VARIANTES SUSTANCIALES PRÓLOGO

The 1 945 Bush Workers Act contained regulations specific to forest work. They were prescriptive and defined the required behaviours and equipment for logging. The regulations needed little interpretation and loggers could be directly prosecuted. For instance they clearly stated that no worker should operate any kind of machinery in the bush under the age of 1 8 . In keeping with the Domino Theory of accident causation, the theory in vogue at the time, the focus of blame was on the perpetrator of the unsafe act or immediate factors directly related to the accident, such as unsafe machinery. Production pressure or poor training were unlikely to be considered as possible contributors to accidents (Fielder, 1 996b).

A review in the l ate 1 980s produced a more generic Act (Campbell, 1 995), the Health and S afety in Employment Act 1 992 (HSE). The Act covered broad issues, including training and equipment use. These are then interp reted by each industry and specific work place. Within the loose specifications of the Act, a worker of 1 5 or over can be a logger, and therefore use a chainsaw, and drive a digger, skidder or bulldozer, provided they are trained or in training. What ' trained' and ' in training' mean is not clear (Fielder, 1 998a). Consequently, p resent prosecutions under the Act are determined by case law. OSH officers prosecute if the Act is transgressed, usually when there is a serious injury or fatality. It is not the intention of the Act that prosecution should be restricted to accidents, but limited finances leave few resources for anything else, at least in logging. Bush inspectors report on accidents and refer them to OSH l awyers for possible prosecution. Since the outcome of the case sets a precedent for subsequent simil ar cases, OSH is circumspect about taking on marginal cases.

Interpretation of the Act is assisted by the Bush Code, which defines what is the ' industry'S best practice. ' For instance, it states that working within two tree lengths of someone fel ling trees is unacceptable. This is not a law, but a gu ideline for loggers and the bush inspector. It fol lows a similar structure to the codes of practice used elsewhere in the world in conj unction with generic safety legislation (e.g. Britain: Eisner, 1 995).

Understanding the implications of a generic Act takes time and an appreciation of case law. The Act states that it is the responsibility of those in the organisational chain, from the

1 06 workers to the forest owner, to ensure workers are trained or in training for any task they undertake. Likewise, they must take all practical steps to minimise dangerous behaviour, equipment, and environments.

A key issue was what is considered 'practical ' . Many industry people cited instances where a person had been deemed 'in training' si mply because they have been given directions to do a job. The Logging and Forestry Industry Training Board (LFITB) FIRS programme had become a benchmark for ' adequate' training. If a worker was injured while fel l ing trees, evidence that he had the ' tree fel ling stage two' module would satisfy the bush inspector that he was adequately trained. It became less clear when the worker was deemed to be ' in training'. The bush inspector was generally satisfied if it was clear that some attempt had been made to begin meeting and documenting the criteria in the ski l l booklets. If the contractor was not using any formalised training system, documentation was more difficult. Companies tended to insist that documentation was reasonably thorough and that FIRS was used, but there was not the same expectation of woodlot contractors.

This chapter contains analysis of phenomena and events which relate to the selective code: I nte.·p.·etation of .·egulations It is divided into five axial groups: .·esponses to the Health and Safety in E m ployment Act 1992, the bush inspecto.·s, systems fOI' i m plementing safety in the c.·ew, influences which shape pel'ception of regulations and the cl'ew and safety.

Res ponses to the Health and Safety in Em ployment Act 1992

Open codes from which this section derived were:

• The .Jatllwry _{/ 996} Forests Owners A.\".\'ociatiofl (FOA) policy statement

• Company rules and policies.

• Knowledge of regulations

• Changing perceptions o.fwILat the Act means

• Covering one's hack

TILe January / 996 Forests Owner,\' A ssociation (FOA) policy statement

The companies and FOA had legal advisers working within their organisations and were quickly alerted to the implications of the HSE Act. I n 1 994 FOA issued a policy statement that by J anuary 1 996 all workers in their forests must be trained or in training through F IRS.

Over time, the effects rippled out to mllch of the industry, although in the earliest stages it was l argely a Carter Holt Harvey (CJ-U-:I), Fletchers and Forest Corp initiative. The policy statement brought a substantial increase in formal training, mai nly amongst company crews. The Logging Contractors Association disseminated its interpretation of the Act to i ts members, though not as i mmediately as FOA. The majority of members of this associ ation were company crew contractors. It apparently took a lot longer for contractors in woodlots to understand the implications of the Act.

E arly in the present study's research phase there was considerable talk, mainly i n company crews, of ' professionalising' the work force by increased training, in part to meet the Act's requirements. " The new health and safety lal1' has put more emphasis on training and to get the responsibility on those people mnning the show to cut down the accidents, and �f they can target all crews it will probably work. but only as long as the crews working for FOA are not the only ones taking the nelt' attitude . . . il's good if we can get these young fullas seeing Ihe job as a more professional occupation. " Fear of rising Ace levies coloured opinions about compulsory training and safety in company crews. Many loggers believed high levies resulted from ' cowboy' crews operating dangerously and having accidents. Mainstream contractors hoped that the new measures would force a change amongst fringe contractors: "1 reckon it 's bloody good. cause it makes the fllllas pull their .fingers out [become more responsible and professional} or get oul [leave the industry}. .. now you got a class of qualified operators in the forest and if they got all these modules, and they are doing everything right, il will make our ACC levies drop for sure and our accident rate come down. '.' Those on the fringes saw things differently. "11 comes down to production

versus safety. Sometimes, unfortunately. we have to break the regulations. Don't gel me wrong, the safety thing is a good thing, like / remember the old days when il was pretty hairy, like some of the vehicles didn 't have brakes, and )lle were a rough and ready /01, and 1 think il 's good. but 1 think the pendlllum has .swung too far, it 's gone 10 almost the ridiculous like 1 can be prosecuted and the guy who owns Ihe block can be proseculed, because he hasn 't got these guys in the right gear and stl!!! . . il 's a bit of a crazy law, 1 think, myse(f ..

M any contractors and workers, both from company and wood lot crews, believed that by becoming more professional and adhering to the regulations, they would ensure continued employment and preference in the tendering processes. "See, what is gonna happen is those

1 08

fullas who stick to the regulations and do the training are gonna be beller off . . That's with a good company, of course, bllt they don 't want OSH beating on their door, so they will ensure that those who are legal and kosher will get preference in the tenders. It 's all part of

the big change in the industry. I'm sure it 's them covering their own backs, but that's what

it 's all about. "

Workers, though less clear about the Act and FOA directive, were aware of some of its i mplications. " When YOII 're in a gang YOII gotta have these strict ntles to do with safety .. . See that's what happened with the OSH law cOIning out. It got these guys humming. They had

the training up to speed. That's what they had to do ... One minute everything is cn,lising

along then we get the OSH law, and it 'sfllll on with all the correct equipment, all the tickets to get. A nd accident policies and all those things. Really we 're just bushmen, but they seem to want to make us into tradesmen. which is a good thing, ! !>pose, and then you will know

your safety stl!!! " The logger, though a little misinformed about the Act, noticed its affects on

training and safety.

Not everyone was convinced the new regulations would benefit logging. Contractors struggling on the fringe areas of the industry were cynical, because they considered it only added to their problems. "Like ! read the OSH hooks. bllt they are a lot of ntbbish. A nd so why are the companies pushing this slllff and trying to make us Irain and get into all that st4f? . . . See, OSH is getting out (�lcontrol .. . beca1lse all they teach YOII is you gotta wear all this gear, so you 're that heavy in the bush YOII are IInsafe . . . And you golla make money, or you shouldn 't be there, and this OSH stllff is jllst making the bush unworkable. " This latter view was typical of woodlot loggers ' impressions of the emphasis on safety derived from the Act. The previous two quotes typified opinions of well informed company loggers.

Company rules alld policie,\·

Companies demanded safety and training strategies from their contract crews. " I'm meant to check up on the guys - wilh CHH they reckon I shollld inspect the fellingface three times a day . . . See ff they're [the worker!>] starling 10 develop any [bad) habits. If there 's any, do something about it. correct it .. . make gllys all/are. " and " We go through the guys ' chainsaws. make slIre all their m01lnts and handles and Clltlers and everything is all intact; all the boots, all the safety clothing. the chap, then the machines. the oil leaks. the brakes, the salety belts, fire extinguishers: YOII gotta have everything - so that's every three months

you do those . . . that's an ongoing thing, and theyj1lst come round and want to have a look in your book, and [yo1l} golla keep all Y01lr records 11]1 to date. ,.

Company contractors saw such procedures as one way the companies had of ridding the industry of bad contractors. "GllYs take risks 10 avoid Ihe regulations . . . [bllt] the FOA are bringing out a thing where YOII 'II see in Ihe dockel book a registration number, and �[your crews not registered, they won 't let YOII send YOllr logs .. . all the big mills won 't touch logs if the guys aren 't up to their training, or registered lPith the LFITB. " Many companies have their own set of rules relating to safety and operation processes, called critical rules. Failure to comply with these could result in contract termination. This encouraged compl iance, although workers said sometimes rules were ignored at times when there was no supervision. "I don 't know why the company don 'I sack hill! 0111 o/Ihe bush. .. like we didn 'l go on the skid site and do the hazard ID ... I'm flicked ([ / knOll' how they [the supervisors] never got into [realisinglwhat's going on. You 'd think they'd be able to see that we weren 't sticking to the nJles but they never said nothing. The boss cOllld pull the wool with shppery talk. . . . see they got on pretty good with him because he 's got Ihe gift of the gab, this fill/a. " The crew usually acquiesced because failure to do so would jeopardise their jobs. Thus there were variations in how seriously crews took the critical rules but their imposition created a greater awareness of regulations and safety issues, at least in the company crews.

Woodlot crews had no imposed rules. " We aClually went Ill' 10 Te Kai [to work for a company]. . and we 'd do these alldits. and it wasn 't lInlil then that Stan [the contractor]thoughl 'Oh yeah, we should be doing this, and we should be doing that ' - normally in his silllalion J wOllldn 't knoll' who It'Ollld check on him . . . no forest manager or whatever - and so / don 'I know who wOllld keep an eye on him . . . to make sure he doesn 't get sloppy. See. when he went back 10 Omarapili, he lvent back to his old ways. " This logger recognised that consequences for poor safety systems did not exist in woodlot crews. Isolation, lack of supervision, lack of consequences, cou ld mean a decline in safe behaviours, particularly with the return to a difficult physical environment which was not conducive to safe practices.

Know/edge (�f the regulatiof/.\',

Many woodlot loggers had not seen a bush code, or FIRS booklet, and had little or no contact with the bush inspector. The geography and remoteness of their operations, and the rel uctance

of the contractor to inform authorities of their whereabouts were partly responsible for this. One fringe contractor, who had recently driven himself to hospital after an accident claimed "] don 't want nothing to do l-tlith those things. ] am happy to look after myself and don 't need some suit telling me how to run my hfe and my b1lsiness. ff] hurt myself, that's my look out.

I don 't want A CC or anything. Blit 1 don 't want people interfering in how ] do things. Okay, I

broke afew ribs. Fine, so 1 drove to the doctor 's, and they patched me lip, and now I'm back on the job, and I 'll go on doing things jllst holt' I always have. I've seen the olltside of a bush code, bllt I never opened one lip to see l l'hat's inside. Hahaha. "

Knowledge of the HSE varied from regIon to regIon. In the Central Plateau, company supervisors acted as quasi-bush inspectors in policing safety requirements. Woodlot c rews generally had contact with companies and thus some exposure to the regulations. The pervading influence of big company plantation logging ensured most loggers were fam i li ar with the b ush code. Company crews in the Far North and Manawatu\Southem Hawkes B ay usually had some knowledge of the regulations and bush code. But in the woodlot crews, especially those on the fringes, there were some confused understandings. ''This safety act thing - it 's getting crazy. They won 'I let YOII do anything - ] mean the c01lncil will come in

and say you can 't employ this g1ly withollt all the safety gear or whether Y01l can fell a piece of lealree on Y01lr own property .. . YOII can 't Cllt any native unless YOII get a special permit even on YOllr olt'n place . . . Not even for YOllr own IIse . . . JIISt rules and reglllations really, you can 't tell. it 's wasting Y01lr time. like we say "l} here. there 'lI be some idiot sitting in Wellington making all these rules and regulations, and it gets somebody else a job. " Loggers often mixed dislike of local bodies, environmentalists, safety regulations, and training imperatives in a discussion. Much of their information was not first hand. In many ways i t all meant the same to them: a hindrance to making a living.

Many workers did not understand the implications or the levels of responsibility set out in the Act. In fringe crews, some contractors deliberately avoided passing on the information. "No, 1 haven 't used the bush code. The boss said it was his and told liS not to look at it. JI They

possibly saw worker knowledge as a threat which could expose their unsafe practices.