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Despite the feet that a theory o f mind is intrinsically interpersonal and intersubjective, surprisingly httle attention has been devoted to a developmental account based on such theoretical lines. There have recently been some motivational and affective perspectives on

how early behaviours such as protoinq)erative communication can be considered to be precursors to children’s theory o f mind (e.g., Mundy et al., 1993; Gomez et al., 1993). However, v^Mst these represent a new perspective on children’s early theory o f mind abilities, and are appealing in that they make place from the very start for the operation o f transactional factors in shaping the child’s developing understanding o f minds, they do not provide a strong theoretical developmental account Wiich leads up to the emergence o f a frilly fledged exphcit theory o f mind. Thus, they are not presented here. Rather, the presentation turns to some conqilementary theoretical accounts which have recently been advanced, and considers three o f them below: Hobson’s (1993, 1994) affective account o f persons, attitudes and interpersonal relatedness; Mayes, Cohen & Klin’s (1993) psychoanalytic account; and Bruner’s (1986; Bruner & Feldman, 1993) linguistic and communication account.

1.7.3.1. H obson’s theory o f emotional states

Closely related to the interpersonal stance o f authors like Stem and Trevarthen, Hobson's theoiy grew out o f clinical work with autistic children and the quest to explain why they fail to develop an adequate theory o f mind. Hobson's theory depends upon a 'starting state nativist' base - in other words, the infant must have innate capacities to perceive and react to 'attitudes' in other people for the development o f intersubjective understanding to begin at all For Hobson, the infants' abihty to perceive the "directedness o f another person's attitudes towards a visually specified world" is highly significant (Hobson, 1994). This is because attitudes are modes o f subjective experiences as well as involving actions and other bodily expressions, and for Hobson, this suggests that there is a developmental path from behavioural expressions o f mind to the 'mental' capacities o f mind.

"relatedness triangle" - "in&nts not only relate to another person and to the nonpersonal world o f objects and events, but they also relate to the other person's relatedness towards the world and towards themselves" (Hobson, 1994). Also crucial throughout Hobson's theory is his philosophical orientation to what it actually means to arrive at "knowledge o f persons with minds". He develops a central developmental concept, "the concept o f persons" (Hobson, 1994), drawing on the musings o f philosophers such as Wittgenstein, which revolves around the notion that there is "something primary and irreducible about our attitudes toward a person, and the attitudes we adopt are what gives substance to our concept o f a person who has her own subjective experiences" (Hobson, 1994, p.80).

Underpinning his theory is the fact that 'affect' is intrinsic to all his concepts - the concept o f persons, attitudes, interpersonal relatedness. Following Trevarthen (1979) he reiterates that 'affect' is the original means to and mode o f primary inter subjectivity (Hobson, 1993). This is also in line with the psychoanalytic theory o f children’s acquisition o f a theory o f mind which is discussed below (Mayes, Cohen & Klin, 1993), in that both accounts propose that it is the fact that the child’s earhest experiences with another person are organised around affect which is most significant for the child’s developing awareness o f minds.

Once the fiiU complexity o f these aspects o f Hobson's theory are grasped (this is a speedy portrayal o f his multifaceted concepts), his hypothesis as to how the developing infant grows into the four-year-old who is able to understand the 'representational mind' follows naturally and clearly - "a child's growing capacity to engage with another person's affective attitudes towards herself is what hfts primitive forms o f self-experience into reflective self-awareness. She can now adopt an attitude to her own attitudes to her own 'self as a source o f attitudes, feelings, and 'points o f view'. Along with this comes a deeper

understanding o f the nature o f other 'selves' as both like oneself but distinct and 'other'" (Hobson, 1993). As a result o f these achievements, the child is able to develop an understanding o f an objective reahty, and o f subjective perspectives on that reahty. Hobson (1990) has also suggested an intimate relationship between this accompHshment and the cognitive developments associated with pretend play and 'mentahstic' thought and language. Inçhcit in this is Hobson's view that any account o f a child's developing conceptuahsation o f 'cognitive' states needs to consider interpersonal perception and understanding o f mental states that involve affective attitudes.

1.7.3.2. Mayes, Cohen & K lin ’s (1993) psychoanalytic view o f children's theory o f mind acquisition

A psychoanalytic perspective on children’s developing understanding o f minds is almost tautological Psychoanalytic theory as a Wiole is principally concerned with children’s inner world o f mental states, their desires and wishes, that underhes their understanding o f the behaviour o f others in the external social world. It revolves around this inner world o f the child Which is filled with mental representations o f the self and others, and in which the child plays with different views o f how others’ behefs and feelings influence their actions towards them Similar to Hobson’s account above, these authors can be seen as providing a ‘starting- state’ theoretical account which describes how the infant’s constitutionally given capacities for engaging others interact with their experiences in interactions with significant others. In particular, Mayes et al (1993) focus on the role that the infant’s or child’s desires to interact with and understand their significant others plays in their emerging theory o f mind.

These authors propose that fi'om the early interactions in infancy between the infant and his caregiver(s) emerges a desire to be deeply interested in the actions and feelings o f his

caregiver(s). Obviously there are innate capacities influencing this innate interest, but these authors propose that such capacities are not sufficient for the often intense involvement characterizing such dyads. More importantly though, Mayes et al. (1993) suggest that it is this desire for others which is likely to be the most significant in terms o f children’s development o f a theory o f mind since this desire motivates the workings o f the imagination and the creation o f an inner world. Thus, this desire gives life to fantasies about others which in turn bring a depth and cohesiveness to the developing cognitive capacities underlying the development o f the ability to attribute meaning, psychological meaning to social interactions. This brief description o f Mayes et al.’s (1993) psychoanalytic theory o f the development o f a theory o f mind hopefidly has illustrated that it is unique in two clear ways. First o f all, it provides continuity between innate social capacities and adaptive mechanisms and the representational achievements manifested in the cognitive watershed around four years o f age - that is, by describing how the young child’s desire emerges intrap sychically early in in&ncy, the theory importantly makes place for the affectively laden infant-mother interactions in a dynamic way. Secondly, this makes room for the development o f individual theories o f mind rather than a universally determined theory o f mind.

1.7.S.3. B runer’s account o f the role o f linguistic and communication factors in the