LA VIDA CRISTIANA EN LA EDAD MEDIA

With the death of his brother Perdikkas, Philip was a strong candi-date for the Argead kingship. If acclaimed by the army assembly and clever enough to elude rivals for power, his inheritance would include the complex set of relationships with the Greek world whose development we have traced from the early fifth to the mid-fourth century.

We know that Philip was extraordinarily successful, not only in securing and holding the kingship of Macedon but in expanding its boundaries from the Adriatic into the Black Sea. The Greek world became subject to the hegemony of Philip and, before his death, was officially joined with Macedon in his war against the Persians.

The accomplishment of these feats demonstrates a solid under-standing of the ways of his neighbors to the south and an ability to employ Greek tools, conditions, and ambitions to Macedon’s advantage.

In dealing with these neighbors, it is not surprising that Philip’s earliest attention focused on territories adjacent to Macedonia – Thessaly and the Chalkidike peninsula – and that he proceeded in ways that were familiar to the Greek states, that is, militarily and through alliance. After taking Potidaia in 356, for instance, he turned it over to the Chalkidian League, with which he was currently allied. But, as we have seen, other Greek states had a strong inter-est in these regions, the states of central Greece casting their eyes on Thessaly and the Athenians looking to the Chalkidike and other

parts of the northern Aegean. Although nominally allied by treaty with Athens, Philip reclaimed Methone from Athenian control in 354. Upon gaining at least a foothold in regions beyond current Macedonian borders, he employed another tool of the Greek states in his founding of new settlements or refounding of established towns as Macedonian centers. In Thessaly, the town controlling the strategic southern access to the pass at Tempe became a Macedon-ian settlement, while Krenides, valuable for its mineral wealth as well as its location just east of the Chalkidike, was refounded as Philip-poi. In regions where he knew the value of the constitutional struc-ture for his purposes, he inserted himself into it: in Thessaly he took the position of tagos, or supreme military commander.

First-hand acquaintance with the situation in Greece was valu-able in shaping a Macedonian response to that situation. One of Philip’s first priorities was the expansion and reorganization of the army. While his forces had to be employed against a variety of peoples and their differing tactics, he had witnessed the success of the Theban reforms while detained for three years in Thebes. And

Figure 4.2 Northern Thessaly. Photograph by Richard R. Johnson

in his youth while his father Amyntas was king, he is more than likely to have seen Greek hoplites and their generals in action near or even within the territory of the Macedonian kingdom. To be sure, Philip’s military reforms went beyond the Theban develop-ments, yet they built on the basis that had enabled Thebes to defeat the once formidable Spartan army, and to build an extensive league with alliances throughout much of the southern Greek world.

There can be little question that Philip appreciated the spirit of treaty-making in Greece. Just as Athens could ally with the Messe-nians in 355 although it had been since 369 allied to the Messeni-ans’ long-standing, bitter enemy Sparta, so Philip’s own ties could fluctuate as convenience dictated. On the other hand, he appreci-ated the value of multi-state agreements and employed them in his growing command over the Greek states. During the fourth century, confederations were built through bilateral treaties; when the network of treaties drew together a sizeable number of states, mechanisms emerged for federal decision-making and implementa-tion, such as a council of representatives from the allied states. The state responsible for the confederation was recognized as its leader, or hegemon, for coordinating the common defense and necessary offense of all the members. Macedon became more and more active in this world of alliances. For many decades, as we have noted, Macedonian kings made bilateral agreements that were of the same fluid nature as those negotiated between Greek states. Perdikkas was adept at such maneuvering during the period of the Peloponnesian War. Macedonian kings also dealt with confederacies, especially the nearby Chalkidian League and the Athenian imperial association that had begun as the Delian League. In his first year as king, Philip and Athens agreed to the terms of a treaty; in the following year, the alliance between Macedon and the Thessalian state of Larisa was reaffirmed; three years later found Philip allied with the Chalkidian League; in 346 he sent two of his senior officers – Antipatros and Parmenion – to Athens to present terms for a bilat-eral peace agreement. A vote of the Athenian assembly affirmed this agreement as the Peace of Philokrates.

Alongside such confederacies were leagues organized for the well-being of major religious sanctuaries, known as amphiktyonies or associations of those states situated around (amphi) the land of the sanctuary. In mainland Greece, the Delphic Amphiktyony had its origins in the Archaic Period. Its membership by the fourth century extended to states that were in no sense physical neighbors of Apollo’s sanctuary, such as Sparta and Athens. Although aggres-sive action was not the main function of an amphiktyony, protec-tion of the sacred property might demand it. In addiprotec-tion to such earlier associations, a new development in the 380s introduced another form of association that strove for the autonomy of indi-vidual states, rather than federation, in pursuit of a common peace.

Its origins were not in Greece but in Persia, now once again an active player in Greek affairs. In order to end the ongoing warfare that regularly spilled into Asia Minor, King Artaxerxes II decreed the terms of the King’s Peace in 387.

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenai and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further that all the other Greek cities, small and great, shall be autonomous. If any refuse to accept this peace I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same purpose, both by land and sea, with both ships and money.

Congresses were called periodically (375, 371, 366, and 362) to discuss and reaffirm the terms of the Peace.

Philip would be drawn into the affairs of the Delphic Amphik-tyony as war surged around Apollo’s land from the mid-350s into the mid-340s. Known as the Sacred War, it resulted from the action of one of the members, Phokis, when the Council of the Amphik-tyony levied a fine against Phokis for cultivating part of the sacred land. Rather than paying the fine, the Phokians resisted, raised an army that included mercenaries, and took much of the store of wealth housed at Delphi. With the wealth and a strong force, the Phokians carried their anger into the territory of other amphikty-onic states for the next nine years. To put an end to Phokian power,

the Amphiktyony invited an outside power to bring his force into central Greece to accomplish that aim. Philip and his army were successful in defeating the Phokians in 346; their base of power was broken and their membership in the Delphic Amphiktyony went to Philip. Thanks to this position, Philip presided over the Pythian games at Delphi in the same year.

The rising predominance of Macedon in the Greek sphere brought support from many who saw in Philip a solution to the endless conflict between Greek states and leagues of states. Isokrates, an Athenian who lived for 98 years (from 436 to 338), is one of the best examples. War was the abiding condition of those years and its consequences directed Isokrates’ efforts toward a search for peace.

He wrote tracts to a number of powerful leaders urging them to reconcile the Greek states and then direct aggression outward, against the Persians. In the Philippos he urged Philip to attempt to reconcile the major states of Argos, Sparta,Thebes, and Athens, since by uniting these major powers it would be made far less difficult to add minor states. Then, Isokrates continued, Philip should extend his activity into Asia against the barbarian Persians, gaining welcome land for the Greeks and eliminating a serious enemy. Philip had other friends: a list of “traitors” provided by the Athenian statesman Demosthenes, who steadfastly remained Philip’s detractor, lists indi-viduals from Thessaly, Arkadia, Argos, Elis, Messene, Sikion, Corinth, Megara, Thebes, Euboia, and Athens (Demosthenes, On the Crown XVIII.295). These and other “traitors” were drawn to Philip through his obvious successes but also because of his personal traits.

The Athenian orator and statesmen Aischines reported that his fellow citizen Demosthenes had described Philip as deinotatos when the group of Athenian envoys, of which they were both members, was returning from a conference with the Macedonian king (On the Embassy II.41). As outlined earlier, the Greek word deinos has several meanings: the positive sense of wondrous, marvelous, strong;

the equally favorable meaning of clever or skillful; but often the sense of fearful, terrible, dangerous. In the presence of such a person, one might feel all of these qualities in the same rush of experience.

There were warnings against trusting Philip and his Macedonians.

Demosthenes spoke out plainly to the Athenians in his First Philip-pic, declaring that their apathy was removing their potential to prevent Philip from drawing even more Greeks into his net. While the Athenians idly watched, Philip was toiling without stop. In his Third Philippic he repeated his warning that Athenians were only watching as the man grew greater.

Eventually such warnings were heeded by people in other states:

Philip’s Greek “allies” were uncertain about the value of his involve-ment in Greek affairs, and by the late 340s, his Athenian “allies”

persuaded his Theban “allies” in the Amphiktyony to join forces against Philip and his Macedonians. Other Greeks also joined this new confederation: Euboians, Achaians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Epidaurians from the Peloponnese and central Greece. and, from the west, Leukadians, Korkyreans, Akarnanians, and Ambrakiots.

Philip had Thessaly in his camp. When yet another war divided the members of the Delphic Amphiktyony, Philip was appointed leader of the joint forces against the violator. The presence of the Mace-donian army in central Greece was sufficient cause for the states hostile to Philip to prepare for battle. As we have seen, roughly equal numbers – 30,000–35,000 on each side – drew up opposite one another at Chaironeia in the summer of 338. Philip led the right flank opposite the Athenian hoplites while Alexander, on the left flank, was positioned to deal with the Theban infantry. The Mace-donians were entirely successful.

Philip turned to new treaty-making, first on the basis of bilateral settlements with the individual Greek states. It may well be that he had the assistance of Aristotle and students in Aristotle’s school in drawing up the formal boundaries of states as one step in reducing warfare. Then an attempt to create a common peace throughout Greece reveals Philip’s appreciation of this recent form of alliance.

Calling a congress of representatives from all of Greece at Corinth in 337, he presented terms for an alliance between the Greek states and Macedon that would be both offensive and defensive. Philip would have command of troops furnished by all the members in

case of war, but he would not be a member of the council of the allies that was responsible for making decisions and acting as the supreme judicial. Apart from affairs of the League, all states would be independent. Any member state that violated the terms of the alliance would be punished, as would any individual who disrupted the workings of his own state or who became a mercenary for the Persian king. The formalization of these conditions established the League of Corinth. Its existence was valuable in many ways, one of them as facilitating Philip’s incipient plans for a campaign against Persia. If we can safely assume that he read Isokrates’ address to him, his campaign might now be described as one on behalf of the Greeks.

In sum, the long association between Macedon and Greece enabled Philip to speak the Greek language in more than words.

He understood the intricacies of treaties and alliances, and appreci-ated the importance of institutions, such as the Olympic games, or practices, for instance the religious regard for the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. He knew well the strife within and between Greek states and was able to exploit it. Familiarity with the different conditions of towns under his own control and with cities – even in his own territory – claiming their independence would have influenced his preference for the former. Just as Perdikkas had refounded the Greek polis of Pydna as a Macedonian-controlled town, so did Philip reorder Krenides to become Philippoi – his city. Leagues, especially Greek associations, were troublesome to the Macedonians, as Philip’s predecessors knew very well. However, they were essential, first, in creating the later Macedonian kingdom and, second, in putting an end to the incessant warfare between the larger coalitions of Greek states. Philip obviously valued the Greek hoplite army and built upon it to craft his own force. As efforts in Thrace proved success-ful, he realized at first hand that Persia was a problem to regions in the northern and western Aegean. His father had supported the Thebans in their aid to the western satraps against the then Persian king, and Philip seems to have had dealings with one Hermias, who had created a small kingdom in the Troad (the northwestern region

of Anatolia around the site of Troy), as well as with one Pixodaros, ruler of part of Karia in southern Anatolia. Such contacts had cul-tural as well as military significance for Macedon.