and to this universe, we immediately think, καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς, that we possess a clear experience (ἐναργὲς πάθος)
of them in our souls, since we are always talking about them and using their names (ὀνοµάζοντες) on every occasion. But when we try to go on
to examine them, and, as it were get close to them, we once again fi nd ourselves at a loss what to think; different ones of us fi x upon different declarations of the ancient philosophers about them, and perhaps even disagree about how to interpret these statements (Enn. III.7 [45] 1.1–10; trans. after McGuire and Strange [1988] 253).16
We should, Plotinus continues, not content ourselves with a mere dox- ography of opinions of those ancient philosophers on time. Instead we should try to discover which of them actually got it right. We may either start our approach bottom-up, beginning with an investigation of time
15 On the theory of common notions in second and third century Platonism, see
Chiaradonna (2007). For the fact that the theory of common notions ceased to be regarded as typically Stoic, cf. also, e.g., Dörrie (†) and Baltes (2002) 129 (ad § 169). George Karamanolis suggests to me that the fi rst Platonist who was infl uenced by the Stoic doctrine of common notions was Antiochus of Ascalon (see, e.g., Cic., Acad. I.30–32, II.30; Fin. V.59). He argues that Antiochus did not simply adopt a Stoic doctrine, but rather understands it in a Platonist way, especially as regards ethics (Fin. V.59), and thus presumably considers it as an essentially Platonist doctrine which one can fi nd outlined in the theory about the Forms in the Meno or the Republic (cf. Kara- manolis [2006] 64–65).
16 One Platonic text that may have inspired Plotinus is, I suggest, Plato, Soph. 242
b–244 b. The Eleatic stranger remarks to Theaetetus that they should start their discussion from what now seems quite clear (ἐναργῶς, 242 b 10), i.e. the meaning of the word τὸ ὄν: ‘we profess to be quite at our ease about it and to understand the word when it is spoken’ (243 c; trans. Cornford). However, when he studies what the ancient philosophers have said about the topic, he fails to understand them (243 ab), and ends up being completely puzzled about what is meant by τὸ ὄν (244 a). On the methodological aspect of this passage, cf. Politis (2004) 6.
and then proceeding to the paradigm of time, eternity, or, inversely we may start from eternity and work our way down towards time. It need not surprise us that Plotinus, being a Platonist, prefers the top-down approach17 nor that he concludes that Plato is the philosopher who was
right.
I have left the phrase καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς untranslated for the moment since its exact meaning is
debated. Phillips translates ‘as if by comprehensive grasp of our notion of them’.18 He assumes that Plotinus here has the Platonic version of
a common notion in mind, i.e. one that depends on an innate idea. He argues that the phrase ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή denotes the act of intuitive
vision (ἐπιβολή) of the whole nature of intelligible realities, which results
in a comprehensive (ἀθρόα) grasp of it as opposed to the partial and
imperfect comprehension of discursive reason. The ἔννοιαι in this case
are the innate Forms of eternity and time in the human soul. Accord- ing to Phillips, Plotinus criticizes us for using the terms eternity and time too freely, as if we had such an intuitive vision of them, which in fact we do not.19 Moreover, Phillips fi nds in Enn. III.7 [45] an indica-
tion that Plotinus uses common notions as a criterion of truth. In Enn. III.7 [45] 7.14 Plotinus says that, had we not had the opinions of the ancient philosophers, we would have had to start our discussion of time from scratch, while taking care that the ideas that we develop fi t with the conception (ἔννοια) we possess of it.20To this observation, we may
add that later on Plotinus indeed rejects the Stoic theory that time is an extension ‘because it does not have the notion of time’.21
Steven Strange both in the very helpful annotated translation of
Enn. III.7 [45] which he produced together with J. McGuire and in
an illuminating article ‘Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time’ takes up Phillips’ analysis of common notions in Plotinus. He accepts much of what Phillips says, yet disagrees with him about the meaning of the phrase καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς. He
draws attention to the fact that in Epicurus Letter to Herodotus an ἀθρόα
17 Cf. Chiaradonna (2003) 222–223. 18 Phillips (1987) 41.
19 Beierwaltes (1995) 58 n. 42 too assumes that the ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή is some sort of
intuitive grasp of eternity and time. He translates ‘durch den unmittelbaren Zugriff des Denkens’.
20 Cf. Phillips (1987) 39.
language, experience and the philosophy of time 107
ἐπιβολή of the ἔννοια is a general view of something.22 Moreover,
he assumes that ὥσπερ here marks an example rather than a com-
parison.23 He therefore translates, ‘we immediately think, as we do in
the case of more cursory conceptual apprehensions, that we possess a clear impression of them in our souls’. I agree with Strange on the Epicurean interpretation of the ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή. The occurrence of
Epicurean terminology in a Plotinian treatise, odd as it may seem, need not surprise us. Epicurus is after all among those ancient philosophers whose opinions Plotinus sets out to examine.24 Epicurus’ discussion of
time may even provide a clue for the understanding of ὥσπερ. As we
have seen Epicurus denies that we have a proper preconception of time, since we cannot grasp it as such. Therefore, it is more correct to say that we have something like (ὥσπερ) a concept of time, rather
than a concept of time. Plotinus, as we shall see, will make a similar point that we cannot properly grasp time.25 Strange further assumes
that Plotinus here criticizes fellow Platonists for the ease with which they talk about eternity and time even though all we have of these are vague concepts. All the same, Strange assumes that Plotinus here assimilates ‘common conceptions to the inborn notions that are our confused earthly reminiscences of the Ideas’.26 Like Phillips, Strange
assumes that these notions somehow function as a criterion of truth. He argues that Plotinus here adopts Aristotle’s dialectical method which consists in comparing and contrasting the opinions of both the wise and the many.27 He identifi es the opinions of the many with the common
conceptions about eternity and time. They ‘provide reliable guideposts for our inquiry, in that any statement that confl icts with them has no chance of being true’, with a proviso that ‘they are unclear and can as they stand provide no insight into the nature of things’.28
Would Plotinus, would indeed any Platonist, trust the common conceptions of the many to be reliable guideposts for further enquiry?
22 Strange (1994) 28 n. 17; his reference is to Diog. Laërt. X.35. Cf. Ghidini (1996)
996–997, who, too, assumes that Plotinus derives the term ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή from an Epicurean source. Yet, like Phillips, she assumes that Plotinus uses it to denote the intuitive vision of a higher reality.
23 See once again Strange (1994) 28 n. 16; cf. Sleeman (†) and Pollet (1980) 26–30. 24 Cf. Enn. III.7 [45] 10.
25 See the discussion of T.2 below. 26 Strange (1994) 28.
27 Strange (1994) 23–31. 28 Strange (1994) 28.
The many are, after all, completely in the dark about the true nature of reality. They have forgotten completely about the intelligible realm and take this material world to be the only one there is. We may thus expect that at least some of the common conceptions are not reminiscences of the Forms. Rather, they will probably be something like the Stoic and Epicurean common notions, i.e. conceptions based on sense-perception. If we take these common notions as the starting points and guideposts of our investigations we run a considerable risk of being led astray because these will probably make us turn our atten- tion away from the intelligible towards the material. We would thus expect Platonists, before they appeal to common notions, to examine fi rst what the origin of these are. As we shall see, this is precisely what Plotinus, Proclus and Augustine do when they discuss time.
IV. Plotinus and Epicurus on time
When we fi rst turn to Plotinus (T.1), we fi nd that much what he has to say about our notion of time recalls, initially at least, Epicurus’ discussion of time. As we have seen, the term ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή itself is
Epicurean. Let me, perhaps somewhat superfl uously, list the other ele- ments in Plotinus’ remark that point in the direction of Epicurus: we associate time with change and movement; we have a clear experience of time that is automatically activated whenever we speak about time or name it; this experience is a general, pre-scientifi c notion, not some kind of well-articulated defi nition. This is not to say, of course, that Plotinus is an Epicurean. In fact, he appears to reproach those philoso- phers who think that these preconceptions are all there is to know about the subject. As we have seen, Strange suggests that these philosophers are fellow Platonists.29 However, Platonists are not normally known as
lazy philosophers. To me it seems far more likely that, if Plotinus has a particular group of philosophers in mind at all, these are probably Epicureans who do not feel the need to move from our experience of
29 Cf. Strange (1994) 25, who assumes that the association of eternity with the eternal
and of time with coming to be and the universe refers to Tim. 37 c–38 b and is thus typical for the Platonists. As we shall see, however, the point about these descriptions is precisely that these represent common notions acceptable to everybody. Cf. Enn. II.4 [12] 1, discussed above, where Plotinus gives a rather Platonic description of matter as the ‘receptacle of forms’, yet assumes that this is an account that philosophers of all denominations will agree to.
language, experience and the philosophy of time 109 time to a philosophical analysis of it. In fact, Plotinus will later on in the treatise complain that the Epicurean defi nition of time—time is the ‘accompaniment of movement’ (παρακολούθηµα τῆς κινήσεως)—does
not say anything really.30
Where does, according to Plotinus, this clear experience, this pre- scientifi c notion come from? As we have seen, both Phillips and Strange assume that Plotinus here refers to concepts based on our recollec- tion of the Platonic Forms. This holds true in the case of eternity. In keeping with the ancient epistemological principle that like is known by like, Plotinus indeed says that we are able to contemplate eternity itself because of what is eternal in ourselves.31 It plays an active role
in our search for a defi nition of eternity. The conception (νοοῦµεν)
that eternity is something most majestic, is not just the starting point of his investigation, it also actively steers it.32 It ‘declares’ eternity to be
identical with god,33 and ‘strives for’ the conclusion that Plotinus fi nally
reaches,34 just as in Enn. VI.5 [23] 1 the soul ‘proclaims’ the common
notion of the unity of god.
The ἔννοια of time, however, is not innate but was developed over
time. How we do this Plotinus describes in the last two chapters of the treatise. From these it appears that Plotinus assumes that we develop our notion in an Epicurean fashion rather than by means of Platonic
anamnesis. The context of Plotinus’ discussion is the following. As is
well known, Plotinus takes issue with all those philosophers who had maintained that time in one way or another depends on movement. Time, he argues, is the life of the soul. Time thus precedes movement, not the other way around. In III.7 [45] 12–13 Plotinus deals with a possible objection to his thesis: doesn’t Plato himself in the Timaeus say that the courses of the stars are ‘times’?35 Plotinus explains that
since time is something ‘invisible’ (ἀοράτου ὄντος) and something that
‘cannot be grasped’ (οὐ ληπτοῦ), and since people ‘did not know how
to count, the god made day and night, by means of which, in virtue of their difference, it was possible to grasp the notion of “two”, from
30 Enn. III.7 [45] 10.1–3. 31 Enn. III.7 [45] 5.11–12: τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ αἰωνίῳ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον θεώµενος. 32 Enn. III.7 [45] 2.5–6. 33 Enn. III.7 [45] 5.18–19: Ὅθεν σεµνὸν ὁ αἰών, καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἔννοια λέγει· λέγει δὲ τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ. 34 Enn. III.7 [45] 6.45–46: τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἡ ἔννοια ἐπορέγεται. 35 Plato, Tim. 39 b 1–d 2.
which as he says, came the conception of number (ἔννοια ἀριθµοῦ).’
Plotinus continues:
T.2 By counting a single motion repeated many times in a given amount