Let us now have a look at the privacy approach that I take to be a better, more efficient, alternative to contextual integrity at the technology and artifact levels of ethical analysis. As a part of their research for the Privacy and Emerging Sciences and Technologies project, funded under the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, Finn, Wright & Friedewald
15 Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of an action (or, in this
case, the proper goals, values and ends of the context) are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness or wrongness of that action. It stands in opposition to (amongst other theories) deontology, which is the normative
(2013) have developed a contemporary conceptualization of privacy. In their view, privacy is best conceptualized as a categorization of types of privacy. The authors believe that their conceptualization “provides academics and other privacy experts with a useful, logical, well-structured and coherent typology in which to frame their privacy studies” (p. 6).
Privacy, according to Finn et al. (2013), has proven incredibly hard to define philosophically. The authors take it to be a fluid and dynamic concept that develops alongside technological and social change. They agree with Daniel Solove (2008), who asserts that privacy is best understood as a “family of different yet related things” (p. 9). Solove finds that there is no common denominator to all things referred to as “privacy” and that the meaning of privacy depends upon context. He therefore outlines a typology of privacy problems that must be addressed, even as they do not collectively conform to an exact definition of privacy. A typology of privacy intrusions is also offered by Debbie Kaspar (2005).
Finn et al. (2013) agree with Solove and Kaspar that creating typologies is the best way to obtain a usable conceptualization of privacy. However, they contend that the focus of both scholars on the ways in which privacy can be infringed is “largely reactive” (p. 3). Solove and Kaspar wrongly “focus on specific harms which are already occurring and which must be stopped, rather than over-arching protections that should be instituted to prevent harms” (p. 3). Finn et al. argue for a typology of types of privacy rather than a typology of privacy harms. The difference between a typology of types of privacy and one of privacy harms, Finn et al. hold, is the pro-active, protective nature of the latter. The authors compare it to the difference between outlawing murder and adopting a right to life. Murder, they say, is only one way in which life can be undermined; a simple prohibition against murder would not prevent the dissolution of safety principles. A positive right to life, on the other hand “forces individuals, governments and other organizations to evaluate how their activities may impact upon a right to life and introduce protective measures” (p. 3).
The authors argue that Roger Clarke’s (1997) human-centered approach to defining categories of privacy does assist in outlining what specific elements of privacy are important and must be protected. Clarke lists the following categories: privacy of the person, privacy of personal behavior, privacy of personal communication, and privacy of personal data. Taking into account important emerging technologies such as drones, Finn et al. (2013) have adjusted this list and expanded it so it contains seven types of privacy. In their view, privacy encompasses the following aspects:
• Privacy of the person. This category refers to the right to keep body functions and body characteristics (such as genetic codes and biometrics) private, which “is thought to be conducive to individual feelings of freedom and helps to support a healthy, well-adjusted democratic society” (p. 4).
• Privacy of behavior. This category refers to the right to behave in public, semi-public or one’s private space without having one’s actions monitored or controlled by others, which contributes to “the development and exercise of autonomy and freedom in thought and action” (p. 5).
• Privacy of personal communication. This category refers to the right to have one’s communications—including emails, telephone calls, and SMSs—protected against interception, which “benefits individuals and society because it enables and encourages a free discussion of a wide range of views and options, and enables growth in the communications sector” (p. 5).
• Privacy of data and image. This category, also known as data protection, refers to the right to have one’s personal data protected and to “exercise a substantial degree of control over that data and its use”, which “builds self-confidence and enables individuals to feel empowered”, and “has social value in that it addresses the balance of power between the state and the person” (p. 5).
• Privacy of thoughts and feelings. This category refers to the right not to share one’s thoughts or feelings or to have one’s thoughts or feeling revealed, which “benefits society because it relates to the balance of power between the state and the individual” (p. 5).
• Privacy of location and space. This category refers to the right of individuals to move about in public or semi-public space without being identified, tracked or monitored, a right to solitude and a right to privacy in spaces such as the home, the car or the office. “When citizens are free to move about public space without fear of identification, monitoring or tracking, they experience a sense of living in a democracy and experiencing freedom. Both these subjective feelings contribute to a healthy, well-adjusted democracy. Furthermore, they encourage dissent and freedom of assembly, both of which are essential to a healthy democracy” (p. 5).
• Privacy of association (including group privacy). This category refers to the right of individuals to associate with whomever they wish, without being monitored, which benefits a democratic society as it “fosters freedom of speech, including political speech, freedom worship and other forms of association” (p. 6).