After Suharto, the instrumental role of Islam seemed apparent during the Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid administrations, when Islam was used in both political language and symbols (interview with Azyumardi Azra, 25/20/2013). However, according to Sukma (2003), the growing imperative of Islam in domestic politics was not automatically reflected in the country’s foreign policy. As a transitional president, Habibie faced severe challenges to his political legitimacy, as he was regarded as the continuation of his predecessor. Thus, it was not expected that he would promote the aspirations of his people (Ananta, Arifin, & Suyadinata, 2005; He, 2008).
Concerned with issues of legitimacy, Habibie distanced himself from Suharto by initiating press freedoms, releasing political detainees and liberalising political laws and laws related to political parties. During the Habibie administration, human rights laws were introduced and decentralisation of authority to the regions began. All efforts were expended in laying down the foundations of the country’s democratisation. His administration also dealt with challenges related to economic recovery and public security. Overall, domestic concerns appeared to come to the fore during this era.
Habibie leveraged foreign policy to gain international support to overcome his lack of political legitimacy (He, 2008). He garnered a positive international response following his democratisation program, the 1999 general election, and the preparation of the East Timor referendum. His economic recovery efforts were also largely successful. The IMF and the World Bank lent its assistance and policy advice, which in turn improved the economy and stabilised the country’s currency. The IMF and the World Bank expressed their trust in his administration, disbursing US$43 billion and offering another US$14 billion to aid an
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economic recovery (Schwarz, 2012, p. 373; Vermonte, 2005). However, this relatively successful record was ‘rendered void overnight’ by the riots sparked by the East Timor referendum. The riots were perpetrated by pro-integration militias backed by the military, damaging Habibie’s international position (Anwar, 2005). Habibie was considered to have failed in resolving the complex political crisis in Indonesia (He, 2008), and lost the opportunity for another presidential term.
In contrast with Habibie, Wahid commenced his tenure with strong legitimacy and popular support. He was the first Indonesian president elected via a transparent and democratic process. Early political support for Wahid came from Poros Tengah (Central Axis), a coalition of mostly Islamic parties. The challenges he faced included a potential break-up of the country’s territory, promoting good governance, the economic recovery process, and a lack of capacity to consolidate democracy. As a result, Abdurrahman Wahid’s foreign policy sought international support for national territorial integrity, economic recovery, democratic consolidation, and the restoration of its tarnished international image which was perceived as a stumbling block for foreign investors (Anwar, 2005).
To achieve this goal, Wahid travelled overseas a great deal to secure international assistance, and received formal support from a variety of countries he visited. He also received assurances from the Muslim Group at the United Nations, a caucus of Muslim nations that overlaps with the OIC (A. Smith, 2000). In addition, Indonesia also secured agreements in relation to economic aid and trade relations. However, his long absences abroad resulted in a backlash at home (Anwar, 2005). Wahid visited a total of 90 countries within 21 months of his presidency, and his foreign policy was regarded as high profile but erratic. Despite maintaining a strong international vision in raising Indonesia’s profile in the region and beyond, domestic concerns caused him to lose sight of this vision.
The continuing issues in East Timor placed Wahid under additional strain, and he felt that Indonesia was betrayed by the West. Australia was suspected of espionage even before the East Timor referendum, and the suspension of US military assistance strengthened that sentiment (A. Smith, 2000). Against this backdrop, Wahid proposed the establishment of a coalition of major Asian countries, widely known as ‘Asia’s Central Axis’. This coalition was expected to include Indonesia, India, China, Japan and Singapore, with the purpose of maintaining peace and stability in the region and building
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a just international political order (A. Smith, 2000). However, there was no clear modality or method to support his proposal to establish ‘Asia’s Central Axis’, and the proposal failed to materialise.
Both Habibie and Wahid had strong Islamic credentials, considering their political supporters. Habibie was the chairman of ICMI, while Wahid was the Chairman of NU. Wahid was also well-known as a moderate Islamic champion, and an advocate for democracy and pluralism. When efforts were made for Habibie to step down from his presidential seat, Muslim groups from modernist-oriented organisations in particular stepped up to defend him.
One of Habibie’s strongest supporters among Muslim groups was Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Muslim World Solidarity), or KISDI. This group had supported Habibie’s candidacy in becoming Suharto’s vice president. It accused other groups that opposed Habibie of being ‘enemies of Islam’. The KISDI also staged a rally in front of the People’s Consultative Assembly on 22 May, 1998, under a banner that read: “Those who Oppose Habibie are Enemies of Islam” (Sukma, 2003, p. 84). Formal support for Habibie was provided by the Golkar Party as his main political backbone. Many in this party were affiliated with the ICMI, and became more involved with Golkar during Habibie’s presidency. Prominent ICMI figures included Adi Sasono and Marwah Daud, who both maintained important positions in the party. The Chairman of the Golkar party, Akbar Tanjung, was the former chairman of the Muslim Student Association and a known Habibie loyalist. Although the nationalist-oriented group was still strong within the Golkar, the party became more ‘Islamized’ when pro-Muslim party cadres came to play a more pivotal role (Sukma, 2003).
While both Habibie and Wahid’s foreign policies might not reflect a strong Islamic orientation, their legacy in establishing democracy has impacted the foreign policy of subsequent administrations. Democratisation and other dynamic changes in the domestic political environment have swept through all aspects of Indonesian social and political life, including foreign policy and diplomacy. Previously, foreign policy and diplomacy had been regarded purely as the domain of the executive branch. Consultations between the government, parliament and other foreign policy stakeholders took place only minimally, or never even took place at all. Democratisation allowed for the involvement of more
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stakeholders in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. The involvement of a great number of non-governmental actors allowed for the reflection of more comprehensive notions of Indonesia’s national interests (Alami, 2011).
Habibie laid the foundations for this democratized foreign policy with the issuance of Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. This law defines foreign relations as “every activity related to regional and international aspects which is conducted by central and regional government or its institutions, state institutions, state-owned companies, political parties, societal organisations, non-government organisations or Indonesian citizens”. This definition covers a broad spectrum of actors within foreign relations, including both state and non-state actors (Alami, 2011). Meanwhile, Wahid brought about a shift from military domination to civilian supremacy, including in the realm of foreign policy. According to Dosch (2006), in the Suharto era, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “would simply follow the unitary opinion of the President and Lemhanas (Institute for National Resilience). Now, the MFA has to listen to various opinions from the president, the parliament, military, and other stakeholders. It seems that the military’s influence has significantly shrunk in the general conduct of Indonesian foreign policy” (p. 54).
The emergence of various actors in foreign policy and diplomacy has resulted in a more democratic foreign policy. However, in this context, the government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still the central and dominant actor. Responding to international challenges and domestic needs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Megawati administration and the Yudhoyono administration carried out a restructuring program (Benah Diri). The program was aimed at ‘linking’ and ‘closing’ international and domestic factors. According to Vermonte (2005), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realised that diplomacy must be understood as a way to strive for national interests as well as communicating international developments to a domestic audience. President Megawati’s Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda deemed this concept an ‘intermestic factor’. This concept was widely expressed during the presidencies of Megawati and Yudhoyono (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013).
As Foreign Minister, Wirajuda also popularised the concept of total diplomacy. This concept originated from Mohammad Hatta, the country’s founding father and the architect of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine. Wirajuda frequently quoted
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Hatta’s concept of total diplomacy. Here, total diplomacy is described using the metaphor of a football strategy, whereby every player has an equal opportunity to ensure the team wins the game (interview with Wirajuda, 18/12/2013).
In total diplomacy, all segments of society are involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Such diplomacy requires synergy from all domestic stakeholders to formulate a comprehensive foreign policy based on this intermestic approach (Alami, 2011). In the Indonesian context, total diplomacy has been concretely implemented through the ‘Foreign Policy Breakfast’ event which was firstly proposed and popularised by Wirajuda under Megawati’s administration. This is a regular forum held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where various stakeholders are invited to discuss particular issues. In this way, the government receives inputs at the same time as having the opportunity to disseminate concepts, ideas, proposals, and policies to wider society. Parliamentarians and Muslim groups are among these stakeholders, and their presence is felt when it comes to foreign policy and diplomacy.
In the post-Suharto era the government could not arbitrarily behave in the same manner as the government did prior to May 1998. Furthermore, Indonesia’s parliament now has more power when it comes to foreign policy. Although two amendments of the 1945 Constitution made in the reformasi (reform) era have not negated the central power of president in foreign policy, parliament now has more power compared to its rubber stamp function during the Suharto era. Ambassadorial appointments must pass through ‘a fit and proper test’ conducted by parliament, and sometimes candidates nominated by the government fail this test.
In the early democratic era when all segments of society were revelling in the new democratic process, parliament tried to secure more power over the government. The parliament, particularly ‘Commission I’which oversees defence and foreign affairs, had for some time positioned itself in opposition to the government. It challenged Megawati’s administration, particularly with regard to East Timor and Australia.
It appears that ‘opposition’ to the government did not exclusively belong to ‘Commission I’, but in fact went even further. In early 2002, the Commission urged Prime Minister Howard of Australia to postpone his visit to Jakarta, an action immediately supported by the Speaker of DPR, Akbar Tanjung and the Speaker of MPR, Amien Rais. Both Amien
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and Akbar refused to meet with Howard (Dosch, 2006). This action was thought to be related to issues that took place in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum, the widespread anti-Australian sentiment concerning the Australian peacekeeping force in East Timor, the shared feeling that Australia betrayed Indonesia in relation to East Timor, and the accusation that Australia supported West Papua’s independence.
Although a pluralistic system of foreign policy decision making has been increasingly promoted, the government has sometimes ignored stakeholders’ views on certain issues, resulting in hostility toward the government. These issues include the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Singapore in 2007, and the Iranian Nuclear issue in 2007.
In the case of the DCA, a majority of the members of parliament refused to ratify the agreement signed in Bali on 27 April 2007 by the governments of Indonesia and Singapore. This agreement was signed together with an agreement on extradition as a single package. DPR argued that the government had violated Article 11 of the 1945 Constitution on the authority of the parliament to approve or reject international agreements based on the national interest. Moreover, the government did not involve the parliament during the negotiation process, drawing accusations that it had not communicated in a transparent way with the parliament (Alami, 2011)
The parliament also objected to the content of the agreement, arguing that certain articles were more beneficial to Singapore than Indonesia. The agreement allowed Singapore to conduct its military exercises and to involve other parties when carrying out any military exercise with Indonesia. Their most significant point of contention was that the agreement could potentially threaten Indonesia’s sovereignty. The parliament was clear in that it wanted the agreement to be separated from the agreement on extradition. Meanwhile, Singapore maintained that the extradition agreement would not be ratified if it was not bundled together with the DCA. Currently, both agreements are on hold. Many argue that Indonesia is in great need of the extradition agreement, as a way of retrieving illegal funds earned via corruption which are now sitting in Singaporean banks (Alami, 2011)
The interests of the parliament have often converged with other stakeholders, including Muslim organisations, when it comes to foreign policy formulation. The parliament frequently “jumped on the bandwagon” of the anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Australia,
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and anti-Malaysian sentiment (Dosch, 2006, p. 62). When Wahid proposed opening diplomatic relations with Israel, he faced severe criticism from Muslim groups, and was charged with being insensitive. The parliament then joined the public and voiced its strong objection to Wahid’s proposal. Having learned from previous experience, Wahid paid heed to the parliament’s suggestion and postponed his planned visit to Australia several times. Indonesia-Australia relations at the time were at a low point in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum (Mashad, 2008). In the post-Suharto era, not involving other foreign policy stakeholders in such matters frequently generated criticism from the public and parliament. The government faced further backlash when it decided to vote in favour of the Iranian Nuclear Program Sanctions in 2007. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Yudhoyono’s administration was accused of following the lead of the United States and other major powers. This decision generated criticism from Muslim groups as well as the parliament. Eventually the parliament used the rights of interpellation on the government, causing domestic political turbulence. This case will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
4. Muslim aspirations and the government’s response