VIENTOS O RETENIDAS

In the past few years, the demands from China, India, and other developing economies for more oil, natural gas, and other resources are major factors, although not the only ones, that have driven up world energy and other com- modity prices. Chinese energy companies’ extensive search for oil and gas assets in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia has created some anxiety about the world’s future supplies of energy.

Beijing’s extensive engagement and its ascending status in Africa also raise important questions about the nature of China’s involvement on the continent, who gets what, and how. Critics charge that China has pursued mercantilist policies in the region for pure economic benefit without concern for human or environmental impacts. Due to China’s support, they argue, the Sudanese government continues its genocide in the Darfur region, and the Mugabe regime can survive and carry on its human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.25

Officially, Beijing has rejected such criticism, stressing noninterference in domestic affairs. As Premier Wen put it, “We believe that people in different regions and countries, including those in Africa, have their right and ability to handle their own issues.”26_{Beijing emphasizes that China’s involvement in}

Africa is different from the old or new colonialism of the past, and that an affluent China is now putting money back into local African economies. As Chinese leaders like to say, it is a win-win situation. Many African countries tend to agree that China’s growing presence has helped the continent eco- nomically; thanks to China many African countries are experiencing good development outcomes.

Nevertheless, with China’s rapidly expanding activities in Africa, interna- tional concerns over Chinese behavior are deepening, and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are strengthening. There are also indica- tions that Chinese policymakers, academics, nongovernmental organizations,

and even enterprises are reflecting on China’s role. Indeed, China’s newly acquired status in Africa is subject to continuous debate within Chinese pol- icy and academic circles. While some celebrate Beijing’s achievements, others caution that balanced policies must accompany the rapid expansion of Chi- nese commerce.

President Hu’s much publicized African trip early in 2007 was clearly a strategic follow-up to the FOCAC summit. To carry out Beijing’s promise of enhanced cooperation, Hu delivered offers and initiatives at every stop of his eight-country tour. Three particular countries on Hu’s itinerary, however, gen- erated more headlines than the others: the Sudan, Zambia, and South Africa. Each country represents a specific challenge for Beijing’s African diplomacy.

Of the three countries, China has the most significant energy interests in the Sudan, and its oil companies have been operating there since the depar- ture of the Western oil majors in the mid-1990s.27_{The state-owned CNPC has}

the largest overseas production in the Sudan, and other Chinese firms have also invested heavily in refineries, pipelines, and other infrastructural projects. Bilateral trade reached $5.7 billion in the first eleven months of 2007.28_China

is the Sudan’s largest trading partner, while the Sudan is China’s third-largest trading partner in Africa.29_{In recent years, Beijing has been facing increased}

international criticism for its unwillingness to use its significant economic leverage to persuade the Sudanese government to cease its sponsorship of atrocities in Darfur. In what seemed to be a response to the criticism and pos- sibly a departure from China’s traditional policy of noninterference, Hu sup- ported a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Darfur.30

The appointment of a special envoy to the Sudan demonstrates Beijing’s desire to avoid criticism and craft an image of working actively to end the Darfur crisis. But it is too early to conclude that Beijing has changed its for- eign policy approach. Wherever and whenever possible, China avoids getting involved in domestic politics and rather tends to focus on economics. Deep in Chinese foreign policy philosophy there is a strong belief that conflict resolu- tion is primarily realized through domestic dynamics, and that foreign inter- ventions are less decisive, do not really work, and are often counterproductive. In Zambia, the rapid influx of Chinese businessmen and investment into the country’s rich copper and other commodity sectors has brought accusations that Chinese owners have exploited the local workers. Not long ago, the oppo- sition leader in Zambia’s presidential election ran on an anti-China platform, and though he lost the election, accusations of low wages and other mistreat- ment in Chinese-owned mines linger. Hu’s stop in Zambia was marked by efforts from both sides to defuse criticisms, with Beijing offering Zambia

$800 million in special loans and canceling $350 million in debts that Zambia owed to China. The two governments also announced the establishment of a Special Economic Zone.31_{While Hu emphatically rejected the view that China}

was simply interested in extracting Africa’s resources for its own economic benefit—in effect, replacing the old colonial powers—China’s own record of labor protection during the past three decades is a troubling one; extraordinary efforts will be required if fair labor laws are to be enforced abroad.

China’s presence in South Africa is likewise being questioned, though the debate has centered upon the extent to which the bilateral economic ties between the two countries are competitive or complementary. South Africa is China’s largest trading partner on the continent, with bilateral trade totaling $14 billion in 2007, up 42.4 percent from 2006.32_{As the most advanced econ-}

omy in Africa, South Africa’s domestic economy has received serious chal- lenges from the arrival of Chinese products. There are significant concerns that Chinese imports are resulting in the loss of manufacturing jobs in South Africa. Facing concerns that South Africa may end up in a neocolonial rela- tionship, exporting resources to China and receiving more expensive value- added manufacturing goods in return—a familiar pattern that characterizes Africa’s past colonial trade relations with Europe—Hu pledged to address the trade imbalances between China and South Africa, which are heavily in China’s favor.33