Although most leadership research has been done observing large groups or management teams, general parallels can be cautiously transferred to multi-crew flight decks. Flight deck authority gradients align approximately with the continuum formed by the three classic types of leadership. An autocratic gradient is one where the captain makes most decisions without consulting or considering the first officer. The captain’s behaviours are probably task orientated, and may be lacking in social maintenance. A number of
accidents have previously been partly attributed to autocratic flight deck gradients, the most notable being the KLM/Pan Am runway collision in Tenerife (1977). One of the early aims of CRM was to reduce authority gradients. The aim was to encourage first officers and other crew-members to speak up (be assertive), and to encourage captains to be more inclusive and exercise joint decision making where possible. In essence, CRM principles aimed to reduce the flight deck gradient to a democratic situation (often called a
CAP 737 Section A, Part 2, Chapter 14: Leadership
synergistic gradient). However in some cases the gradient reduction went too far and produced a near laissez-faire climate, where task-orientated behaviours were not properly prioritised. Such gradients lead to off-task conversation and behaviour, even at critical times. Accidents such as Delta 1141 at Dallas Fort Worth in 1988 demonstrate the effects of laissez-faire cockpits. Sterile cockpit requirements were one way of countering these sorts of problems.
The desired situation is a gradient that recognises the captain’s authority, but retains relationships and synergistic working. This requires a balance of task-orientated and relationship orientated behaviours, the amount of which depends on the crew-members and the situation. It is impossible to be specific or prescriptive about the ideal mix, or even the ideal behaviours. In some cases, task-orientated behaviours will coincidentally be good for relationship maintenance, particularly where there is a strongly shared goal. If the crew work well as a team to attain joint overall goals, there is an extremely positive effect on relationships. Maintaining relationships is more challenging when tasks are going wrong, or the goals are not being achieved. It is important to note that leaders cannot achieve an optimal working environment through use of relationship maintenance behaviours only; the usual result of such behaviour will be a laissez-faire climate, which in the long-term is unsatisfactory to everyone, as well as being unproductive. In other words, being friendly and trying to be liked is only effective (beyond the short-term) if accompanied by task- orientated leadership that achieves task goals. In the long-term, too much emphasis on relationship-orientated behaviour at the expense of task-oriented behaviour will usually lead to the opposite of what is intended, and the subordinates will feel negatively towards the leader regardless of their attempts to be liked.
Captains must therefore retain authority and executive control over the overall climate and strategy, and should be seen to be doing so. It is important to recognise that good CRM is not about establishing a flat or shallow cockpit gradient, nor a very steep one. It is not just about being nice or being liked. In an ideal situation, the captain should feel sufficiently empowered to determine critical decisions in the best interests of flight safety, not in the best interests of CRM or crew relationships. Most effective first officers prefer positive leadership.
The FO was flying into a demanding airfield with maximum gusty crosswinds and the aircraft was damaged after a heavy side load landing. Subsequently the Captain said that on approach he was thinking 'I wish I was doing this' and the FO was thinking 'I wish he was doing this' … but no one said anything.
In the above anecdote, the captain has avoided taking what he felt to be the safest course of action, in order to maintain the first officer’s contribution to the task. This may be an unintended consequence of CRM training, because the captain mistakenly felt either insufficiently empowered to take the task-related action he wanted to, or he felt that the first officer’s entitlements were more important than the captain’s task preference. It also demonstrates that effective leadership depends to a large extent on those being led (followers). Followers can dictate part of the situational component of effective leadership.
Acceptance of the captain’s authority is an obvious requirement, helped by respect for the organisation and process by which the captain was appointed. But good ‘followership’ also involves assisting in the creation of the right social and task climate. This might
involve reassuring the leader of their authority and support, as well as completing tasks as required and keeping the leader informed of the status of those tasks. It also requires followers to communicate doubts and concerns about their own abilities when appropriate so that the leader can cater for these (as in the above scenario).
Followership behaviour motivated by goals other than joint goals can be destructive. An example would be a first officer attempting to be seen in a better light than their captain during an observation. Good followership involves taking a supporting role that does not attempt to undermine the leader.
Finally, it is worth considering that good leadership skills can be helpful in single crew operations, and so should not necessarily be restricted to multi-crew CRM training. Single pilots often have to show leadership when dealing with people who make up the wider operation. Examples might be in dealing with ATC (e.g. having to refuse an ATC request), dealing with passenger behaviour, or demonstrating authority when protecting safety interests against commercial or social interests. A good example follows;
The commander was to conduct a single-pilot task to transport a newly married couple from their wedding reception to the local airport, where they were to board a flight to commence their honeymoon. The couple emerged from the reception followed by an entourage carrying many heavy bags and it was immediately obvious to the
commander that if he agreed to carry all the baggage he would be overweight. Resolving the conflict with the groom and bride’s father required assertiveness, tact and diplomacy, normally dismissed as irrelevant during single pilot CRM training.