Valoración de material, efecto panal y porosidad en relleno

The consequences of the post-modern view of truth and theory are enor- mous. Rigid truth claims are unfashionable in the social sciences today, but the need for theory is central. Social scientists of every orientation find it extremely difficult to give up theory as the skeptics require. A world with- out theory means an absolute equality of all discourse, an end to founda- tional claims. The entire intellectual climate of the social sciences would be transformed. Truth would be replaced by new forms of post-modern "clar- ity," irony with regard to our own disbelief, recognition of our individual "will to power," discovery of "strength through moderation" and ulti- mately a "transvaluation of all values" (Hassan 1987: 197).13

One possible outcome of the absence of universal theory is overload. Here it is not only a question of no theory but also an instance of too many theories that are altogether equal. In a situation where there is no possibil- ity of employing specific criteria to arbitrate between texts, among theo-

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The New Age post-modern current (discussed in Chapter 8) speaks of a movement for truth through global unity, worldwide peace around the planet, "transformational values," guided by a "spiritual aura" (Bordewich 1988). All this is would be difficult to integrate into modern social science.

ries, as concerns relative truth claims, there is no way of reducing their numbers, selecting some for greater attention, and ignoring those obvi- ously irrelevant or fraudulent.

Critics argue that post-modernism erases the difference between truth and error (or between theory and nonsense) and that this opens the door to nihilism. "Since there is no truth, there is no error either, and all beliefs are equal" (Scholes 1989: 56). Vattimo, a skeptical post-modernist, ac- knowledges the validity of this complaint and argues that nihilism is a re- spected and viable philosophical tradition (1988). But most skeptics claim that when they recognize the impossibility of truth they are not endorsing nihilism. They argue, rather, that the absence of truth is a positive, liber- ating activity inasmuch as it accepts "complexity and complication" (Hoy 1989: 45). Derrida contends that the absence of any possibility of truth claims makes not for nihilism; rather, it makes totalitarianism impossible, he argues, because totalitarianism depends so completely on its own ver- sion of truth (Schwartz 1990: 10), and post-modernism undercuts it by negating the possibility of truth. Post-modern social scientists similarly ar- gue that post-modernism mediates against totalitarianism because by aban- doning truth claims it affirms the gender practices of "listening, question- ing, and speaking" (Ashley and Walker 1990a: 395).

The post-modern view—there is no truth, and all is construction—is itself the ultimate contradiction. By making this statement post-modernists assume a position of privilege. They assert as true their own view that "there is no truth." In so doing they affirm the possibility of truth itself. Few post-modernists escape this dilemma, but those who try (Derrida and Ashley are examples) relativize everything, including their own statements. They say even their own views are not privileged. They warn their readers that the views they express are only their own and not superior to the opin- ions of others. But even this relativist position, once stated positively, im- plicitly assumes truth. It assumes truth in the statement that what they are saying is not more veracious than any other position. There is simply no logical escape from this contradiction except to remain silent.

Modern social science seeks to produce objective theory that can be chal- lenged on the basis of data. Theory is data dependent, and data has priority over theory in the sense that if data show the theory to be wrong, then the theory must be abandoned, given that the rules of method have been re- spected. Data and evidence are the basis for arbitrating between two com- peting theories. They may eventually both be found wrong; but both can- not be right. All this, the post-modernists argue, is mere propaganda because either theory does not exist or, if it does, then data are subordinate to theory (Gergen 1987: 2). Every fact is itself theory laden, a construction without meaning independent of language, intuitive interpretation, and context. Facts are defined, even invented, by the community and have no

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meaning outside that collectivity (Smith 1988: 105). Post-modernists re- duce social science knowledge to the status of stories.

A note of caution is in order before we proceed. The whole discussion between post-modernists and a stereotyped positivist version of modern social science overlooks points of agreement between the two. Many mod- ern social scientists would agree with the post-modernists about the com- plexity of the social world. They would be the first to admit that although truth is a goal in social science, it is admittedly never attained. But they would disagree with the skeptical post-modernists who assert that this complexity is so absolute as to render all "truths," no matter how absurd,

equal.

Post-modernism's questioning of truth and theory is only one dimen- sion of its larger challenge to modern social science. The dispute between the two is all encompassing, but it is especially severe as concerns meth- odology. A discussion of this topic is reserved for Chapter 7. First, we consider a related topic, representation.

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