Anthropology Kant writes in the same vein: ‘The fact that men can have the idea “F’ raises him infinitely above all the other living beings living on earth... So any language must think “F’ when it speaks in the first person, even if it has no special word to express it. For this power (the abiUty to think) is understanding’ (AkVni27). So, when a child learns to speak in terms of ‘I’ she first comes to think herself (cf. ibidem). Cf. also Kemp Smith (1984), p.LI and ff..
the identity o f junction whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for the intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity o f its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules (A 108, my italics: AK).
What Kant is claiming here is that the categories, which the mind itself introduces, operate as rules, and that the mind has to be able to be conscious of the ‘identity of its act’ in following rules. But what is required for self-consciousness to be possible is that in the consciousness of ‘identity of function’ (of the rules) the subject thinks ‘I’ to itself, an ability Kant also registers, as with the possession of concepts that are rules, as a fact in the account of philosophy. This means that ‘I think so-and-so’ would not be possible without the consciousness that I am following rules in combining the representations involved. And in so doing I use ‘I’ and in that I present myself only as the subject of these representations.
Just how important the following of rules is - including in the expression of the awareness of our doing that - Kant stresses again in terms of its being the condition of the possibility of all meaning: ‘We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations’ (A116).
In the B-Deduction the self-conscious aspect on the subject’s part is stressed several times. There we find Kant saying that synthesis is ‘an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself (B130), and ‘it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me’ (B131-2). In the same context Kant also claims that the I think’ representation is an act of spontaneity (cf. B132).
Kant’s view links closely the possession of self-consciousness, with its identity throughout its manifestation through the self-sufficient use of I’ in connection with representations in general, and the consciousness of the rules used in connecting
representations. ‘This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis’ (B133).
However, here we find the indication to something else. The consciousness of the synthesis, of the rules which synthesize representations, is said to be dependent on my conjoining one representation with another (cf.B133). Now, the conjoining, and the related issue of the basis of the synthesis which is present in every concept or representation of which we can be conscious, will receive its due attention when I come to explain later Kant’s thesis that the unity of apperception is the transcendental ground for the necessary conformity to law of all appearances, and that it is the a priori condition of all combination (cf.A118, 127).
In this section I have tried to show what it means to say that self-consciousness as a faculty for Kant is self-sufficient: in Henrich’s words, it is independent from experience in what concerns its structure and mode and this independence expresses itself in the a priori
certainty which accompanies the use of ‘I’. In my way of putting it: self-consciousness is self-sufficient because it does not depend for its successful exercise on knowledge of the empirical criteria for the identity of a subject of experience conceived as an object in the world of which we would have experiences. Concepts as rules were shown to be fundamental also in relation to ‘I’, but then the mle that mattered is one in which the user of ‘T presents itself merely as subject.
In the sequence, we have to address that other aspect of Kant’s view of self- consciousness: that the transcendental apperception as a unity of apperception is the a priori
ground of all concepts. It is worth seeing how Allison and Henrich deal with this point. This will be the purpose of the next two sections.
4. Allison: Between Subjectivity and Objective Unity
Allison’s view about the identity of the transcendental apperception suffers from an indefiniteness. On the one hand, he says things that favour an interpretation of that identity in terms of ‘subjectivity’. I borrow this phrase from Henrich: 'Subjectivity means that all thoughts in relation to which the thought that “F’ think them is possible do not have this property by virtue of the content that is thought in them. They are ‘my’ thoughts because I
think them, or can think them’^^. They are mine because I think them, that is, independently of what is thought in them there is something objective that guarantees that the thoughts pertain to me. Henrich thinks of subjectivity as a form of putting thoughts together which presupposes a unity, as it were, of a subject of thoughts. This can eventually be explained by discovering the causes of this unity or, as he says, combination-elements or combination- acts which are constant in their form^"^. This is precisely what Hurley understands by ‘objectivity’ in her presentation of the Strawsonian unity-requires-objectivity argument^^.
On the other hand, Allison’s account of the identity of the transcendental self is in terms of the ‘objective unity’, which he conceives as a necessary condition for the identity of complex thoughts themselves. It is the identity of the subject insofar as an act of synthesis is necessary to explain even the analytic unity of apperception or the analytic unity of all general concepts. In this respect Allison reserves a special role for the notion of an act which ‘contains’ a synthesis and the correlated claim that apperception or self-consciousness is only possible through consciousness of this synthesis. It is in this connection that Allison’s view of synthesis âs an act receives its importance^^. I will make explicit the two lines of Allison’s interpretation of Kant, and then see to what extent they are independent. My claim will be that the ‘objective unity’ option reduces to the ‘subjectivity’ option, or, in another jargon, the ‘unity-requires-objectivity’ type of view. Basically, because Allison believes that we have to be able to guarantee ascription of experiences. But, then, Allison does not take
23 . (1989), p.255. 24 . Cf. op.cit. p.256.
25 . Cf. Hurley (1994) for the view that togetherness or co-consciousness of beliefs or experiences can only be guaranteed ‘objectively’, that is, by appeal to persons in the world. Hurley comes up with this ‘neo-Kantian’ [sic] approach, inspired in Williams (1978, pp.95-101), as an attempt to explain Kant’s view that the unity of consciousness is dependent on self-consciousness. The interesting point of the paper is the accusation that Kant is a partisan of the myth of the giving, the idea that there is a homuncular agent who is unlocated and has unexplained abilities to synthesize. This way of questioning Kant’s position would also be reinforced by worries like Walker’s: that when it comes to the self there is a ‘breach’ in the wall of Transcendental Idealism (cf. 1975, pp.131- 5). Walker relishes this possibility, especially in view of the power consequently ascribed to transcendental arguments, but Hurley sees here a deeply confused view on agency and spontaneity. 26 . All these points are to be found in Allison, op.cit. pp. 142-4. Allison discusses these problems mainly in three places in his book, (a) In the Deduction chapter (7): pp. 133-58; (b) in the chapter about the Apperception and the Paralogisms (13): pp.272-93; and (c) in part of the chapter on the Refutation of Idealism (14): pp.304-9.
exactly the Strawsonian line, he rather ends up locating the subject that should account for objectivity outside the realm of experiences. A true transcendent point of view in my opinion. I will start examining the ‘objective unity’ option.
Allison’s starting point is the claim that the representation of a manifold as a manifold is a single complex thought. Backing such a claim is Kant’s theory of concepts as analytic unities which are to be understood as synthetic unities of representations. The Concise Oxford Dictionary's definition of ‘book’ provides an example of such a synthetic unity and also gives an idea of a concept as a synthesis in the sense of result or product, as we have seen in the last chapter.
Allison’s second step is to show that a single complex thought requires a single thinking subject. The argument for this requirement is normally taken by Kant interpreters from William James, and so does Allison: the thought of a whole as a whole requires that each element of the whole be thought by the same single thinking subject, otherwise we would not have guaranteed the thought of the whole itself and could end up with just a set of distinct thoughts of the elements of the whole. Now what James’ understanding of this claim was seems to be clear. It is plausible to think that he was trying to give a concrete illustration of Kant’s verse analogy. In the Second Paralogism, first edition, Kant argues for the
simplicity, and not exactly for the singularity, of what thinks in the following way. ‘For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a
single substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple’(A352). Now it is true that Kant uses the phrase 'single substance’, but this should be interpreted as substance in its logical meaning: as a logical subject (cf.A147/B186; B288; B3(X)). So, the claim is that thought can only inhere in what is always thought as a subject, never as a predicate, and not that the thought can only inhere in the same single permanent substance. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, Allison uses James to account for the I’ of apperception - the logically simple subject - of his support text: B407^^.
James, however, read the verse analogy in a different spirit, and his interpretation is not at all indicative of a logical subject. ‘Take a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell
to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole s e n te n c e '. So, what is a condition of the unity of a thought for James is that one person
thinks the thought. This is the clearest presentation of the point about the necessary supposition of co-consciousness or togetherness of content.
Unfortunately, without paying attention to the distinction I have drawn, Allison’s explanation of the crucial principle of the necessary unity of apperception is in fact unclear. He maintains that from the claim that a single complex thought requires a single thinking subject it follows that (1) a numerically identical T think’ can be reflectively attached to each of the component representations taken individually, and (2) that the thinking subject can be aware of the numerical identity of the T think’. Now, what would be a numerically identical T think’ being reflectively so attached? If it is (1) the claim that the T’ in the T think’ needs to refer to the same thinking subject, the same person or human being, then we have the typical Strawsonian picture. But could it be interpreted otherwise? Could it not be (2) the claim that in this context we are talking about the T think’ as a type, and not about a
tokenl But, then, does it make sense to talk about its numerical identity?^^
Let us examine the illustration Allison offers in support of his claims. If A, B and C are to be thought together in a single consciousness, then the I that thinks A must be identical with the I that thinks B, etc. Furthermore, consciousness of A and B and C as a single complex thought, as a unity, must make possible the consciousness of the identity of the subject in relation to these representations as a unity. How is this explanation supposed to be illuminating if what is doing the work from the start is the notion of a ‘single consciousness’? If ‘single consciousness’ stands for what guarantees co-consciousness or togetherness from the start, then the necessary unity or identity of apperception is not proved at all through the requirements of a single complex thought. The argument is in fact very weak, for a single consciousness is what uniquely can guarantee unity of representations from the start, so the position itself presents matters, without implying consciousness of identity. That is, it guarantees unity even if I do not think I think A’, ‘I think B’, etc. The thought I think’ as a thought could not achieve it anyway. But, if it is the person, who
28 . Principles of Psychology, I, p. 160, quoted by Kemp Smith, op.cit.: p.459.
stands for the T , that explains the unity of a single complex thought, then it is not simply because of the use of ‘I’, or of a type, which is possible in connection with any representation, that we will have necessary numerical identity of consciousness. Because one is not aware of one’s numerical identity with the use of a same sounding T . More is required: the ‘I’ has to refer to the same subject. Allison seems to accept this.
But then Allison has to face a well known Kantian tenet and, as a consequence, he qualifies his intentions: he is not trying to prove that we are aware a priori of our numerical
identity, because this would certainly amount to having a Cartesian view of the self; rather we are aware of the ‘fact’ that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge. How does Allison defend this claim, and does this now assert something different from what is contained in James’ point? We may expect an clarification coming from Allison’s account of the act of synthesis, but in his strategy the necessity of such a synthesis is itself derived from the necessary unity or identity of apperception. Nonetheless, he says that the act of synthesis is what makes that identity possible.
Much of the difficulty concerning the connection between the thoroughgoing identity of the apperception and the theory of synthesis relates to two Kantian theses which have one formulation in B 133: (1) That identity ‘contains’ a synthesis and (2) that identity is possible only through the consciousness of the synthesis. Is it possible to learn something from Allison’s explanation of these theses?
The explanation of (1) reminds us, firstly, that apperception involves an actual consciousness of an identical ‘I think’. This means that the thought of the identity of the ‘I think’ ‘contains’ a synthesis, that is, through it a unification of representations is also brought about. Suppose we have I think A’ and I think B’ pertaining to a single consciousness. Allison’s point is that the subject of these thoughts can only become conscious of her identity in the thinking of these thoughts if it combines A and B. The claim then is that apperception of identity requires that a unity of representations has been brought about. This is why this act of becoming aware of identity ‘contains’ a synthesis.
The claim that awareness of identity involves awareness of synthesis or combination finds its defence as follows. The combination of A and B which makes the consciousness of identity possible is a ‘putting together’, that is, the awareness of identity is made possible through a combination or synthesis of A and B, but it is itself at the same time an awareness
of the result of their combination. So, one would have to think ‘I think A’, ‘I think B ’, and then ‘I think A and B’.
But in this case, the objection is straightforward. The necessity of a conjunction of T’-thoughts threatens an infinite regress. Why is it not required that one thinks those thoughts plus T think A, B and A and B’?
It is at this juncture that Allison insists that ‘my consciousness (apperception) that both A and B are my representations is inseparable from my consciousness of the act of thinking them together in a single consciousness’ (claim 2 above)^^. That is, the consciousness of the act of synthesizing is expected to do the trick, to avoid the regress. Now, Allison’s all important qualification of this claim is that it does not amount to introspective psychology nor to an idealistic ontological thesis about how the mind creates the phenomenal world. But do these negative points pre-empt the accusation that the position indulges in the myth of the givingl^^
Allison tries hard to connect the points he is making with a consciousness, not experience, of the form of thinking, that is, with the formal account of the objective unity (or