ORGANIZACIÓN SEMANAL:
3.3 Valoración de la estructura de entrenamiento propuesta.
Jakobsen asserts that the willingness to use force can be explained by three ‘will producing; patterns which are Interest-driven pattern, Government-driven pattern and Domestic pressure-driven pattern.36 Furthermore, following Jacobsen’s’ logic I argue that because of the unique threat of states attaining nuclear weapons, there must be an additional pattern that is a ‘vital interest’ driven pattern. The pattern is dependent on the coding, of low to high, of three variables; the nature of threatened interests, prospects of military success and domestic support. This section will examine each of the variables in turn, assessing the extent they were present and determining whether they explain why the US was not willing to threaten the use force over Libya’ nuclear programme.
The nature of the threatened interests.
The Clinton administration articulated within the ILSA that:
The failure of the Government of Libya to comply with Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United Nations, its support of
international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and those countries with which it shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives.37
36 Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice, pg.43.
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Therefore, Libya’s pursuit of WMD was seen as ‘endangering’ national security and foreign policy interests of the US. However, the interests actually being threatened by Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons were not stated.
The greatest threat to the US would have been Libya developing a nuclear weapons system with the capability to strike the US. Gaddafi had stated that Libya, and other Arab nations, should develop such a capability in order to deter US attacks.38 If Gaddafi was only developing a nuclear weapons capability in order to deter US acts of
aggression, it would not be an existential threat to the US. Therefore, it would not be a vital US interest. However, clearly there would always be a fear expressed by some within the US that Gaddafi would not act rationally and would launch an unprovoked attack.
Clinton in his National Strategy for engagement and enlargement stated ‘in those
specific areas where our vital or survival interests-those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity-are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral’.39 This statement emphasised that the use of force was viewed as a viable tool when vital or survival interests were at stake. Therefore, a simple deduction would be that as Clinton never issued a threat, the issue of Libyan nuclear programme was not seen by the Clinton administration as a vital threat and did not require the use or threat of force.
The threat to US interests was more likely that development of a Libyan nuclear weapons capability would complicate the balance of power in the region and the US
38 Cited in Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pg.183.
39 Bill Clinton, President Clinton’s first comprehensive strategy document, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, in The Clinton foreign policy reader : presidential speecheswith commentary, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, Boris Zlotnikov, (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pg.29.
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ability to influence events. This view is put forward by Litwak who states ‘The US concern was that Gaddafi would use what he characterised as a “deterring force” as an offensive coercive instrument to intimidate neighbours and to provide cover for the objectionable foreign policy behaviour’.40 Development of even a limited range nuclear weapons capability could have directly threatened Israel, who in turn, may have decided to take pre-emptive action that would destabilise the region. Gaddafi had openly been anti-Israeli; opening military camps inside Libya to train Arabs to fight the Israelis and funding armed groups within Palestinian territories.41 Furthermore, Israel had taken pre- emptive strikes on a suspected Iraq WMD sites in 1981.
Even a limited nuclear weapon system would have been enough to add to the cost- benefit calculation of conducting any form of military action against Libya.
Furthermore, there would always be a concern that Gaddafi could supply such weapons to terrorists or proliferate to other rogue states or non-state actors. The risk of
proliferating nuclear weapons would increase the threat to the US that the weapons would fall into the hands of enemies willing to use them.
Ambassador Indyk pointed out the concern over proliferation stating that ‘a country like Libya getting nuclear weapons, it’s a threat to our vital interests to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would have been treated as a threat to our vital national interests’.42
If Libya was allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability it would have damaged the credibility of the NPT, possible encouraging other countries to act similarly and causing a rapid increase in nuclear proliferation. Therefore, it was in
40
Robert S Litwak, Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, pg.190.
41 Alison Pargeter, Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012),
pg.125.
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the US interest to prevent such nuclear proliferation as the more states with nuclear weapons the more risk was posed to the US.
Due to the ability to deter the US from acting against Libya, and the risk of proliferation That Libya’s development of a nuclear weapon would have signalled it is assessed that it would have affected US strategic interests43 if Gaddafi had been successful.
Therefore, by Jakobsen’s hierarchy this issue is coded ‘high’.
The prospects of military success.
Throughout the 90s Libya’s military capability declined whilst the US demonstrated convincingly in the Gulf war of 1991 its superiority in conventional forces. As pointed out by Dr El-Kikhia ‘its military is antiquated. It still uses Soviet weapons of 1970’s vintage, and those weapons have demonstrated their ability in the Gulf War. Even far more sophisticated weapons could not stand up to America’s might or European might’.44
The US also firmly indicated that it was capable of taking out WMD plants within Libya, with Frank Bacon, US press spokesperson stating about the Libyan Tarhunah Chemical plant ‘should military options be necessary, we can accomplish this with conventional means.’45
Therefore, the balance of power was clearly in the US favour.
43Op.cit. Jakobsen (1997), pg.36; Jakobsen defines a Strategic interest as one that refers to the
preservation of an Acceptable balance of power, be it global or regional the interest here is to prevent areas of Greatest economic and strategic importance outside the homeland from falling into the wrong hands. Protection of access to important raw materials and important trade links falls into this category, and the American involvement in Europe during both world wars was motivated by this interest.
44
Dr Momsour El-Kikhia, ‘Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on international relations house of representatives’, One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, Tuesday 22 July 1999,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg63272/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg63272.pdf , accessed 17 February 2013 pg.19.
45 05/08/96 [Excerpts] Official Transcript: Defense Department Briefing (Spokesman Kenneth Bacon on
May 7) (4250), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Kenneth Bacon held the regular Tuesday briefing for the press at the Pentagon May 7, http://www.fas.org/news/libya/960508- 436361.htm, accessed 18 February 2014.
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It was also highly unlikely that any major power would have supported Gaddafi if a clear demand had been made that he halt his WMD programmes or face military action. Libya was already politically and economically isolated due to issues over terrorism, and the international outrage would have been focussed on Libya’s disregard for the NPT. Furthermore, no state would have wanted to oppose the US without strong national interests for doing so.
The 1986 bombings proved that Libya was vulnerable to US attacks. Geographically Libya was an easier target for the US than Iraq. The majority of the population lives within the littoral and its coast line goes on for 1170 km46 making it particular
susceptible to airstrikes from European or a US Carrier Group. Furthermore, a Carrier Group was continually deployed to the Mediterranean along with a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) throughout the 90s. 47
However, the high probability of being able to conduct an attack successfully, is different from conducting an attack successfully that achieves the aim of destroying Libya’s nuclear programme. It is unclear whether the US had detailed knowledge of locations essential to his nuclear programme. Without detailed intelligence it is unlikely that limited air strikes alone could confidently destroy Libya’s programme. The US did have the capability to conduct special operations, or even a limited amphibious
operation through the use of the MEU. However, this would have raised the stakes significantly by placing ground troops in direct contact and raising the chances of US
46 CIA World Fact book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html,
accessed 15 January 2014.
47
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994, (London, Routledge, October 1993), pg. 13; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995, (London, Routledge, October 1995), pg.13; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996-1997, (London, Routledge, October 1996), pg.29; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98, (London, Routledge, October 1997).
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casualties. However, due to the vastly capability difference of the opposing forces, if the US had felt it was in its interest to do so it would have had a ‘high’ chance of a military operation succeeding.
The level of domestic support
US politicians clearly saw the issue of reparations for victims of Lockerbie as a priority, most likely because this issue could have an instant effect on votes. This is highlighted by Ambassador Welch who points out ‘my dealing with Congress on the matter is that all they really cared about at the end of the day was getting satisfaction for the
American claimants from Libya. If that could be afforded, they were willing to hit the pause button on other issues’.48
Furthermore, when asked about whether there would have been domestic support for a hard line and threat of force he pointed out that ‘people would have been supportive, but what does taking a hard line mean’, there are limits to it, public enthusiasm can spike early and decline rapidly’.49
This comment points to one of the common issues faced by gaining domestic support, in that it can depend heavily on the mood of the time.
If a case had been put forward to threaten the use of force against Libya over its nuclear weapons programme it is highly likely that it would have been relatively simple to gain the backing of the people for some level of intervention. A media agenda that raised the alarm of the prospect of Libya, a rogue state, led by the irrational Gaddafi, would have undoubtedly concerned many US citizens. However, whether support would have been
48 Author’s interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.
49 Ibid.
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for air strikes or a more prolonged ground operation, with the likelihood of causalities is not possible to assess.
If Gaddafi’s nuclear programme had been placed in front of the US congress and people it is not difficult to believe that a case for threatening military operations could be made. Particularly, as Gaddafi was viewed as a brutal dictator by the US. However, due to the various options it is likely that there would have been a debate regarding what form any military threat should take. Therefore, this element is assessed as ‘medium’.
AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten