VARIABLES

3.4.1 Rhetoric and 'Truth'

A popular indictment against rhetoric is that it does not lead to ' truth'. Historically, Plato saw rhetoric as a means by which the ideal 'truth' can be concealed and Aristotle

countered with a defense of rhetoric as a way of ascertaining 'truth' . Yet truth is a contested concept, with many connotations and meanings. Drawing on sources such as Derrida and Foucault, contemporary scholars tend toward the latter, more flexible notion of truth as it pertains to rhetoric. To Hart ( 1 997), for example, rhetoric is both a social art and a social transaction, rel iant for its ' truth' not on some absolute, but on the j udgement of a majority, however slim, as the test of 'demonstratedness' : " rhetoric never produces True Truth. It produces partial truth, truth for these times and these people" (p. 9). Correspondingly, Covino and 10lliffe ( 1 995) point out that rhetoric is "located in the real m of uncertainty and probable truth, i n which conclusions are arguable rather than incontrovertible" (p. 8).

Figure 3 . 1 sets out the matrix in which Cherwitz ( 1 995) compares truth in rhetoric with truth in science and dialectic, differentiating them according to the categories of: the nature of certainty; the process of ascertaining truth; the veh icle for ascertai ning truth and the methodology.

Figure 3. 1 Conceptions of 'Truth '

SCIENCE DIALECTIC RHETORIC

Nature of

Empirical certai nty Logical certainty I ntersubjective certainty certainty

Process of

Discovering truth Synthesizing or deducing of truth Evoking truth

ascertaining truth

Vehicle for

Observation Syllogism Persuasion

ascertaining truth

Methodology Correspondence Entailment Adherence

(I ntersubjective validation)

From "Rhetoric as 'A way of knowing' : An attenuation of the epistemological claims of the 'New Rhetoric"', by R. Cherwitz, 1 995, in Rhetoric: Concepts, definitions and boundaries, W. A. Covino and D. A. lolliffe (Eds.), (pp. 452-460). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Cherwitz suggests that rhetoric deals with "intersubjective certainty" by "evoking truth" through "persuasion" to achieve "adherence (intersubjective validation)". The

intersubjectivity refers to a tacit agreement or understandi ng that is often based on experience or 'commonsense' . In turn, a Foucauldian perspective shifts the focus away from what truth is or what truth is understood to be, toward the consequences of the belief that something is true - the "truth effects" (Jeffcutt, 1 993).

Offering another conceptualisation, Rorty ( 1 982) suggests that the relationship between truth and real ity can be considered in two ways: as direct (, vertical') representation or as an iterative (' horizontal ') process of negotiated truth, the "reinterpretation of our

predecessors' reinterpretation of their predecessors' reinterpretation" (p. 92).

F ish ( 1 995) also explores the notion of different types of truth occupying different dimensions. He implicitly chal lenges Aristotle's efforts to demonstrate an alliance between rhetoric and truth, suggesting that they emanate from different worldviews. Fish draws on Richard Lanham' s distinction between homo seriosus and homo rhetoricus. The former, serious man, "possesses a central self, and irreducible identity. These selves combine into a single, homogeneously real society which constitutes a referent real ity for the men l iving in it." (p. 1 27). In contrast, rhetorical man "is an actor; his reality is publ ic, dramatic" (Lanham, 1 976, p. 1 & p. 4, cited in Fish, 1 995, p. 1 27). I f we wish to ascertain which of the two represents the ' right' view of human nature, we must do so from within one or other worldview. Citing Lanham, Fish points out that "from serious prem ises, all rhetorical language is suspect; from a rhetorical point of view, transparent language seems dishonest, false to the world" (Fish, 1 995 p. 1 28). As such, positivism and interpretivism are 'worlds apart' . The homo seriosus v iew is apparent in the common ly used subtitle to academic articles, "rhetoric versus real ity" (Symon, 2000).

Whatever the details of perspectives, there is agreement around the notion that rhetorical truth is different to accepted rational approaches. This lends support to Hart's contention that the type of sense-making employed in rhetoric is different from trad itional forms of logic. For Hart, the guidelines set down for logical, scientific reasoning must be

rewritten under a "more indulgent" set of standards. Importantly, he points out that the logic of persuasion emp loys a different rationality. It i s credibil ity-driven, sal iency­ driven, audience-dependent; a logic of association, and often a logic of emotion (Hart,

1 997, pp. 84-86). Given these features, issues such as the audience's will ingness to trust and the rhetor' s trustworthiness (related to Aristotle's 'ethos') become relevant to perceptions of truth and therefore to the bel ievabil ity or persuasive power of a message.

3.4.2 Ethical Status of Rhetoric

Whi lst highlighting the c lose association between notions of truth and rhetoric, an historical overview also serves to reveal the intimate relationship between rhetoric, ethics and the exercise of power. Traditionally, the term 'rhetoric' was used to signify

"either ( 1 ) the use of persuasive resources (rhetorica utens), or (2) the study of the use of

persuasive resources (rhetorica docens)" (Blakesley, 200 1 , p. 1 4), both of which are

important to our understanding of persuasion in business. Together they have led to a second charge that has concerned rhetoricians and phi losophers since ancient times: rhetoric is manipulative and therefore unethical.

This indictment stems from the central ity of persuasion to rhetoric. Persuasion can be regarded as a form of coercion, and the oppressive exercise of power will inevitably evoke moral questions. Homer ( 1 988) alludes to Plato 's denunciation of the Sophistic practices, in his comment that rhetori c "can be misused by the unscrupulous and the appearance of good character may in fact be only an appearance" (Homer, 1 988, p. 56). To that type of thinki ng, Aristotle' s rejoinder is that rhetoric empowers people to expose deceit and is therefore ' good ' , a l ine taken up in the 20th century by Burke, who referred to some sorts of rhetorical deception as "mystification", which "rhetorical analysis shou ld always be ready to expose" (Burke 1 969b, p. 1 78). Analysis reveals the strategies of rhetoric and provides a critical lens on what is claimed.

In short, rhetorical analysis enables us to exam ine and expose the verbal enactment of power. Herrick (200 I ) argues that, in broad terms, we can focus on personal,

effective public speaking and vocabulary building, he suggests, can assist an individual to achieve personal goals. Through rhetoric too, the individual can influence the thinkin g o f others, thus exerting psychological power that can b e used to advocate and test new ideas and positions on issues, as wel l as opinions and bel iefs. Undoubted ly this abi lity to influence others al lows for the dissemination of destructive as well as ' good' ideas and its persuasive function can subvert the capacity to test or interrogate ideas. Yet,

u ltimately, rhetorical criticism offers an avenue whereby a range of views can be usefully explored.

So whi le there is an argument to suggest that the exercise of power through persuasion is potentially ' bad' , it is also potentially constructive and beneficial (Brummett, 2000). And that rhetors can exert such power appears, in turn, to be an argument in favour of the role of the rhetorical critic - someone who can expose the devices.

The association between rhetoric and persuasion has caused commentators to question what ethical standards should guide rhetors. Yet even our personal relationships are marked by persuasion. McCloskey's ( 1 998) claim that "no speech with intent is ' nonrhetorical '" (p. 8), appears to echo Burke' s assertion that "wherever there is ' mean ing' there is 'persuasion ' " ( l 969b, p. 1 72). One can reasonably argue that an understanding of rhetoric and engagement in rhetorical dialogue offer positive

opportun ities for participation in discussions about issues that affect our lives, and equip us to make j udgements about the morality of others' actions.

The rhetorical critic can interrogate the arguments, thus contributing to, and expanding these conversations. The critic can also expose the use or misuse [abuse] of the power of rhetoric. However, this raises another issue of power - the view that the rhetorical critic is selective and influential, bringing with her not only the skills at persuasion, but al so the added authority of the discipline (Dow, 200 1 ). Dilemmas associated with the ethics of rhetoric may not be easily resolved. In this thesis I take the view that, as long as these shortcomings are recognized, the cautious rhetorical critic can make a positive

3.4.3 Legitimacy of Rhetoric

When Hart ( 1 997) presents the realm of rhetoric impinging o n so many areas, he implicitly draws attention to the i ndictment that rhetoric is a ' supplement' rather than generative, depending on other disciplines for its legitimacy. S ince traditionally rhetoric has been associated with establ ished fields of enquiry such as philosophy, ethics, or politics, the fundamental question remains: ' What is the role of rhetoric?' W ith regard to this i ssue, Gaonkar ( 1 990) notes that Vickers has referred to the function of rhetoric as akin to a "service industry" (p. 343). Indeed, rhetoric has been evocatively and variously described as "the harlot of the arts" (Condit, 1 997, cited in Dow, 200 1 , p.33 8), "a

parasite" (Gaonkar, 1 990, p. 3 42) and a "bastard discipline in many eyes, continually searching to establish our legitimacy as heirs to some tradition" (Dow, 200 1 , p. 337). Goankar suggests that 20th century rhetoric "can be read as a revolt against the

' supplementary' tradition" (Goankar, 1 990, p. 347) impl ied by Vickers and Scott. This revolt may have led rhetoricians to assume too much for the art of rhetoric, provoking Gaonkar to suggest that "sometimes this 'parasite' becomes so deeply entangled with the affairs of an alien body . . . it forgets its own nature and purpose and pretends to be a substantive entity" (Goankar, 1 990, p. 342). Others point to the ubiquity of rhetoric (Burke, 1 969b; Lyne, 1 990; McC loskey, 1 998), a view reflected in Brummett' s ( 1 995) question as to whether indeed we can engage in another discourse without engaging in rhetoric. In this sense, rhetoricians stake a claim to both the rational and interpretive positions, as when they subj ect ' scientific' texts to critical analysis and expose the rhetoric of objectivity (Ceccarelli, 200 1 ; Kuhn, 1 970; McCloskey, 1 998).

Under different interpretations, the art of rhetoric is cast severally as prostituting itself, indulging in an almost predatory existence by threatening to colonise other established disciplines, or as insecure about its respectability. This inclination to establish rhetoric as a separate, respectable identity tends to miss the point. In arguing against rhetoric, we may fai l to see what it does do. Effective rhetoric goes beyond the rational to produce emotional adherence - as a suasory process it both exploits and engenders feel ings of understanding and agreement. Rhetorical criticism can help audiences to detect

m isrepresentation and advance counter-arguments and generally show how the strategi es of persuasion work.