3.2.1. Reductionist view
The principles of neuroscience assume and predict that all experiences are generated by brain activity as a consequence of structural patterns. A convergence of methodologies and measurements indicate that religious/mystical experiences and beliefs associated with them are predictable phenomena (Persinger et al. 2010)
Brandt et al.(2010:306) describes the reductive neuroscience of religion as aiming “to disprove the reality or importance of religion and to replace it with non-mysterious neurological functions (or malfunctions), in other words, explaining typical religious and mystical experiences as simple brain functions taking place under
certain circumstances (Du Toit, 2007:227). One of the most prominent proponents of this specific view is Michael Persinger.
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basic principle of neural-structuralism (Persinger, 2001:515 & 2010:432)25, which enables the
researcher to localise certain functions of the mind and brain. 26 The main conviction of neural-
structuralism is that, through an appropriate and thorough study of the brain, neuroscientists would be able to predict phenomena associated with certain genes, chemical make-up (Muller, 2008:3), or areas of the brain (cf. Ramachandran et al. 1997).27
In terms of religion, the structuralists views ‘God’ as a term simply given to an imaginary external cause of certain sentiments and sensations. It is argued that these experiences are no more that neurological accidents (cf. Persinger, 1987 & 2001). The domain of the ‘religious’ is consequently considered as an evolutionary by-product or neurological epiphenomenon. Generated or projected by the brain, the ‘religious’ explains away the causes of certain mental activities, which generally perplexes the conscious brain (cf. Brandt et al., 2010:306).
The mechanism by which these ‘religious’ experiences are born, Persinger argues, are ‘epileptiform micro-seizures’ focussed in the temporal lobes, specifically the amygdala and hippocampus. The seizures are triggered by stress-related chemical states, such as hypoglycaemia, hypoxia or fatigue. Furthermore, according to Persinger (2001), these micro- seizures can have an emotional function – both positive and negative – as it may induce feelings of peacefulness and meaningfulness on the one hand, and anxiety and fear on the other.
25 This model may also be called ‘materialist’, as it is argued that all mental processes can “ultimately be accounted for by a few basic physical laws” (Muller, 2008:3)
26 In the latter half of the 20th century there has been a considerable amount of researchers proposing the existence of a ‘God spot’, ‘God gene’ or ‘God circuit’ in the brain (Graham, 2014). Ramachandran (1998), for example, proposed that the brain’s amygdala may by the source of all religious experience.
27 There has been a sizeable amount of researchers warning against reductionism, imploring the the neurosciences to take the whole person in it’s environment and different contexts into account. It is argued that such is the nature of complex systems and that the human person embodies ‘ultimate biological complexity’ (Du Toit, 2007:276)
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According to Brandt (2010:306), structuralists, like Persinger, are proponents of an evolutionary origin – and thus it had an important survival function (cf. Inzlicht et al., 2009) – to what they deem incorporates ‘religious experiences’.28 Atran (2002, in McNamara, 2006:182) defined
religion in terms of this perspective as “...a converging by-product of several cognitive and emotional mechanisms that evolved under natural selection for mundane adaptive tasks.” In the same vein, Boyer and Bergstrom (2008:111) asks the question whether the health and fitness benefits of religious practices could further bolster the argument from an evolutionary standpoint (cf. Williams & Sternthal, 2007:2001).
In conclusion, it is clear that the main thrust of the structuralist, or reductionist view of neuroscience, is to explain religion by establishing it’s neurological underpinnings – in other words, reducing religion to a natural phenomenon (Dennett, 2007).
One famous experiment conducted in an attempt to validate the claim of the reductionist school was Persinger’s ‘God helmet’ (cf. Cooke et al., 2013:3). This helmet used low voltage electromagnets to stimulate the temporal lobes, by generating an electrical field rotating horizontally. A double-blind study indicated that subjects exposed to these electrical stimulus experienced something akin to what they would describe as RMS. The researchers interpreted the results as evidence that the temporal lobes may well be the sources of all RMS experiences. The reductionist school built upon these studies by attempting to further localise higher brain functions such as religion, emotion, language, etc.
28 It is argued, for example, that God-experiences during life-threatening events assisted in the disappearance of fear and a readiness to die.
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3.2.2. Religionist view
Brain-Mind studies can help religious people to understand their religious experiences. The Theological emphasis on the human person as an interr elated unity will help to obviate reductive and simplistic approaches in the neurology debate (Du Toit, 2007:279).
In contrast to the reductionist view, although still concerned with contouring the neurobiological substrates of religious phenomena, is to indicate the the authenticity of religious consciousness (Brandt et al., 2010:306) by demonstrating that religious phenomena are accompanied by a genuine neural occurrence.
In practice, this view is premised upon the observations of brain-state changes during RMS practices such as meditation and prayer, using SPECT scans. In contrast to the reductionist view, proponents of this stance argue, that RMS experiences are irreducible to other neurological states. Thus, in a somewhat apologetic fashion, religionists reason that these experiences are not the product of “distraught or dysfunctional minds and cannot be explained away as the results of epileptiform seizures or psychotic hallucinations” (Brandt et al., 2010:306).
D’Aquili and Newberg are generally accepted as the main protagonists of this view (Brandt et al., 2010:306). Although the religionist school propagates an authentic scientific understanding of religion, some theology is lost or relativized in the process. The point of departure in this regard, is that theology can be described as mostly unscientific and therefore needs to be replaced by the new discipline of Neurotheology – scientifically informed theology. Charlene Burns (2012:308) gives an appropriate description of this view of Neurotheology as ‘theology without theologian.’
There will be a more thorough engagement with Newberg’s work and Neurotheological nuances toward the end of this chapter to better place them on the spectrum of the four different views.
3.2.3. Conclusion
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The most prominent difference, evident in the outline above, is on account of their respective assumptions about, metaphysics and anthropology, among others.
The reductionist school has no regard for any authenticity in RMS experiences, in effect, these experiences are irrelevant to their view of reality, except as objects of scrutiny – there are no mysterious origin to these experiences. The religionist school, although conservative enough not to allocate an external causality to RMS phenomena outright, does consider them to have an origin not entirely so non-mysterious as made out by the reductionists. As pertaining to anthropology, the religionist approach tends to cultivate a more holistic view of the human person as a psycho-somatic being , as opposed to the mechanistic view of the reductionists. These assumptions are evident in their respective methodologies, and can be expected to exercise a measure of divergent influence on their epistemological and ontological beliefs.