On the IGY generally, see Bertram (1958), Beck (1986b:46-58), Quigg (1983: 46-55). Plans for a third International Polar Year had evolved to become an international scientific programme encompassing the whole earth. Worldwide, 67 countries took part (Shapley 1985:59). Planning for the IGY generally attempted to separate politics from science. Resolutions were passed at planning meetings to the effect that IGY activities would not "modify the existing status of the

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