• No se han encontrado resultados

11. REVISION BIBLIOGRAFICA

2.1. MATERIA PRIMA (Jergón Sacha)

2.2.8. Viscosidad

Change calculated frcm Development in Civil Aviation 1973-1983 Tables 1 2 - 1 5 - 1 9

tri b u t a b l e to the important fact that the process of i mpl e m e n t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t projects is a long term one and does not instantly react to changes in revenues from oil, c o n s e q u e n t l y the mo v e m e n t of foreign labour c o n tinues to flow until c o n tracts are completed. The p a r a d o x of i n c r e a s e in t r a f f i c and d e c l i n e in the d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s is solved in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d i r e c t i o n of traffic. The r e d u ction in invest m e n t in new pr o j e c t s as was o r i g i n a l l y p l anned in the 1981-1986 F i v e Y e a r D e v e l o p m e n t P l a n resulted in the d e p a r t u r e of much of the foreign labour as new jobs were not being generated, w h i c h influenced traffic trends positi v e l y for a p e r i o d b e y o n d the s t a r t of d e c l i n e in oil revenue s .

Serageldin, Socknat, Birks, B. Li, and Sinclair, (1983) stated that Libya was the second ma j o r l a b o u r - i m p o r t i n g c o untry in the M iddle East with 280,400 m i g r a n t workers in 1975, s e c o n d o n l y to S a u d i A r a b i a w i t h 6 6 8 , 4 0 0 . They also p r e d i c t e d that at a high growth rate the number of m i g r a n t w o r k e r s in Libya will increase to 71 9,300 w o r k e r s in 1 985 .

jn

1 983 , the decline in oil r e v enues had r e s u l t e d in there b eing only 569,000

r q

m i g r a n t w o r k e r s p r e s e n t in Libya. In mid 1984, the C e ntral Bank of Libya e s t i mated that this dro p p e d to

263,100 mi g r a n t l a b o u r e r s . ^ With the d e c l i n e of oil revenues in 1985 and d r a m a t i c a l l y in 1986, the number

r n

of m i g r a n t labourers must have dropped drastically. z The d e p a r t i n g m i grant labour left the country by air. ^

The inter p r e t a t i o n of the par a d o x of i n c rease in air traffic and d e c l i n e in oil revenue in a cou n t r y where oil c o n t r i b u t e s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y to the e c o n o m y is only p a r t i a l l y solved in terms of the d e p a r t u r e of a s u b ­ stantial number of m i g r a n t labourers from the country.

There are two other factors that go along side this theory. These are pri m a r i l y that the L i b y a n G o v e r n m e n t since 1981 had d e c i d e d that int e r n a t i o n a l traffic to and from L ibya should pass through a single gateway, thus inf l a t i n g the number of p a s s e n g e r s thr o u g h the c o u n t r y ’s only real inte r n a t i o n a l airport, (See Chapter 5 below) and that the inc r e a s e d import a n c e of Sabhah as a str a t e g i c post in the m a n a g e m e n t of the conflict in Chad, p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1981, had i n c r e a s e d the m o v e ­ ment of p a s s e n g e r s on this route, albeit m a rginally.

The trends in traffic ca r r i e d by L IBYAN A R A B AIRLINES, p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1973, have shown c o n t i n u o u s and s u s ­ tained growth. Th e r e was no lack of s u p p o r t on the side of the g o v e r n m e n t for the e x p a n s i o n of the

na-tional air c a r r i e r ' s operations. The national air c a r ­ rier m a n a g e d to obtain its fair share of the ava i l a b l e market. The desire and effort by the g o v e r n m e n t to support the national air carrier was o b s t r u c t e d by the refusal of the the U nited States G o v e r n m e n t to deliver a i r craft m a n u f a c t u r e d in the United S tates or with US c o m p o n e n t s or t e c h n o l o g y as a result of L i b y a ' s having f a l l e n i n t o d i s f a v o u r w i t h the A m e r i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The p a r a d o x is that the funds a v a i l ­ a b l e to L I B Y A N A R A B A I R L I N E S c o u l d n o t o b t a i n the a i r c r a f t required, for on the one hand the US would not allow the A m e r i c a n a i r craft m a n u f a c t u r e r s to sell a i r c r a f t or parts to Libya, and on the other Libya c a n ­ not get a i r c r a f t e l s e w h e r e outside the So v i e t Bloc for the US d o m i n a t e s the a e r o s p a c e industry o u t s i d e it and US l e g i s l a t i o n and inf l u e n c e wo r k to en s u r e the denial of a e r o s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y to Libya, (see C h a p t e r 6).

Conclusion

The b leak e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d in Libya upon i n d e p e n d e n c e in 19 51 and the p o l i t i c a l w e a k n e s s of the g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e d to persist until r e v e n u e s from oil be g a n to p r o v i d e the tool for i m p l e m e n t i n g ec o n o m i c d ev e l o p m e n t . The lack of suitably e d u c a t e d n a t i onals

a n d t h e c o m p l e x i t y of the a i r t r a n s p o r t b u s i n e s s d e l a y e d the m a t e r i a l i s a t i o n of a nat i o n a l air carrier - until 1965. The foreign control over the cou n t r y ' s a i r p o r t s and much of its ai r s p a c e cre a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e u n c e r t a i n t i e s in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the air transport systems and i n f r a structure.

For a long time the c o u n t r y ' s ai r p o r t s were bas i c a l l y run for, or with the help of, foreign g o v e r n m e n t s or m u l t i - n a t i o n a l companies. Foreign a i r l i n e s o p e r a t e d to the country almost u n r e s t r i c t e d l y to the ex t e n t that c a b o t a g e routes were e x p l o i t e d by them. The general a v i a t i o n sector w h i c h s u p p orted the oil i n dustry was so i n t e n s e l y e x p l o i t e d by small, foreign g e neral a v iation c o m panies that in comparison, the o p e r a t i o n s of the n a ­ tional air carrier formed only a fra c t i o n of the total hours flown and n u mber of p a s s e n g e r s c a r r i e d w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . In 1 9 7 0 the L i b y a n n a t i o n a l a i r c a r r i e r t r a n s p o r t e d 109,208 p a s s e n g e r s on its d o m e s t i c and

in-f

14

t e r n a t i o n a l n e t w o r k s 0 while the oil field services o p e r a t o r s carried 245,469^5 almost t w o - a n d - a - h a l f times the total t r affic t r a n s p o r t e d by the n a t i o n a l carrier.

The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a national carrier a c h i e v e d a p a r ­ tial control over the air tra n s p o r t i n f r a s t r u c t u r e as

it t o o k o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n of the m a i n d o m e s t i c s c h e d u l e d r o u t e s . F o r a d e c a d e a f t e r i t s m a t e r i a l i s a t i o n , f r o m lack of a d e q u a t e g o v e r n m e n t support, the n a t ional carrier d e v e l o p e d its network only to the e x tent that it m a naged to find its way in p a r allel o p e r a t i o n s on the main i n t e r n a t i o n a l routes t e r m i n a t i n g in Libya which had p r e v i o u s l y been e x ­ pl oited only by foreign airlines. The small foreign o p e r a t o r s c o n t i n u e d to work, free from g o v e r n m e n t c o n ­ trol or c o m p e t i t i o n from the national car r i e r for two decades. This sector was totally left to the oil c o m ­ panies to manage.

There was a subs t a n t i a l change in the d e g r e e of g o v e r n ­ ment control over the air tra n s p o r t sector after 1969.

T h e e n d of the t r e a t i e s w i t h t h e U S A a n d B r i t a i n brought the control back to the Li b y a n a u t h o r i t i e s who could, with a v a i l a b l e funds from oil, support the n a ­ tional air c a rrier to fulfil its role in o p e r a t i n g the d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e t works and in the m e a n ­ time e m bark on a t r a ining p r o g ramme w h i c h w o u l d ensure na t i o n a l control of the m a n a g e m e n t and o p e r a t i o n of the n a t ional airline. Similarly, the c h a n g i n g political and e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s m a d e p o s s i b l e c o n s i d e r a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t and i m p r o v e m e n t in the c i v i l a v i a t i o n

infrastr u c t u r e .

A l o n g s i d e the d e v e l o p m e n t in the m a n a g e r i a l and t e c h n i ­ cal a b i l i t i e s of the n a t i o n a l s and the i m p r o v e m e n t of the i nfrastructure, the air transport sy s t e m saw a c o n ­ s i d e r a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t in the c o m p o s i t i o n of the a ir c r a f t used by the national air carrier. D e s p i t e the financial a b i l i t y of the country and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to help the nat i o n a l carrier face the growing d e m a n d for a i r c r a f t c a p a c i t y d u r i n g the er a oil revenues grew most substantially, the p o l i t i c a l d i f ­ f erences with the Un i t e d States p r e v e n t e d the healthy pro g r e s s of the national carrier.

The d e c l i n e in oil r e v e n u e s a f t e r 1981 has m e a n t a d e c l i n e in d e v e l o p m e n t plans. The d e p e n d e n c e of the d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s on foreign labour, and the s u b ­ stantial p r o p o r t i o n these form of the air traffic to, f r o m a n d w i t h i n L i b y a , c o u p l e d w i t h th e L i b y a n G o v e r n m e n t ' s own po l i c i e s that do not e n c o u r a g e travel ab r o a d by L i b y a n nationals, cause a m a r k e d d e c l i n e in the a i r l i n e ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l and d o m e s t i c operations.

The o i l i n d u s t r y d o m i n a t e s the L i b y a n e c o n o m y and c hanges in oil revenues reflects m a r k e d l y on the Libyan air t r a n s p o r t scene.

Footnotes

1. The d r a s t i c collapse in the oil price since 1982 and the e f fect this has had upon revenues from oil for oil e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s . The t e r m 'the t h i r d oil shock' has been used as a title for a book d i s c u s s i n g the fall of oil prices since 1982 by J. Pearce et al., The Third Oil Shock, R o u t l e d g e

&

K e a g a n Paul, 1983.

2. F. Waddams, The Libyan Oil Industry, Johns Hopkins, T able 11.1, p . 216, 1980.

3. A. A t t i g a , T h e Inf lueiice of O i l on t h e L i b y a n Economy, (Arabic text), Dar Attalia, Beirut, Table 10,

p. 1 08, 1 972 .

4. F. Waddams, The Libyan Oil Industry, Johns Hopkins, Table 11.4, p . 220, 1980.

5. K. R. Sealy, The Geography of Air Transport, H.U., Table XVIII, 1968.

6. IB R D , T h e E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t of Libya, J o h n s Hopkins, 1960. Ar g u e d against the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a n a t ional air carrier. The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a national airline need not d e p e n d upon the c o m m e r c i a l v i a b i l i t y of the a i r l i n e ' s own operations, rather an a i rline is a tool w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e s to e c onomic d e v e l o p m e n t and is thus i n d i r e c t l y b e n e f i c i a l to the economy.

7. S A BENA w i t h d r e w its services from Libya upon the

c l o s u r e o f t h e T r i p o l i - B e n g h a z i s e c t o r t o f o r e i g n

a i r l i n e s .

8. B reak do w n of one air c r a f t would mean the loss of 50 per cent of the fleet's o p e r a t i o n a l capacity.

9. T h e a u t h o r e x p e r i e n c e d the b e g i n n i n g of the a i r l i n e ' s o p e r a t i o n at their Tripoli office.

10. N o r m a l l y 12 to 18 months.

11. Mea n i n g checks at all op e r a t i n g d e s t i n a t i o n s after arrival and in p r e p a r a t i o n for departure, or, routine checks, i n s p e c t i o n and m a l f u n c t i o n r e c t i f i c a t i o n p e r ­ formed en route and at base stations dur i n g transit, t u r n a r o u n d or night stop. As d e f i n e d by E.B. Ocran, D i c t i o n a r y of A i r T r a n s p o r t and T r a f f i c C o n t r o l , Granda T e c h n i c a l Books, 1984.

12. N o r m a l l y ca r r i e d out at major m a i n t e n a n c e bases.

In the case of LI B Y A N A R A B AIRLINES, at the AIR FRANCE, Orly m a i n t e n a n c e base.

13. a) I n t e r n a t i o n a l flights included, b) C a l c u l a t e d as follows:

T = D x n x t

T = total u t i l i s a t i o n time

U = A n n u a l u t i l i s a t i o n (2,000 hours) n = nu m b e r of a i r c r a f t 2

t = time airc r a f t o p erated (Four months) 14. M c D o n n e l l Douglas, D o m e s t i c Air T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

S y s t e m S t u d y f o r L I BY M S A I R L I N E S , P h a s e 1, p. 10, J a n u a r y 19 7 3.

15. The Sunday Ghibli, 20 March 1966.

16. J. Wright, L ibya, A M o d e r n H i s t o r y , Croom Helm, p . 97, 1983 (reprint).

17. A r t i c l e 14 Libyan Civil Aviation Law, 1965.

A r t i c l e 14 r e a d s :

No L ibyan national or foreign r e s ident in L ibya may i m ­ port or h i r e - p u r c h a s e an a i r craft u nless he obtains special p e r m i s s i o n to this effect from the D i r ector General. No h i r e - p u r c h a s e d aircraft may fly be t w e e n L ibya and any place o u t s i d e Libya w i t h o u t the prior p e r m i s s i o n of the D i r e c t o r General.

18. Bank of Libya, 13th Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1968-1969.

19. 'Report by the Department of Civil Aviation on the Studies Prepared by TWA Experts on KINGDOM OF LIBYA AIRLINES CORPORATION' . The report is u n d a t e d but a s ­ sumed to be w r i t t e n in 1968-1969.

20. ibid, p. 1 . 21 . i b i d , p. 2 . 22 . ibid, p . 3.

23. i b i d , p. 4 . 24. ibid, p . 21 . 25. i b i d , p. 21 .

26. ibid, p. 22.

27. M c D o n n e l l Douglas, Domaestic A i r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n System Study For Libyan Airlines, M c D o n n e l l Douglas,

p . 16, J a n u a r y 1 973.

28. J.Waddam, The Libyan Oil Industry, Johns Hopkins, p p . 180-182, 1980.

2 9 . ibid, p . 191 .

30. 0.1. El Fathali, in O. El Fathali, M. Palmer and R. C h a i k e r i a n ,Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya, Heath, p . 19, 1977.

31. The ai r l i n e c h a r t e r e d two F 2 7 's from L INAIR and c o n t i n u e d to do so until 1972 when these were replaced by two F 2 7 's from PIA.

32. A u t h o r ' s personal experience.

33. A u t h o r ' s personal experience. P r o t a g o n i s t s of the p r o j e c t w e r e Mr. F a t h i B e n T a h e r , the T e c h n i c a l M a n a g e r , H a d i R e g i i , C h a i r m a n of the t h e n P e o p l e ' s Committee, p r e v i o u s l y the U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y to the M i n i s ­ ter of C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , Mr. A. Z av; i , its F i n a n c i a l Manager, and the author.

34. Soon after the Zuara speech of Col. Muammar El Q a dhafi in April 1973, the top m a n a g e m e n t of the a i r ­ li n e w e r e r e l i e v e d of t h e i r p o s t s an d r e p l a c e d by p o p u l a r c o m m i t t e e s f r o m s t a f f of m i d d l e and l o w e r r a n k s . T h e s i t u a t i o n in the a i r l i n e d e t e r i o r a t e d

r a pidly and the g o v e r n m e n t had to a p p o i n t the U n d e r ­ s e c r e t a r y of the M i n i s t r y of C o m m u n i c a t i o n s to head the a i r l i n e in an a t tempt to put some r a t i o n a l e into the a c tions of the committees.

35. A r t i c l e 9 of Law N o . 5, 1975, c o n c e r n i n g the e s t a b ­ lishment of the L IBYAN A R A B A I R L I N E S C o m p a n y reads as follows:

A r t i c l e 9

'The Bo a r d of D i r e c t o r s shall have the w i d e s t a u t h o r i t y in m a n a g i n g the company, settling its affairs, m aking g e neral policy, financial and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e rules and o r d i n a n c e s to be f o l l o w e d and the o r d i n a n c e s of e m p l o y e e s and w o r k e r s so much so with the e x c e p t i o n of

the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s res e r v e d by this law or the trade law or the a r t i c l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n of the com p a n y ' s g e neral a s s e m b l y 1.

36. A r t i c l e 4(1) of ab o v e law reads as follows:

A r t i c l e (4)

’1) Air T r a n s p o r t for passengers, cargo and mail to be r e s t r i c t e d to the C o m p a n y b e t w e e n two p l a c e s w i t h i n the r e p u b l i c w h e t h e r p a i d or u n p a i d . Th e M i n i s t e r of C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , for c o m p e l l i n g reasons, may give p e r ­ m i s s i o n to any a v i a t i o n company or i n s t i t u t i o n to carry out the said o p e r a t i o n s and the p e r m i s s i o n should be c a n c e l l e d when the r e ason is done away with'.

37. See A r t i c l e (35)

The A r t i c l e s of A s s o c i a t i o n of L i b y a n A r a b Airlines issued by the C o uncil of M i n i s t e r s 7 J a n u a r y 1975.

38. C o m p e n s a t i o n s to the national air car r i e r have b e ­ come fully e x p l a i n e d as an integral part of the law g o v e r n i n g its f o r m a t i o n only since 1975. (Article 14 and A r t i c l e 15 of Law No. 5, 1975).

39. L i b y a n Ar a b Airlines, General Budget as at 31st March 1 972, and A u d i t o r s R e p o r t for the year ending 31st March 1972.

U n i t e d A c c o u n t a n t s , Benghazi, Tripoli, 5 F e b r u a r y 1973.

40. The a u t h o r ' s first hand i n f o r m a t i o n as then C h a i r ­ man and Chief E x e c u t i v e of the a i rline until S e p t ember

1 977 .

41 . 1 975 and 1 976 formed a single f i n a ncial year for the a i r l i n e u n d e r L a w No. 5, 1 975, w h i c h ca m e i n t o o p e r a t i o n on 7th J a n u a r y 1975. C o n s e q u e n t l y the first

f inancial year was 1975/76.

42. This s t a t e m e n t cannot be s u b s t a n t i a t e d due to the a b sence of p u b l i s h e d data. The a s s u m p t i o n is based on a u t h o r ' s u n o f f i c i a l d i s c u s s i o n s with c e r t a i n me m b e r s of the airline.

43. J. Wright, Libya: A M o d e r n History, Croom Helm (reprint) p . 92, 1983.

44. See note (63), C h a p t e r 1, where d e v e l o p m e n t s at