In converting behavioural intentions into actual behaviour, various factors may intervene and distort or strengthen a previous consistency between attitudes and behavioural intentions.
Decision making is largely processed at the subconscious and, often without taking notice, in-dividuals recur to various types of strategies and cognitive short-paths that permit them to cope with specific situational features (Ajzen 2008, 540). Moreover, biases, priming and framing effects, as well as values and the influence of context and surrounding people may shape and direct actual behaviour (cf. Ariely and Norton 2008; Bettman, Luce, and Payne 2008; Bohner and Wänke 2002; Fraj and Martinez 2006b; Kahneman 2003; Poffenberger 1942; Schoen 2006;
Wyer 2008). In this framework, to reliably discern and objectively assess peoples’ impulses is difficult if not impossible both for the individuals themselves as for their counterparts (Sommer 2007, 37; cf. also Kroeber-Riel and Gröppel-Klein 2013, 185ff., 192-4, 333-5 & 382). Bettman, Luce, and Payne (2008) advocate four meta-goals which individuals generally strive to realize in any decision-making situation: (1) maximizing the accuracy of the decision, (2) minimizing cognitive effort needed to take the decision, (3) minimizing the amount of negative emotions while deciding, and (4) maximizing the ease of justifying why the final decision has been taken (2008, 590). Depending on the specific situation and issue at stake (i.e. salience, time, motiva-tion) one or the other goal may be more or less relevant than the others. Corresponding to it, individuals may apply different decision strategies and varying cognitive shortcuts. Applied to political consumerism this entails that depending on the specific framework and the approaches selected for making a decision, political attitudes may not translate congruently into the respec-tive political behaviour.
In striving for ease of justification, incentives to behave in a certain way may vary depend-ing on whether a decision is made in private or in the presence of others; similarly, if the deci-sion is taken in private but its outcome will be known to others afterwards, the decideci-sion-making process as such may also differ from when it is entirely kept private. As Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) have shown, decisions taken in the presence of others are much determined by the desire to satisfy a certain image (cf. also e.g. Friedrichsen and Engelmann 2013; Sirgy 1982). Privately taken decisions in turn require justification ‘only’ towards oneself. Conse-quently, the focus therein lies more on behaving in such a way as to maintain a consistent
self-image (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 2008; see also e.g. Mazar and Ariely 2006). However, to maintain this is not as simple either. Valor (2007), for example, discerns ‘cognitive’ and ‘emo-tional’ ambivalences which may distort decision making. In situations of cognitive ambiva-lence, individuals perceive a lack of knowledge and that they therefore cannot behave in such way as they think it would be their ethical obligation (2007, 686). In contrast, emotional am-bivalence occurs when individuals perceive a mismatch between different dimensions of their personality (2007, 687). Both types of incongruities may complicate ease of justification and, as a consequence, incite ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger 1957, see Valor 2007, 686). Hence, Valor (2007) concludes, consumers who find themselves in an ambivalent situation may recur to different neutralisation strategies that serve them to reduce the dissonance between their felt obligation and what they want or can do. Related to political consumerism, individuals may for example lower the level of their perceived ethical obligation or consider it as being beyond their power to act in line with their political ideals (cf. Valor 2007, 687-8). That is, they may alter attitudes held initially. Another finding which proves the ambivalent nature of behaviour is provided by Mazar and Zhong (2010). They observe that while the mere exposure to green products may trigger altruistic behaviour, actually purchasing these ethically and environmen-tally considerate products makes people more prone to engage in dishonest behaviour than the purchasing of conventional products. This illustrates how values related to ethical commitment are not necessarily persistent, and acting according to certain (ethical) values in one case may alter an individual’s predispositions to act for other activities. Hence, their finding actually sup-ports both the notion that preferences are volatile over time and context as well as the notion that attitudes and behaviour are linked in a continuous reciprocal process in which they shape each other.
The concept of cognitive dissonance implies that next to easy justification, individuals typ-ically strive for a decision making that is as effortless as possible and yet maximally accurate.
As Simon (1978) notes, people are in many situations simply not capable to search and process the vast amount of information they could theoretically take into consideration before making a decision. Frequently, individuals face a large array of purchasing options while simultane-ously being surrounded by multiple media and other environmental influences. Although in theory they may have access to all relevant information, the complex system is little transparent and keeping track of new developments is difficult while factual time-pressure often is high (cf.
Boström and Klintman 2009; Kroeber-Riel and Gröppel-Klein 2013, 747; Schimank 2005, 161
& 168-9). These circumstances make prone to depend on expert advice and other tools that
allow for making decisions in uncertain or ambivalent situations simpler (Boström and Klint-man 2009, para. 21) while maintaining a high enough level of security that the ‘right’ decision is taken (cf. Kroeber-Riel and Gröppel-Klein 2013, 469 & 476ff.; see also Poffenberger 1942, 95; Ybarra, Lee, and Gonzalez 2012).17 One major strategy to cope with this ambivalence con-sists in using so-called heuristics, that is, simplified rules that facilitate and abridge decision-making (cf. Bohner and Wänke 2002, 153; Noel 2010, 146; Schoen 2006, 22). Such heuristics may entail straightforward strategies of selecting only based on price or brand, or they may as well entail more complex procedures where individuals compare, evaluate and ultimately rate various aspects of the alternatives (cf. Kurz-Milcke and Gigerenzer 2007, 50; Wyer 2008, 57).
As Nelson (2004) observes, also in political consumerism “[…] many decisions are made rather simply” (2004, 37), grounding on screening processes or the activation of particular subsets of images which the individual holds in relation to the product or producer (2004, 29). Thus, again, political consumerism appears to be clearly driven by more than mere values and attitudes, and the translation from behavioural intentions into actual behaviour shows to be possibly interfered by the simple desire to find a quick path towards a decision.
The remaining fourth meta-goal relates to the desire to minimize the amount of negative emotions experienced while deciding. This aim is of particular relevance in political consum-erism since high-stake concerns build the very core of political consumer activity (e.g. product security, individual and/or the family’s health, ecology or animal welfare or employee safety;
see e.g. Lindén 2005; Micheletti and Stolle 2010; Stolle and Micheletti 2005; Tallontire, Rentsendorj, and Blowfield 2001). Accordingly, the risk of negative emotional and/or cognitive consequences in the case of taking a ‘wrong’ decision in politically infused purchasing situa-tions may be perceived as being relatively high. However, when salience is high whereas the situation is not a matter of routine, individuals have shown to be particularly prone to either over- or underestimate relevant information (see for an overview Bettman, Luce, and Payne 2008, 601; Kroeber-Riel and Gröppel-Klein 2013, 483), and even to deter or abstain from choosing (Ariely and Norton 2009; see also Jäckel 2004, 277-8). Thus, despite holding political values and attitudes, depending on the evaluation of a situation’s level of risk individuals may deter from converting the intention to engage in political consumerism into the respective be-haviour. Furthermore, as Bohner and Wänke (2002) highlight, also the ease of information re-trieval may have a relevant impact on the assessment of a situation or object; that is, being able to rate a situation without much effort comes along with more positive emotions, which in turn
17 This idea relates to Herbert Simon’s famous notion of ‘bounded rationality’ (1955; see Simon 1978).
appears to lead to a more favourable assessment (Bohner and Wänke 2002, 107). As a conse-quence, the presence of e.g. labels or other easily recognisable criteria that allow for evaluating a product or producer may facilitate the conversion of intentions to engage in political consum-erism into actual behaviour. Finally, moods and impulses, past personal experiences or the mere presence of habits which are difficult to overcome may play in, too, and influence which atti-tudes are being relied on in a situation and how they are translated into behavioural action (cf.
Ajzen 2008, 541; Bohner and Wänke 2002; De Vries, Aarts, and Midden 2011; Kroeber-Riel and Gröppel-Klein 2013).
Altogether, the findings highlight the complex processes that underlie decision making and the mere impossibility of predicting political consumer behaviour by relying only on values and attitudes. Too many factors may interfere alongside and result in an incoherent relationship between attitudes and behaviour. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, focusing on attitudes which are comparatively unchanging over time may be one part of an approach to predict be-haviour and thus to further explore involvement in political consumerism. Moreover, the ob-servations of this section emphasize that outside conditions heavily condition behaviour as well.
In this regard, information provision appears to be a particularly important factor: information can deliver knowledge about issues and action possibilities whereas reliance on the information provided can promote a feeling of security. Together, the presence of these two aspects can facilitate involvement, their absence hinder it. As a consequence, in looking at individuals’
degree of familiarity with information providing phenomena and their confidence in them means moving focus onto criteria that are less a subject of individuals’ fickleness. Instead, fa-miliarity and confidence should be relatively steady across varying contexts. In conclusion, then, information provision appears to be a second piece to be included in a promising tactic designed to better comprehend political consumers.