II. MATERIAL Y MÉTODO
2. Métodos
2.4. Variables recogidas en caso de infección
Reflecting and shaping the broader tendency for mental health care and mental
health nursing to be defined by a diversity of ‘possibilities’, much of the existing
literature specific to mental health nursing of suicidal mental health care consumers
discusses the issue using the concepts of ‘engagement’ and ‘observation.’
‘Engagement’ in this context can be seen as corresponding closely with notions of
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as less interactive, and more focused on ‘physical’ interventions including risk
assessment, ‘close’, ‘formal’ or ‘continuous’ observation, containment and
medication (Cutcliffe & Stevenson 2008a). Exploring this dichotomisation highlights
further the central importance of a particular quality of interpersonal engagement
between nurses and consumers in ‘integrating’ diverse elements of service within an
optimal model of care. It also reinforces, however, that such a model of care
arguably remains under‐developed and under‐realised.
The formal practice of ‘observation’ (also known as ‘close observation’, ‘special
observation’ or ‘specialling’) is supported by some authors (Libberton 1996; Stuart
2001). It is argued that constantly observing consumers at risk of suicide may have ‘a
modest protective effect’ (Stewart et al. 2012, p. 1346), and it has been reported
that consumers do sometimes feel secure and like being under observation (Jones et
al. 2000). Regarding intermittent observation, it is noted that such practice may be
well tolerated by patients and it has been associated with lowered rates of self‐harm
(Bowers et al. 2008).
However, while evidence supports the use of intermittent observation (James et al.
2011, p. 37‐38), it is argued that observation as a primary approach is not well
supported by evidence (Cutcliffe & Stevenson 2008a, p. 944‐945; Andersen et al.
2009, p. 25; Kettles & Addo 2009). Indeed, both consumers and staff have expressed
concerns about reliance on observation (James et al. 2011, p. 38), with some nurses
finding the practice to be stressful (Westhead et al. 2003), contradictory to
humanistic nursing values and therapeutic engagement, and undermining of their
sense of ‘job control’ (Dodds & Bowles 2001). Furthermore, some consumers find
observation ‘impersonal, intrusive and non‐therapeutic’ (Stewart et al. 2012, p.
1340), and compounding of their feelings of isolation and pathology (Temkin &
Crotty 2004, p. 78). Additionally, Barker and Walker (1999), Jones et al (2000), and
Dodds and Bowles (2001) all argue that, contrary to claims made by advocates of
observation, consumers under ‘observation’ commonly feel ‘neither safe nor
supported’ (Cutcliffe 2002, p. 34). Reinforcing such criticism it has been found that
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while the person was actually under ‘observation’ (Cutcliffe & Stevenson 2008a, p.
26; Department of Health 1999, 2001). It has also been reported that, in an acute
unit in the UK, change from a formal observation approach to one of structured
activity resulted in declines in absconding and self‐harm, as well as declines in staff
sickness and staffing costs (Dodds & Bowles 2001).
It is noted, furthermore, that a focus on observation may reinforce a traditional
medical hierarchy of power relations, minimise the focus on patient rights and
therapeutic processes, and raise serious ethical dilemmas (Horsfall & Cleary 2000).
Thus it is suggested that:
The idea of ‘observing’ rather than ‘exploring’ such ‘things’ – or rather the human context, within which they might be operating – betrays the most conservative form of psychiatric medicine (Barker & Buchanan‐Barker 2005, p. 544).
Cutcliffe and Stevenson (2008a, p. 35) argue that mental health care consumers are
commonly seen as people who need to be managed and controlled, and that this is
reflected in the ‘over‐zealous’ use of observation (as well as ‘no harm’ contracts and
medication). Additionally, Cutcliffe and Stevenson (2008a) describe the potential for
observation to be a modern day version of Bentham’s Panopticon (Bentham 1995).
Indeed, some critics of observation as a primary approach argue that the control and
containment (observation) role is ‘antithetical’ to ‘empowering and developmental’
(engagement) roles (Barker & Buchanan‐Barker 2011, p. 356), and that a focus on
observation may actually be preclusive of therapeutic engagement (Cutcliffe &
Stevenson 2008a; Barker & Buchanan‐Barker 2011),
Towards the potential for ‘integration’ of diverse elements of care, it is important to
note the possibility that observation and engagement may co‐exist (Billings 2004, p.
191). Cardell and Pitula (1999), for example, note the potential for ‘therapeutic
observers’ to observe while still being caring, helpful, hopeful, and acknowledging of
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reported observation to be a positive experience when their nurse engaged with
them within the observations (Jones et al. 2000), when nurses were both ‘caringly
vigilant and inquisitive’ (Bowers et al. 2011, p. 1464), and when consumers were
observed by nurses who were familiar to them (Dodds & Bowles 2001) and who
talked to them (Jones et al. 2000a). Thus, it is reinforced that a particular quality of
engagement may be essential to consumers (Ghio et al. 2011, p. 517. Reynolds et al.
2005) and nurses (Vrale & Steen 2005) experiencing the potentially objectifying and
alienating intervention of formal observation therapeutically.
Conceding the potential for integration of observation and engagement, Barker and
Buchanan‐Barker (2005, p. 545) note that, while observation may exist without
engagement, observation is inherent in engagement. In this sense engagement and
observation may clearly co‐exist. However, it is suggested that the emphasis in
current service provision needs to shift further ‘towards’ engagement. This
reinforces the potential importance of relationships between suicidal mental health
care consumers and nurses (Hewitt & Edwards 2006, p. 666; Cutcliffe & Stevenson
2008a, p. 942). However, it is suggested that, in practice, ‘engagement’ is often
undermined by an ‘observational approach’ (Koehn & Cutcliffe 2007, p. 138).
Furthermore, it is noted that evidence is lacking for what could effectively replace a
focus on observation (Cox et al. 2010).