The second half of the behavioural complexity part of the proposed conceptual framework consists of the Sociopolitical Impact upon HL, as well as the impact HL has onto its sociopolitical context. The impact of HL is not limited to humanitarian responses. Efforts in this area are also relevant to society at large. As almost every government is involved in humanitarian operations as a donor and/or a recipient (Long and Wood 1995), the public has an interest in their efficiency and effectiveness (Özpolat et al. 2015, Apte et al. 2016).
There are various levels of government involved, ranging from the supranational, to regional structures, such as tribes or groups of belligerents (Hilhorst 2002). On the demand side, governments are involved by requesting aid, allowing access or curtailing it. Thus, NGOs risk being politicised. On the supply side, governments are also the biggest donors. This is not necessarily a merely humanitarian quest and can compromise the neutrality and impartiality that define the humanitarian space. Governments may for example attempt to dispose of surplus production that is often the result of subsidies or to support diplomatic goals (Long and Wood 1995).
Sociopolitical factors add to the messiness of HL in other areas as well. One of them is planning. Both the identity of the donors and the amount of goods or finances they supply is uncertain (Van Wassenhove 2006, Charles et al. 2010). Humanitarian organisations usually receive most of their donations once a disaster has occurred and is reported in the media, which makes advance planning and continuous investment difficult (Day et al. 2012). The extreme fluctuations in the levels of funding are difficult to handle for HL. This is particularly true for preparedness, which is not something donors like to fund, but is essential for a more effective and efficient HL (Jahre and Heigh 2008, Kumar and Havey 2013, Kunz et al. 2014). Therefore, even when planning is possible, it is often not within the scope of activities an organisation can secure funding for.
Even though humanitarian organisations are not ordinarily part of the commercial sector, they still operate in a competitive market. Even non-profit organisations respond to market forces (Hannagan 1992, Thornton 2006). Non-profit organisations are not just passively at the mercy of their donors, but actively manage the relationship with them (Drucker 1990, Hannagan 1992, Stauch 2011). For any non-profit organisation, attracting donors is of vital importance. However, money spent on recruiting donors, is effectively money that cannot be spent on actual aid to the beneficiaries. While active fundraising increases donations, donors are less likely to contribute to an organisation that spends a large percentage of its income on fundraising rather than charitable work, as this is seen to be ineffective (Thornton 2006). There are many ways in which NGOs are trying to reach potential donors, including direct mail, internet pages, and televised fundraising events (Thornton 2006, Stauch 2011). These techniques have been an established part of non-profit management for a long time (Drucker 1990, Hannagan 1992). However, potential donors, both private and governmental ones, are targeted by many campaigns at once, which can lead to a donation fatigue (Moszynski 2010). Too many fundraising activities actually decrease the overall amount of donations (Thornton
2006). Therefore, humanitarian organisations are facing a situation where increased marketing could actually work to their disadvantage, not just individually, but across all non-profits asking for donations from the same target groups, creating a significant sociopolitical issue.
Sociopolitical factors also influence the demand side, which is particularly evident in man-made disasters. As previously mentioned, demand for humanitarian assistance is on the increase, but the supply of donations is not unlimited. There is highly politicised competition among NGOs for scarce donor funding (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997, Van Wassenhove 2006, Beamon and Balcik 2008). While government donations have decreased in times of economic turmoil, private donations have remained stable, amounting to US$ 18 billion in the period from 2006 to 2010 (Stoianova 2012). Nevertheless, even the increase in donations that was seen before the economic crisis could not keep up with the increase in the number of non-profit organisations competing for those donations (Thornton 2006, Herzer and Nunnenkamp 2013). While private donors are becoming more active while governmental donations decrease, they tend to focus their efforts on different areas. Palestine is the second largest recipient of governmental donations, but receives hardly any money from private donations; countries such as Niger and the Central African Republic receive a significantly higher share of private donations (Stoianova 2012, Herzer and Nunnenkamp 2013). This suggests that not every organisation that serves a particular market can secure donations from all potential donor groups.
Recently, private donors are gaining importance. In 2010, private donations accounted for 32% of the money given to humanitarian responses, up from just 17% in 2006 (Stoianova 2012). Nevertheless, governments remain major donors, in particular to the UN agencies and the IFRC organisations. Among the different types of organisations, NGOs receive the most private funding. In 2010 US$ 4.9 billion of private donations made up 57% of NGOs’ income (Stoianova 2012). This can partially be explained by donor preferences. For many private donors, it is more attractive to fund specialised organisations that only provide a limited range of services, and diversification can actually decrease the amount of donations they receive (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997, Herzer and Nunnenkamp 2013). On the other hand, for governments a broad range of activities that large organisations can offer is often more attractive politically. Political preferences, as well as social change, contribute to the messiness of HL by creating much of the demand and supply uncertainty.