Of all the men who have occupied the highest office, Dwight David Eisenhower was quite possibly the most strategic in the means and extent to which he drew on religion to further his political goals. It is very telling that contemporaries could criticize Eisenhower both for being too religious and for not being religious enough- and that both charges could have a ring of truth to them. For many years, Eisenhower’s political skills were maligned by observers of his administration. A popular idea had that his de-facto chief of staff, the powerful Sherman Adams, ran the country while Ike spent his days idling around the greens and fairways of various golf courses. That perception, however, has recently begun to change.
Greenstein’s (1982) research contradicts the impression that Eisenhower was a good man but a disinterested leader, a presider rather than a president. He explains how Eisenhower’s main skill was being able to successfully blend his roles as a symbol of national unity and as a divisive political actor. He did so by concealing his political side, by operating in a “hidden-hand” style. Thus Eisenhower’s press conferences were vague and inarticulate but behind closed doors his language was precise. He claimed to be non-partisan and refused to “engage in personalities” but his actions demonstrated a highly refined sense of political motivations and consequences. His smile, symbolically, overlay a ferocious temper. Sometimes Eisenhower’s machinations failed, like when he clumsily tried to coerce Nixon into leaving the ticket in 1956. But at other times it is hard to see how any other approach would have produced better results. The way in
which he undermined Sen. Joe McCarthy behind the scenes while refusing to joust with him publicly is a case in point.
Eisenhower’s use of religious rhetoric certainly syncs with Greenstein’s image of the General’s leadership style. Talking in religious terms allowed Eisenhower to maintain his broad popularity while possibly helping him subtly accomplish his goals. In truth, Eisenhower was “a far more complex and devious man than most people realized.” It was none other than Richard Nixon who said that. And he certainly would know (Boyle 2005, 20).
In terms of religious practices, Eisenhower may very well have been the most outwardly religious president of modern times. Notably, he began his first inaugural with a prayer he had written himself after attending church services on the morning of his installation. It took him just ten minutes to compose it. Nevertheless, the prayer was very well received and the
administration received so many requests for copies that the Republican Party eventually printed and distributed it. Later, M. Robert Rogers, chairman of the President’s Committee for Arts and Sciences, would even set the prayer to music (Bergman 2009, 262).
The prayer was nothing unusual; Eisenhower developed a habit of opening each cabinet meeting with one. Likewise, he searched for appointees with strong religious convictions, especially admiring his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as well as his Secretary of
Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, a member of the Mormon Church’s Council of Twelve (and later its President).3 Eisenhower went a step further by asking the Congregational minister Rev. Fox
3 As an aside, Eisenhower’s admiration for Dulles was rather exclusive. Dulles’ frequent moralizing, his apocalyptic
language, his inflexibility, his arrogance and his cold personality made him an extremely unpopular figure in the Capitol. “Dull, duller, Dulles” was a common saying of the time.
to join his staff as a special assistant. Fox helped to advise the President on religious matters and he regularly added biblical wisdom to Eisenhower’s speeches (264).
Though his administration did not start it, Eisenhower also helped to establish and organize the National Day of Prayer. He was the first president to send out Christmas cards, mailing 1,100 of them in 1953. By comparison, President George W. Bush would mail out over a million (263). He attended church regularly. He helped create an organization called the Foundation for Religious Action which attempted, albeit mostly without success, to unite people in a spiritual crusade against Communism (Smith 2006, 222, 232). Of course, it was also under Eisenhower’s lead that the first annual presidential prayer breakfast was held, that the words “under God” were added to the Pledge of Allegiance and that the phrase “In God We Trust” was made the national motto.
No one should doubt Eisenhower’s personal faith. The Eisenhower home in Abilene, Kansas was a very religious place. Eisenhower’s parents, David and Ida, were well-known Jehovah’s Witnesses, then called “Russellites” or “Bible Students.” The Eisenhowers had turned to the Witnesses in grief after the death of their eight month old son, Paul, in 1895. Ida and David were comforted by the Witness prophesy that Armageddon would occur in 1914, meaning they would be reunited with their departed son shortly. Many members of the family were understandably disillusioned when the world didn’t end in 1914. Still, Ida continued to be involved with the Witnesses until her death in 1946 and she regularly hosted meetings and services in their house. Eisenhower thus grew up in a family where the Bible was read together, where prayers were said before every meal and where certain activities like drinking, gambling
and swearing were discouraged. Although Eisenhower himself, like his father and brothers, left the Witnesses and renounced many of their teachings, he retained a respect for the simple values he had learned as a child and an abiding belief in God. Prayer did remain an important part of his life. There are a litany of stories where Ike was caught in the act, but, as he told a friend at the end of the war: “Do you think I could have fought my way through this war, ordered
thousands of fellows to their deaths, if I couldn’t have got down on my knees and talked to God and begged him to support me and make me feel that what I was doing was right for myself and the world?” (Smith 2006, 227).
At the same time, it is undeniable that every religious action Eisenhower undertook, that every religious word Eisenhower ever spoke as president, were things he did with political purposes in mind, and not merely manifestations of his own personal faith. Despite his spirituality, prior to becoming president Eisenhower was not in any real way involved in organized religion. On his own for the first time as a cadet at West Point, Eisenhower did not participate in any religious activities, whether church services, Sunday school, Bible study or even the YMCA. Over the course of his extensive career in the Army, Eisenhower was stationed across the world and only occasionally found the time to attend chapel. Eisenhower’s biographer Stephen Ambrose (1984, 38) writes, “He did not think the denomination important. Theology was a subject about which he knew nothing and cared nothing; he never discussed his idea of God with anyone.”
Nevertheless, as he began to contemplate a run for the presidency in 1952, Eisenhower and his staff worried that his lack of affiliation with a church would cost him votes. Still,
Eisenhower resisted. He thought that to join a church at such a late date in his life would smack of hypocrisy. Most accounts say that he was finally convinced otherwise by a conversation with the writer Clare Boothe Luce who reminded Eisenhower that he needed to set a good example for the country. How difficult would it be for parents to get their children out of bed and into their Sunday best, Luce wondered, if the kids could say the President doesn’t go to church so why should they?
Therefore, in February of 1953 Eisenhower was baptized in a private ceremony, joining the high-profile National Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC. His wife, Mamie, had been raised as Presbyterian. Eisenhower was sixty-three years old. From that point on, Eisenhower attended regularly, donated a substantial amount of his own money to the congregation and actively participated in services. In 1959, Eisenhower actually invited Nikita Khrushchev to go with him. Khrushchev, predictably, declined.
One can easily understand why Luce’s argument about setting an example was persuasive to Eisenhower. Eisenhower repeatedly talked in public about how the United States had three pillars of strength- military, economic and moral/spiritual. As President, he felt part of his job description was providing spiritual leadership. As his speechwriter Stanley High admitted, Eisenhower hoped “to inspire a spiritual reawakening in America” (Bergman 2009, 265). To Eisenhower, our entire political system was founded on the age-old ideals of faith and religion. He once told a national radio and television audience in 1954, “Now I don’t think it amiss... that we call attention to this fact: that in conception, our Nation had a spiritual foundation, so
said? ‘We hold that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain rights.’ That is very definitely a spiritual conception” (Eisenhower 1954). More famously, perhaps, Eisenhower told a campaign audience in 1952, “Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith- and I don’t care what it is.” Eisenhower’s feelings on the subject did not go much deeper than that. A short anecdote proves the point. When asked about his religion by a friend, Eisenhower dug into his pocket and produced a coin. One side was inscribed with the word “Freedom,” the other with the word “God.” “That coin,” Eisenhower claimed, “represents my religion” (Perret 1999, 428).
There were certainly some, like the public commentator and scholar William Lee Miller (1964), who criticized Eisenhower at the time for his newfound embrace of religious ritual, for the vagueness of his beliefs, for the rigidity his positions implied. By and large, though, Eisenhower’s religious predilections were well in keeping with the public mood of the 1950s.
The most common way that Eisenhower utilized religious rhetoric was by demonizing the atheist Soviets. For instance, Eisenhower opened his 1955 State of the Union by presenting his take on the basis for the Cold War. He told the American public:
At the outset, I believe it would be well to remind ourselves of this great fundamental in our national life: our common belief that every human being is divinely endowed with dignity and worth and inalienable rights. This faith, with its corollary- that to grow and flourish people must be free- shapes the interests and aspirations of every American…
It is of the utmost importance, that each of us understand the true nature of the struggle now taking place in the world.
It is not a struggle merely of economic theories, or of forms of government, or of military power. At issue is the true nature of man. Either man is the creature whom the Psalmist described as ‘a little lower than the angels,’
crowned with glory and honor, holding ‘dominion over the works’ of his Creator; or man is a soulless, animated machine to be enslaved, used and consumed by the state for its own glorification.
It is, therefore, a struggle which goes to the roots of the human spirit, and its shadow falls across the long sweep of man’s destiny. This prize, so
precious, so fraught with ultimate meaning, is the true object of the contending forces in the world. (Eisenhower 1955)
In this speech, Eisenhower very coherently argues that the Cold War is at its heart a religious struggle, and not a political or economic one. The way that this statement is
constructed, to argue that Eisenhower was wrong would be to argue that the Bible itself, that that description by the Psalmist, was wrong. That would be a difficult case to make today, no less so than in the 1950s.
In a little plainer language, Eisenhower made this same point in a press conference held in March of 1956: “I have in public talks pointed out that this is, underneath it all, a battle between those people who believe that man is something more than just an educated animal and those who believe he is nothing else. That is exactly what it is. It is atheism against some kind of religion” (Eisenhower 1956a). This opinion was one Eisenhower would often express.
Depicting the Cold War as a battle between atheism and religion allowed Eisenhower to also express confidence in its eventual outcome. One side was on the side of God, the other was not. The winner was obvious, as Eisenhower told the graduates of Baylor in 1956:
Communism denies the spiritual premises on which your education has been based. According to that doctrine, there is no God; there is no soul in man; there is no reward beyond the satisfaction of daily needs.
Consequently, toward the human being, Communism is cruel, intolerant, materialistic. This doctrine, committed to conquest by lure, by intimidation and by force, seeks to destroy the political concepts and institutions that we hold to be dearer than life itself. Thus Communism poses a threat from
which even this mighty nation is not wholly immune.
Yet, my friends, Communism is, in deepest sense, a gigantic failure. Even in the countries it dominates, hundreds of millions who dwell there still cling to their religious faith; still are moved by aspirations for justice and freedom that cannot be answered merely by more steel or by bigger bombers; still seek a reward that is beyond money or place or power; still dream of the day that they may walk fearlessly in the fullness of human freedom.
The destiny of man is freedom and justice under his Creator. Any ideology that denies this universal faith will ultimately perish or be recast. This is the first great truth that must underlie all our thinking, all our striving in this struggling world (Eisenhower 1956b)
Eisenhower’s broad religious comments on the Cold War were linked to a much more targeted and precise policy campaign. All the negative religious rhetoric aimed at the Soviets set the stage for Eisenhower to extensively use overt religious themes and arguments to drum up support for his controversial program of foreign assistance. This aid would be going, naturally, to those countries that opposed the Godless communists. Every speech in which Eisenhower criticized the Soviets for their atheism must be seen as helping to create a context in which he could make a faith based argument for helping other countries who did share our religious beliefs. Sometimes, he would make this connection explicit. Part of Eisenhower’s stated rationale for aiding the countries of the Middle East was, as he said, “The Middle East is the birthplace of three great religions- Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbolize religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of which no despotic government can
rightfully deprive him. It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism” (Eisenhower 1957a).
To understand why foreign aid was controversial, it is necessary to provide some context. The reality is that U.S. foreign assistance had taken on a distinctively different character
following the outbreak of the Korean War. In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Congress abolished the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which had heretofore overseen the country’s foreign aid expenditures, and replaced it with the Mutual Security Agency (MSA). The ECA had been intended as a temporary body that would help promote the economic recovery of countries ravaged by World War II. The MSA, in contrast, reflected the evolving perception that U.S.-Soviet tension was likely to be a permanent feature of the post-war socio- political landscape. The MSA consequently had a much more pronounced bias towards military objectives.
But the question of whether the U.S. should allocate any foreign aid at all was
increasingly debated. Many political figures felt the Marshall Plan had achieved its goals- by the early 1950s Europe was far along the road to economic recovery- and hence suggested that perhaps the US should eliminate foreign aid entirely. Eisenhower himself was an avowed fiscal conservative who initially thought that foreign growth could be achieved by the reduction of trade barriers and the creation of incentives for private investment. “Trade not aid” might best describe Eisenhower’s initial foreign economic policies (Kaufman 1982).
By the end of his first term, however, Eisenhower had experienced a change of heart. Events such as the French defeat in Asia and the stirrings of nationalism worldwide made the
Administration leery of the possibility of a wave of Communist takeovers. Even more disconcerting was the new Soviet economic aid offensive. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet leadership had embraced new policies that sought to expand Soviet influence throughout the Third World. The new Soviet rulers, particularly Khrushchev, believed that socialist
movements could gain power not just through revolutions but also via parliamentary means. Top officials made high profile visits to countries like Burma and India, where they promised
extensive economic assistance. They delivered on these promises by issuing large, long-term, low-interest loans to countries like Afghanistan, Egypt and Indonesia.
Eisenhower was not persuaded that the Soviets were acting out of the goodness of their hearts. As he told his friend Lewis Douglas, it “was idle to suppose” that the Soviet Union had “any friendly interest in the countries that she proposes to help.” Rather, he believed that Moscow wanted to undermine U.S. ties to certain governments and to use their “economic penetration to accomplish political domination” (66-67). Eisenhower responded by advocating much more generous and comprehensive aid for the underdeveloped world. His total mutual security request for the 1957 fiscal year was $4.67 billion, an increase of almost $2 billion over the funds that had been appropriated for fiscal 1956.
The White House was caught unprepared by the firestorm that ensued. They expected to encounter opposition to some of their requests, like for aid to India, a non-aligned country with a centrally controlled economy, but they also believed the package would win ultimate approval. Instead, they ran into widespread opposition from leaders on both sides of the aisle. Fiscal conservatives saw mutual security as a worthless giveaway that lacked any defined metrics for
measuring whether it was successful or not. Many isolationist Republicans had been eager to reduce the country’s foreign obligations for quite some time, regardless of their cost. But these conservatives were now joined by many liberal Democrats who were increasingly discomfited by the idea that mutual security was gradually becoming a permanent program free of constraints. Some even thought that the Soviets’ increased effort in this area was reason enough to reduce instead of expand America’s aid programs. As a Wisconsin House member remarked, “If we are so foolish as to enter into a competitive economic aid race with the Communists, we will come out second best. We know they can offer a sales program that promises the moon or everything