Variables socio demográficas

“In order to think the gift, a theory of the gift is powerless by its very essence,” Derrida proclaims in his provocative work from 1992, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit

Money (30, italics in original). The French philosopher’s argument here turns on

the paradox inherent in the concept of the gift; the act of giving a gift is, on one level, conceived as an unsolicited, freely given object, but on another level, the gift commands a return gift, having set in place an obligation of reciprocity toward the original giver. This aporia is acknowledged by Mauss as the complex logic underpinning the social practice of gift exchange; however, Derrida contends that a gift in fact fails in its function as a gift if it is recognised as such. If a thing given - a gift - is received as a gift, the receiver then

acknowledges a debt. A cycle of indebtedness and reciprocity is then entered into, which, Derrida argues, denies the very essence of the meaning of a gift. A gift is supposed to be “free” and unencumbered by obligation or responsibility:

For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to

give me back what I gave him or her, there will not have been a gift, whether this restitution is immediate or is programmed by a complex calculation of long-term deferral or difference.

(12, italics in original)

Derrida constructs his argument against Mauss’s essay on the gift, looking to problematise the anthropologist’s sociological interpretation of a gift

exchange economy. Mauss claims that gift-giving within traditional societies is a constructive means of containing, restoring, dominating or maintaining social relations. The gift economy is a cultural universal, a peace-keeping

methodology practised in pre-state, or non-institutionalised, societies. Derrida, on the other hand, refuses to be tied to the constraints of institutional structures and practices of exchange; he deliberately lifts his discourse beyond the

strictures of tradition, announcing:

Even though all the anthropologies, indeed the metaphysics of the gift have, quite rightly and justifiably, treated together, as a system, the gift and the debt, the gift and the cycle of restitution, the gift and the loan, the gift and the credit, the gift and the countergift, we are here departing, in a peremptory and distinct fashion, from this

tradition. That is to say, from tradition itself.

(12-13, italics in original)

Having distanced himself from a socially-embedded discourse, Derrida offers an abstract and speculative analysis of the gift by unravelling the

anthropologist’s “flawed” logic. Significantly, the gift itself is an impossibility; “the simple identification of the gift seems to destroy it” (Derrida 14). Not only must the receiver be blissfully unaware of the implications of the object that would make it a gift, so must the individual giving it:

But the one who gives it must not see it or know it [as gift] either; otherwise he begins, at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay himself with a symbolic recognition, to praise himself, to give back to himself, to gratify himself, to congratulate himself, to give back to himself symbolically the value of what he thinks he has given or what he is preparing to give. (14)

Neither giver nor receiver must be aware of the binding or loaded quality attached to an object when construed as a gift. For the giver, a gift asserts certain rights – a countergift, a contractual obligation to repayment in due course, a sense of control or domination over another, and for the recipient

acceptance signifies indebtedness, the requirement for a satisfactory return gift, an acknowledgement of social relations with the giver. Where Mauss views these transactions or contractual exchanges as an appropriate means to cement relationships thereby giving rise to a coherent and unified social group,

Derrida’s interpretation is cynical – especially toward the giver. This individual is not so much involved in culturally endorsed practices of ensuring normative relations as in securing a “return payment to oneself” and accruing regard by generating a “gratifying image of goodness or generosity” (23). Derrida characterises the “giving-being” as using the transaction to indulge in a public display of benevolence that generates “self-approval, and [a] narcissistic gratitude” (23). Derrida’s argument cannot accept Mauss’s embedded interpretive position, instead privileging semantics over sociology. By decontextualising and abstracting the act of gift giving, Derrida reduces

constructive social praxis to mere word play. Mauss’s examination reveals gift- giving as a multifaceted practice, involving individuals and groups, war and peace; however, Derrida would reduce this complexity to a narcissistic boost.

The inadequacy of Derrida’s analysis can be demonstrated by reference to the unconditional gift of a mother’s love in the Harry Potter novels. Lily Potter gives her life to save her baby son from Voldemort. In doing so her love permeates Harry, shielding him from Voldemort’s attack, which rebounds to devastating effect. Harry continues to be protected by this intangible source

until Voldemort forcefully takes some of his blood in Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire. Although Lily’s act is “aneconomic”, Derrida’s position cannot account for the extreme cost of her gift, except, perhaps, to denigrate the symbolic logic of her martyrdom as a kind of “deferred narcissistic boost” (23). To be fair, Mauss does not explicitly deal with this form of gift, but neither does he

attempt to simplify a complex social and cultural system or abstract gift-giving from the structures which shape these interactions, in this instance the familial institution. Gifts within the nuclear family appear to require separate analysis, being outside of the market exchange (capitalism) and the system of

indebtedness that Mauss regards as a cultural universal in traditional societies (the moral economy). With specific reference to the mother-child relationship, David Cheal observes that, “not all social life in a capitalist society is dominated by the rational acquisition of goods and influence” (8). Giving within this context is not marked by a self-interested contest between unconnected individuals; parents’ interest in this relationship involves altruism unimaginable by Derrida.

Can Derrida’s subversion of the gift, denied the contextual elements of exchange and debt, be taken seriously, or is it just a linguistic game, a cerebral exercise unencumbered by real life experience? He demands that neither giver nor receiver know that a gift has in fact been given and received; is this a reasonable position to take, or is John O’Neill right in claiming that “Derrida’s

forté is to make difficulties where there are none” (134)? Derrida’s “free” gift is an impossibility, a point that he makes clear by referring to the gift as a

“simulacrum” (31). However, his intention to isolate the concept of the gift from its economic background deliberately problematises a social practice without gain. Evans-Pritchard observes, “The exchanges of archaic societies which [Mauss] examines are total social movements or activities. They are at the same time economic, juridical, moral, aesthetic, religious, mythological and socio-morphological phenomena. Their meaning can therefore only be grasped if they are viewed as a complex concrete reality” (vii). Derrida’s speculations distort the social relations that underpin a gift exchange economy. It is the “aneconomic” gift that is an aporia, when viewed from an anthropological perspective, not the social practice Mauss describes. Derrida’s “tit for tat” (37) deliberately obscures the motivations behind gift-giving, implying that the practice is irrational and dismissible. The double bind that Mauss identifies in gift exchange – that in social practice it simultaneously acknowledges and denies the obligation it carries – is a paradox that his analysis can accept.

There is a sense that Derrida’s theory of the gift is sheer intellectual play. He revels in the ability for language to twist and turn about the relatively fixed concept of a gift exchange economy. However, O’Neill levels a serious

accusation against Derrida; that the theory of the Derridean gift has been

the basis that such gifts provoke an “immoral binding of free subjects” (131). O’Neill may well be attributing too much influence to Derrida’s philosophising; however, the individualism prioritised over community in this perspective is clearly at odds with that of Mauss. Mauss concludes, “therefore let us adopt as the principle of our life what has always been a principle of action and will always be so: to emerge from self, to give, freely and obligatorily. We run no risk of disappointment” (71).

It is the hero’s compulsion to act on behalf of the community, and in doing so he lifts his personal potential above the ordinary. To this extent, the hero fulfils Mauss’s directive. Without a sense of community and responsibility toward others the hero would not exist; that heroes have existed in various forms over all time, as Joseph Campbell describes, suggests that the cultural need to inspire the individual to conform to the group is continual. Mauss’s research works neatly with Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. Without a pan- monetary system the various peoples of Middle-earth rely upon gift

transactions to conduct inter-racial relations, as exemplified by Galadriel’s gifts to the Fellowship. But, as I will illustrate in the closing section of this chapter, giving gifts remains a powerful system for securing group relations even within a market economy.