T h e r e is n o question that rural Malays in Yala see their environment as d o m i n a t e d by Malay setdements. To them, Yala is located in a negen Melayu, a term which conflates notions of setdement, country, and state. T h e Thais are outsiders a n d invaders here. Like the m a n at the very b e g i n n i n g of this diesis, Malays emphatically reject diat they are khaek ,
either inferior or "guests" in s o u d i e m Thailand. In the preceding chapters, I have n o t e d tiiat the Thai g o v e r n m e n t has used economic development p r o g r a m m e s as a strategy of penetration into tiiis negeri, and described in detail die course of this process in Khala and Maju.
In theory, the p r o g r a m m e of GPM groups and RCM sales eliminates m i d d l e m e n in r u b b e r marketing and increases profits to producers, but in practice it has b e e n a spectacular failure. In 1986, while there were 292 villages in Yala p r o v i n c e ( U ^ f ] - ^ n U b Q ^ n U f i n ^ f ^ f l b g ^
^ ^ Q ^ 2529, p.4), only about diirty had active GPM groups, a n d registered g r o u p membership rarely exceeded fifteen people (Ch.4, supra). T h e n u m b e r of members actually contributing to g r o u p sales was usually far fewer. In the face of this pitiful record, the exceptional n a t u r e of Maju's achievement can be gauged, and it is little wonder that Thai officials cling to this example so keenly as an instance of their success. In view of the material I have presented, I argue that there are four basic reasons why Thai attempts at integration of Malays by means of economic development programmes have failed, and after setting these out, I will relate them together in a general proposition.
T h e first reason runs directly to the heart of the issue I have outiined above, the failure of historians and political scientists to explain the lack of
mass separatist activity by rural Malays in the face of Thai incursions into Malay social life.The fact is that rural Malays have developed their own mechanisms to minimise Thai penetration of their villages. Not a conscious master-plan, but successful strategies which have been developed over time in regular interaction with Thai officials. To use Scott's terminology, these are everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985). In Khala, Cik Osman decided very early in the piece not to become involved in the GPM group, and his pivotal role in the village rubber economy meant his absence gave the group little chance of success. Rival leaders attempted to make the scheme work, but their efforts were half-hearted or received insufficient backing from other villagers. People in Khala were not averse to making greater profits. In fact they devoted much energy in their daily lives to improving their economic circumstances. Rather, they were unwilling to participate u n d e r the conditions offered, or in the case of many poorer villagers, were simply incapable of choosing whether to participate because their relations to land m e a n t a recurrent need to borrow money within the existing economic framework. Had Cik Osman decided to support the GPM group, his own economic position would have been undermined, and with it his political leadership in a community where he represented the interests of many other villagers. In that event, control of Khala's rubber economy may well have been lost to Thai officials. Cik Osman's decision sacrificed increased profits to keep the Thai administration at bay and the village economy in Malay hands.
Cik Rashid, as both a leader and major landowner in Maju, could afford to allow the establishment of a GPM group without threatening his own income and political position. There remained the potential for losing the village rubber economy to Thai control. Cik Rashid overcame this by
becoming an active leader of the GPM group, using his fluency in Thai and Malay to regulate the flow of information to DOAE officers, employing his knowledge of the DOAE bureaucracy to maximinse the allocation of resources to Maju, and then extending these tactics to the RCM sales in Raman, to the point where by 1988 the RCM sales were finally appropriated into Malay hands a n d transferred to Maju itself. That was an exceptional feat, and much of the reason for it stems from the extraordinary character of Cik Rashid. However, the essential point is that Cik Rashid in Maju and Cik Osman in Khala b o t h acted with the same considerations in mind. Each man considered how to preserve the existing economic structures in their villages, and how to exclude Thai officials from gaining any control over those economic structures. Cik Osman's solution was to ensure the GPM group's failure, while Cik Rashid took possesion of the government's scheme and eventually brought it to Maju under his control. To speak of failure in Khala a n d success in Maju is therefore to speak in purely economic terms, a n d to accept a distinction that is more real for Thai officials than Malay villagers. For in terms of the political struggle between the Thai government and rural Malays, the latter successfully resisted the encroachment of the Thai state in both instances.
Such behaviour explains the paradox that confounds political scientists and historians, who are aware of the strong Malay support for separatist ideology, but who see litde active support for formal separatist groups. The fact is that separatist groups have been made largely redundant, for in resisting the advent of the Thai state, rural Malays like tiiose in Khala and Maju have been quite successful with their own strategies. They have had n o cause to resort to mass insurrection u n d e r the leadership of formal separatist groups. From this explanation, I would hypothesise that mass