Valor Teórico: Los resultados desarrollan o apoyan alguna teoría

Instigated in 1971 the PIF has become the main political regional body for South Pacific countries.84 _{Although the Forum tends to rely on the United Nations (UN) for major}

security initiatives such as the regional peacekeeping forces committed to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), or the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN), many security challenges exist that the PIF directly address. Indeed, the PIF is seen as an effective institution that can provide multilateral cover for security initiatives when the UN is unable to offer its resources, effectively acting out the principle of subsidiairty. In an effort to thwart transnational security threats, the Forum has adopted a number of declarations and plans. The Honiara Declaration in 1992, the Aitutaki Declaration in 1997, the Bikatawa Declaration in 2000, the Nasonini Declaration in 2002 and the Pacific Plan adopted in 2006, have all indicated a commitment to strengthening security in the South Pacific. Generating peace-building initiatives and ensuring a secure region are the cornerstones of the PIF. As outlined under the chapter heading ‘regional priorities,’ the Pacific Plan states that its main objective is to “[e]nhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism.”85

Commenting on its security role, the Pacific Plan also outlines a call for the development and implementation of strategies and legislation for maritime and aviation security. In addition to this, the Plan encourages: surveillance development; strengthening regional policing initiatives and law enforcement training; the development of plans to deal with natural disasters; and the implementation of a Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy (PIRSTCS) on border security.86 _{The PIRSTCS is designed to}

84 _{Membership includes Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New}

Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Tahiti) came under its mandate in 1991.

85 _{Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and}

Integration,” Final Draft: (September 2005), 3.

86 _{Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and}

Integration,”3 and 7. Other Security threats that the Forum outline include money laundering, terrorist recruitment, identity fraud, West African fraud, people smuggling, issuing passports of convenience, electronic crimes, small arms trafficking, illegally trading in endangered wildlife, drug trafficking and organised crime. See Neil Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of

cover transnational crime, bio-security and mentoring for national financial units. The strategy also cooperates on inter-regional and sub-regional levels. For example, the PIF cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).87 _{In conjunction with the}

above mentioned declarations, diplomatic initiatives and military manoeuvres have also been initiated. For example, an Election Observation Mission (EOM) and a regional intervention force to the Solomon Islands were initiated under the banner of the Bikatawa Declaration. Other diplomatic initiatives have been formed to add to security efforts. These include the Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting (PILOM), the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI), the Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meeting (CHARM), the Eminent Persons Group, and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC).

Despite the formal efforts of the PIF to confront security challenges in the Pacific, there has been little adherence to these agreements: the regional declarations simply do not meet national realities.88 _{Indeed, while the Honiara Declaration provides the passage for}

greater cooperation on intelligence sharing and security assistance, little actual progress has been made and no formal security institution or research centre exists with a focus on threats in the Pacific.89 _{While there have been some practical security results in the area}

of fisheries surveillance, there is still a high level of corruption. In a recent forum, an interviewee noted that approximately 60 per cent of logging and fishing in the South Pacific is corrupt or illegal.90 _{Although the traditional security capabilities of the PIF are}

seen to be severely limited, the PIF do act under the banner of regionalism, promoting

Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” Journal of the South Pacific Law (2006): 1., http://www.paclii.org/journals/old_JSPL/current/art1/view.html.

87_{Adjacent to the PIRTCS, regional law enforcement communities aim to strengthen cooperation through:}

donor collaboration meetings; the working group on Border Management Issues (WGBMI); the Data Collection Working Group; the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination centre (PTCCC); the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI); or the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML).

88 _{Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational Crime in the}

South Pacific,” 2-3., Also see Greg Urwin, “Regionalism and the Pacific Plan,” International Labour Organisation Public Lecture (Suva Fiji 15th _{November 2005), Phg 7 and 18., http://forumsec.org/_}

resources/article/files/SG%20ILO%20Public%20Lecture%2015Dec051.pdf.

89 _{Pebbles, Pacific Regional Order, 162. Also see Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the}

Suppression of Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” 2.

90 _{Interview with the director of a security related NGO, 19 April 2007. This is specifically associated with}

economic development and good governance, with the aim of promoting security and the wellbeing of Pacific Island Countries (PICs).