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In this section, I shall attempt to evaluate paltering by appealing to a combination of the theoretical formulation of Ubuntu which I highlighted in the previous chapter, and the communicative ethics which I introduced in the first section. Specifically, I shall argue that based on this African ethics, not all palterers would be perceived negatively by their targets should paltering be detected, nor would paltering necessarily have reputational consequences

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for the palterer. This section seeks to contribute a uniquely African ethical perspective to the published literature on paltering.

The theoretical formulation (of Ubuntu) identified communal relationships and interconnectedness/interdependence as core aspects of this philosophy. These core aspects also have implications for how personhood/humanness is understood within African contexts, as well as for this theory‟s view of morality. As previously discussed, one becomes more or less of a person to the extent that one prizes communal relationships and relationships of interconnectedness. In other words, to be a person, is to be a being-with-others. The normative implication of this is that the right action is one which connects, rather than separates, individuals. Specifically, the philosophy of Ubuntu defines right action as action that honours relationships or the capacity for the same; reduces discord or promotes friendly relationships with others – in which the physical world (horizontal line) and the spiritual world (the vertical line) are fundamentally united; and wrong action as wrong insofar as it promotes division, ill-will and discord. Hence, the aphorism: (in Zulu) umuntu ngumuntu

ngabantu I am because we are.

The African ethics which I describe above eschews lying, since this is an inappropriate way of relating with others; it is not other-regarding; it is a devaluation of oneself to the level of an eranko (animal); and finally, it entails a failure to exhibit the virtue of honesty.82

Truth-telling (Sis oot _{) and honesty are therefore moral imperatives in the African ethics I} describe. These two are important constitutive elements of personhood in this philosophy, which connect individuals in a trust-relationship, promote friendliness, and enhance a relationship of interdependence. Although honesty and truth-telling are moral imperatives in this ethics, they must nonetheless be tempered, since òtít _{r korò (truth is bitter) and could}

82 _{In this regard, Ubuntu shares some common themes with virtue ethics. Lutz (2009: 315) affirms this point by} asserting that “as is the case with traditional ethics elsewhere, traditional African ethics is virtue ethics.” Like virtue ethics, Ubuntu prescribes what sort of person one ought to be – one who prizes communal relationships and other virtues such as loyalty. In addition, similar to virtue ethics, this ethics emphasizes doing the right thing for the right reason (having the correct moral motivation). Finally, like virtue ethics, Ubuntu acknowledges that one‟s sense of duty to others decreases as the degree of relationship lessens (allowing for permissible bias): „family first‟ and „charity begins at home‟. However, virtue ethics lacks a hierarchical order for resolving conflicts between virtues: sometimes the courageous thing to do in a particular situation may be to lie, and lying is contrary to the virtue of honesty. Specifically, virtue ethics gives guidance for living life without giving specific rules for resolving ethical dilemmas or justifying the violation of certain values when value conflict arises. Ubuntu, on the other hand, specifies that the most important rule for right action is that it should connect persons

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also cause great damage to the individual‟s psyche. In other words, and as previously noted, the obligation to tell the truth disappears where relationships of friendliness and harmony may be jeopardized, where fellowships and individuals may be significantly harmed, and where life in the community would be inhibited.

The absence of an obligation to tell the truth where communal disharmony would result, or an individual‟s relational capacity may be significantly harmed, should not be taken as a permission to lie. In this way, the African ethics I apply in this study distinguishes itself from consequentialism, which generally argues that one may lie if such an action would produce good consequences. Lies are prohibited in this philosophy (for the reasons already stated above). It is specifically in this way that the African Ethics which I apply in this study distinguishes itself from the casuistic approach. Although casuistry considers context in its moral evaluation of acts, like my approach, and argues that one is wrong to lie under oath, casuistry will in some cases justify lying as the best moral choice when it saves life. In other words, in a casuistic approach, the end may sometimes justify the means. However, the African Ethics I apply in this study prohibits lies, since lying devalues an individual to the level of eranko (an animal). Rather, this ethics emphasizes that the means, as well as the end, must be good.

Its insistence that the means must never be wrong in itself, as well as that the end must be good, is also one feature this African ethics shares with Kantianism. Like Kantianism, this moral philosophy holds the view that certain acts, such as falsehood, cannot become an acceptable means of achieving an end, however good. Since this African ethics emphasizes the rightness of the means, as well as the end, it is therefore, a viable third option for addressing ethical dilemmas for would-be Kantians who believe that it is wrong to lie but cannot stomach telling the truth to a murderer, who seeks to kill a fleeing victim. Nevertheless, unlike Kantianism, which defines morally right action as one which enhances an individual‟s capacity and independence, this philosophy defines right actions as right insofar as they foster social cohesion, and relationships of interconnectedness and interdependence.

Lying – since it is falsehood in itself – is not consistent with Ubuntu‟s demand for one to exhibit certain values and virtues such as honesty, as well as for an action (means) to be good or at least neutral. Paltering, on the other hand, as I have shown in the previous sub-section, does not necessarily imply deception. As such, it is not wrong in itself. However, paltering

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may become wrong if the intention for paltering is to deceive. Deception is an inappropriate way of relating with others, since it is not other-regarding. There are a number of other ways, in addition to the ones already mentioned in this subsection, one can hold back or conceal the relevant truth without lying or deceiving. I have highlighted these in the second section. Some of them include: use of technical terminologies (jargonization); deflecting the full magnitude of information (mitigations); shrouding the truth (veiling), to name but a few. The African Ethics, which I apply in this study, accepts these non-disclosure strategies as ethically justifiable; if they are not wrong in themselves, and intend a good end such as enhancing one‟s prized values.

I have defended these non-disclosure strategies (within the clinical context) in a different section, against a potential criticism that patients would not have faith in a healthcare system if they knew health professionals could freely employ such non-disclosure strategies to avoid telling the truth. I reiterate that response in my answer to the view that palterers would be perceived negatively by targets should paltering be detected; or that paltering would have reputational consequences for palterers. I contend that it is the patient‟s own responses, for example, in the engagement, that will determine whether non-disclosure is advised and disclosure is ill-advised, and not solely the health professional‟s use of his own discretion. A target of paltering would have great faith in a healthcare system (and in a palterer) that incorporates his values in the non-disclosure decision-making process. The target would however, lose faith in a palterer who deliberately ignores those prized values, especially if they clearly appear to support non-disclosure. It is exactly in this way that this ethics is a better ethical theory for addressing dilemmas than the sixth sense suggestion by Sokol, or the moral judgment proposed by Wright and colleagues. This theory specifically, and unlike the proposals by these scholars, incorporates the prized values of an individual in making ethical judgments. Moreover, certain empirical studies exist (Marzanski, 2000a: 322), as I pointed out in a previous section, which show that it is a hasty generalization to assume that all patients – within the clinical context, for example – want full (truthful) information disclosure at all times. Sometimes, patients also wish that their rights, such as their right not to know, would also be respected by doctors even when they (patients) have not formally indicated this in a consent form.

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5.4.4 Summary Remarks

I have argued in this section that it is a hasty generalization to conclude that, just because paltering has been employed in the fields of negotiation and politics to deceive, it is therefore synonymous with deception. I have shown that paltering does not necessarily imply deception; that it is distinct from lying; and following a combination of the theoretical formulation of Ubuntu which I described in the previous chapter and model of truth-telling based on the Yoruba concept of oot _{, is a justified (as well an ethically acceptable) non-} disclosure strategy in exceptional situations where truthful disclosure would harm a person‟s relational capacity or jeopardize social cohesion. I am optimistic that this study will make a conceptual contribution to the ethical literature on paltering, as well as introduce a fresh perspective to the same by showing how an African moral theory may be used to evaluate paltering.

Truth-telling is one of life‟s basic rules; children are taught from their early years to tell the truth and avoid lies. Yet this is not always easy; since not all contexts are as clear as deciding between black and white. Some situations exist where (truthful) disclosure may lead to harm, or where it is ill-advised. Paltering, based on the African Ethics I propose in this dissertation, is an ethically justifiable non-disclosure strategy when full (truthful) disclosure is counter- therapeutic. Future studies can focus on studying paltering using other ethical frameworks, such as Islamic Ethical frameworks; and in other contexts, such as in the researcher- participant context or in the field of counseling, to name but a few.

5.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I highlighted six guidelines for making decisions around unsolicited information based on a combination of the theoretical formulation of Ubuntu provided in Chapter Four, and the Yoruba model of truth-telling discussed in the first section of this chapter. I showed in different sections how these guidelines may be used to address the ethical dilemmas around disclosure and non-disclosure of unsolicited information. Specifically, I argued that disclosure of unsolicited information is justified to the extent that it enhances human relationships and interconnectedness; and ill-advised to the extent that it is likely to cause division. In addition, the determination of what is likely to enhance or honour the patient‟s existing relationships and capacity to be relate should be informed as much as possible by a) knowledge of the patient‟s cultural and religious context and b) engagement

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with the patient in their individual capacity in a friendly relationship. Finally, in making ethical decisions about disclosure or non-disclosure, actual or long-standing relationships should take priority over future or potential relationships. I have also argued that in the event these guidelines favour non-disclosure, paltering may be an ethically acceptable strategy to avoid lying.

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