Virtual reality

In Section VI, we saw that when a person is unable to do something because she lacks the ability or the opportunity to do that thing, we are inclined to reject the idea that she ought to do that thing, but when a person is unable to do something because she is unable to overcome motivational obstacles to her doing the right thing, i.e., when she is not sufficiently motivated to do that thing, we do not take this to undermine the fact that she ought to do that thing. In Section VII, we drew distinctions between abilities, opportunities, and motivation. These distinctions allow us to offer a principle that reflects these intuitions:

If, all things considered, a person ought to do something, φ, then that person has the ability to φ and an opportunity to φ.

Now we need to consider what can be said in favor of this principle.

above has the support of the following conceptual argument. The ethical thing for a person to do in a particular situation just is the thing that she would do in that situation were she sufficiently motivated by the relevant ethical considerations. Similarly, the rational thing for a person to do in a particular situation just is the thing that she would do in that situation, if her will was determined by rational considerations. The equivalences here can be generalized: all things considered, the proper thing for a person to do in a particular situation just is the thing she would do in that situation, if she were sufficiently motivated to act in accordance with the balance of all applicable normative considerations. So, what a particular person ought to do, all things considered, in a particular situation is the thing that she would do if she were motivated in accordance with the balance of all applicable reasons.

What would a particular person do in a particular situation if she were sufficiently motivated in accordance with the balance of all applicable reasons? To answer this question, we should imagine a situation that is as close to the actual scenario as possible, while making only the adjustments required by the antecedent of the conditional. In other words, to answer this question, we should hold fixed this person’s abilities and opportunities, but imagine that she is motivated in accordance with the balance of reasons that apply to her and then consider what she would do. Anything that she would do would have to be something that she actually has the ability and opportunity to do, but it may be something that, in the actual scenario, she is not sufficiently motivated to do. So, for any way of acting, φ, if our person

ought to φ, then she must have the ability and opportunity to φ.

This argument is, to my mind, compelling. It depends on a plausible conceptual connection between what a person ought to do and what that person would do if she were properly motivated. The existence of this connection is clearly demonstrated by the useful role that the idea of an agent who is idealized in just this way can play in our practical reasoning. People who hold a wide variety of moral theories, or who hold no particular moral theory at all, frequently rely on character models to aid their thinking about what they ought to do. Even those who do not choose to rely on this sort of device should admit that, provided we pick the appropriate model, it is a valid way of answering the question, “What should I do?” They should also agree that the proper role model is one who is not significantly different in terms of abilities and circumstances, but who has the right sort of character and, thus, is properly motivated.

The principle that I am recommending reflects a reasonable conception of the role and purpose of claims about what one ought to do. These claims are or should be practical and action guiding while also promoting value. A theory that suggested that an agent ought to do things that go beyond his abilities or that are impossible in his circumstances would be an impractical and unreasonable theory. It would underwrite impossible demands and offer little in the way of guidance. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a normative theory that suggested that a person ought to do something only if she can actually work up the motivation to do it would be nearly pointless. It would not

demand that we act virtuously. Instead, it would make the demands of morality and rationality depend on what the agent already cared about and on how stuck the agent is in her ways. This would offer us little in the way of guidance because it would demand too little. Instead of either of these alternatives, the demands of a moral theory should be reasonable, prescribing only actions that agents have the ability and opportunity to perform, but they should also be demanding, expecting us to be better people than we often are.

It might be thought that “ought” claims are stronger than this: that they are not merely practical and action guiding, but that they place some stronger form of obligation or demand upon an agent, and as such it would be unfair to impose them without being more sensitive to how an agent could possibly be motivated. But it is not clear what this stronger sense of “ought” is supposed to be. Linking this sense with obligations does not help to make it clear, for the practical, action guiding “ought to do” claims I have in mind very often express obligations. Winona, for example, has an obligation not to steal, and so she ought not to do so. The only sense in which “ought” could express some stronger normative claim, one for which it might be unfair to fail to consider motivational obstacles, is one that is tied to blameworthiness, such that “A ought to ϕ” more or less entails that A would be blameworthy if he failed to ϕ. This is not a use of “ought” that I am familiar with or that I find particularly useful. Recall that I am inclined to say that Winona ought not steal, but that she may not be blameworthy if she does. Separating what an agent ought to do from what she would be blameworthy for doing reflects the

fact that there are excuses, i.e., considerations that may mitigate or entirely remove blame without implying that the act in question can be justified. And if we need a term that tracks whether or not an agent would be blameworthy for ϕ-ing, I prefer “would be blameworthy for ϕ-ing.” Of course, if one understands and sees a use for stronger “ought” claims of this sort, they may use them. I am concerned with “ought” in its action-guiding use, which I believe includes its obligation-imposing use. What I have argued is that this action-guiding usage should guide our will, not be guided by the will that we already have.

There is one final complication that must be addressed. I have been arguing that some fairly basic considerations about the nature and point of a normative theory suggest that, in determining what an agent ought to do, it is appropriate to set motivational considerations aside. But I must also admit that it would be too much to set all motivational considerations aside. After all, I noted earlier that normative reasons only apply to an agent that has some capacity to appreciate the force of those reasons. A cat does not have a moral duty to respect the rights of human beings, because a cat is not capable of appreciating and guiding her actions in accordance with moral considerations. At least part of what the cat is lacking is a capacity to be motivated to act on moral reasons. And it seems that just in virtue of this it is always false that a cat ought to do something for moral reasons. So, we might wonder why, if we are supposed to set aside the motivational limitations of, say, a kleptomaniac and say that the kleptomaniac should not steal, we should

not set aside the limitations of a cat and say that the cat ought to respect the rights of persons by not scratching them.

The first thing that we need to do is get clear about this proposed restriction on what an agent ought to do. It is intuitive to suppose that for an agent to have reason to do something, φ, she must at least be capable of coming to appreciate the reason. She must, at least, have the potential to appreciate the relevant reasons. This does not mean that it need be easy for anyone to make her appreciate and care about those reasons. Depravity may make it extremely difficult to get a person to see moral reasons as legitimate reasons, but this is not enough to show that the depraved person should not act morally. If the depraved person retains the capacities that would make it possible for her to care about moral considerations (or, for example, to see people, among other things, as deserving a certain kind of respect), that is all that is required.

In order to have a reason to φ, an agent must have the potential for appreciating that reason. Of course, having the potential for appreciating a reason must not amount to actually appreciating the full force of that reason and being motivated in accordance with that reason’s weight. Requiring this would run afoul of our intuitions that the kleptomaniac ought not steal. Our examples of people who, because of motivational obstacles, cannot do what they ought to do were all meant to be examples of people who could appreciate the considerations that supported what they ought to do. But, while they have the capacity to appreciate these kinds of considerations and while

they may have some motivation to act on them, they do not because they are driven by some stronger motivational force.

What we should require is the following. In order for an agent to have a reason to φ, and so, in order for it to be the case that this agent ought to φ, it must be the case that this agent could, in principle, come to care about that sort of reason, though this might require extensive education, training, conditioning, intellectual persuasion, and exposure to the value underlying that reason. This may only be possible “in principle” because, for example, in particular cases there may be no one around who has the resources, the skills, or the motivation to provide the kinds of education that would be necessary. All that is required is that the agent has the basic intellectual and emotional faculties such that the right sort of education would be effective in producing appreciation for the relevant reasons. When this is the case, an agent has a sufficient potential or capacity to appreciate a reason.

Applying this suggestion, we might say the following. People of reasonable intelligence can in general come to appreciate and care about a wide range of reasons: moral, prudential, etc. They can come to appreciate the value not only of themselves and others who are similar to them, but also of people very different than themselves, of animals, of natural areas, of aesthetic beauty, and many other kinds of things. Intelligent people who suffer from weakness of will, from compulsive desires, from pathological fears, and so forth, can still come to appreciate and care about this full range of reasons. They simply have difficulty controlling their actions in accordance with these

considerations. On the other hand, there are other people who lack the potential to appreciate certain kinds of value and certain kinds of reasons. Insanity, senility, or a mental defect may make a person incapable of appreciating a wide variety of reasons for action. There might be no amount of moral education that could prompt a mentally incompetent person to appreciate moral value. Similarly, non-human animals may only be capable of appreciating a limited range of reasons. Some animals can be made, through training, to see that violence towards humans is not in their own interests. But it seems doubtful that even the most intelligent animals can come to appreciate what we might call “moral reasons” for not acting violently. So, I suppose that if it is true that a dog ought not bite, it is not for moral reasons.

So, it seems that if an agent ought to do something, then she must not only have the ability and opportunity to do that thing, but also the potential for appreciating the reasons why she ought to do that thing. She must also have some capacity that would make it possible for her, given the right sort of education, to feel the force of the relevant reasons. This is problematic in so far as it prompts one to wonder why, if the truth of “A ought to φ” requires that A has this potential to feel the force of the relevant reasons for φ-ing, it should not also require that A is actually motivated by them. The considerations I have been relying on, concerning the role of a normative theory and the importance of the concept of an agent who is properly motivated, are sufficient to answer this question. A normative theory must respect the equivalence between what an agent ought to do and what a properly motivated version of

that agent would do. Of course, the properly motivated version of that agent must still be a version of that agent. It should be like that agent except that its will is in proper order. But to imagine a version of the agent that appreciates reasons that the actual agent does not even have the potential to come to appreciate is not to imagine the agent with its will in proper order. It is to imagine the agent with an entirely different kind of will, a will that is susceptible to considerations that the actual agent could not possibly see as reasons at all. A normative theory should demand that the agent be properly motivated, relative to that agent’s potential.

The considerations presented in this section suggest that if a person ought to do something then she has the ability and the opportunity to do that thing, and that she has the potential to appreciate the reasons that support doing that thing. In general, when we focus on normal, healthy human agents, the last condition can be ignored. We can safely assume that normal, healthy human agents can be taught to appreciate the full range of considerations that we are aware of: moral, prudential, grammatical, etc. But normal, healthy humans vary a great deal in their abilities and their circumstances. In so far as they do differ, the things that they ought to do will also differ. What an agent ought to do is what she would do if she were an ideally motivated human agent who had to cope with the actual agent’s limited abilities and opportunities.