VOLUMENES DE DRAGADO DE MANTENIMIENTO TRAMO CONCEPCION PUNTA GORDA

Now man’s happiness is twofold … One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2. Pet, i. 4) that by Christ we are made partakers of the Divine nature. And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness (ST, I- II.62.1 co.).

From the above citation from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, we notice two kinds of beatific happiness of humans: One can be achieved by natural principles, and the other can only come from participation in God. Thus, human deification according to Aquinas is achieved within the distinction between the essentially divine Being and the created, and the possibility of the participation in God is its precondition (Williams 1999:36; Marshall 2004:29). Aquinas refers to the participation as “the light of grace”, quoting 2 Pet 1:4 (ST, I-II.110.3 co.). By arguing that “[n]o being can act beyond the limits of its specific nature, since the cause must always be of a higher potency than its effect”, he makes sure of the distinction between God the Creator and the creatures, and in his statement that “[n]ow the gift of grace surpasses every capacity of created nature, since it is nothing other than a certain participation in the divine nature, which surpasses every other nature”, the possibility of it can be observed. Thus, God alone deifies (deificet) human beings through sharing His divine nature which is achieved by human participation in Him (ST, I.112.1 co.). Human deification in Aquinas is not deification in essence, because for him God’s essence is identical with His being (Rossum

148

See Also Marshall (2004) for the parallel between Aquinas and Eastern Orthodox theology on the same theme.

2003:369).149 Thus, for human beings the union with God means that, although the communion with Him through participation is possible in a sense, there should be distinction between God and human.

Aquinas frequently stresses the merit of intellect, but at the same time he makes it clear that the human intellect obviously has its limitations. Because of its insufficiency, the human intellect is not able to see God’s divine essence, and the power of understanding God comes as by God’s grace. Aquinas calls grace the “illumination” of the mind and “light”. “By this light we are made ‘deiform’(deiformes), that is, like to God” (ST, I.12.5 co.; I.12.5 ad.3).150 Thus, if one human being ‘sees’ God more than another, that cannot mean that the one is more perfect nor that the one’s ability is superior to the other, because the “ability to see God does not belong to the mind by its own nature but by the light of glory which renders the mind in some sense like to God (deiformitate)” (ST, I.12.6 co.; Untea 2010:73).151 As such, the intellect and the divine are placed as altogether central to Aquinas’ doctrine on deification. The more we become like God, the more we know God (Williams 1999:38). In this sense, the glory of God can be observed as standing against human intellect and that the perfection of nature is achieved only in the glory (ST, II-II.26.13 s.c; Williams 1999:89).

Untea points to dissimilarity between Aquinas and Palamas in terms of the reality of human participation in the divine God. In his opinion, Aquinas stresses the reality of the intermediary created Being while Palamas insists on the reality of human participation through the uncreated energies (Untea 2010:113). Simply put, however, they share a similarity in that human ability, like intellect, is

149

Van Rossum (2003:369) produces evidence that the union with God is still a distinguishable matter through Aquinas’s usage of the verb conjungere (or coniungo). In his opinion, Aquinas prefers the verb conjungere to

unire, which means the union with God; for him conjunction does not mean complete identicalness.

150

He quotes 1 John 3:2 for this reason: “When he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is”.

151

It is the same with angels in their hierarchy or orders. The more intelligible angel is able to enlighten and pass the truth on to a lower one (ST, I.106.1 co.). However, this hierarchy or order in angels is not derived from their nature, but from God’s grace. The hierarchy is about how they have been “likening to God (deiforme)” not about how intelligent they are themselves (ST, I.108.4 arg.). The angels in the highest level, according to Dionysius, are called “Furnace and Thrones and Effusion of Wisdom” because those titles show how they are deiform in their disposition (ST, I.50.6 s.c.), not by nature.

For Thomas, charity is a distinguished virtue, seeing God more perfectly for human beings. Those who have more charity will have greater desire for the divine things, and this desire predisposes them to receive what they desire; this then consequently leads to seeing God more perfectly (ST, I.12.6 co.). In Williams’ estimation, the level of participation in God’s divine nature is determined by the degree of charity one possesses (Williams 1999:38), and he maintains this opinion saying “[i]f charity is the substance of God and the prime means of our likening to God, the very locus of our participation in God … is also a locus of union with God”. In this regard, the reality of the Eucharist is charity (ST, III.79,4 resp.; Williams 1999:93).

not sufficient to know, to participate in, and to become like God. Untea describes this inability of human nature from an eschatological perspective. Even though the intellect sees the essence of God in a sense through the light of grace, His essence in this life is always beyond reach (Untea 2010:72). Therefore, it can definitely be said that Aquinas is not a rationalist. “He had a strong sense of the divine mystery which cannot be grasped by the human ratio, and he often gave evidence of an ‘apophatic’ approach” (Rossum 2003:379).

Aquinas quotes Rom 1:2-3,152 Augustine153 and Gregory of Nazianzus154 in investigating whether the statement “a man was made God” and vice versa is true (ST, III.16.7 arg.1-3). However, while Augustine and Gregory, as have seen, indicate the Incarnation-deification formula, Aquinas’ focus is exclusively on the Incarnation. His attention is focused only on the divinity and humanity of Christ, not on the Incarnation of the Son and deification of human beings when he says “a man was made God”. His equivalent understanding of “being humanized” and “being deified” is based upon the two natures of Christ in one person (substance). The divine nature of Jesus was “enfleshed” and His human nature was “deified” (deificatam) (ST, III.2.1 arg.3). One is not changed into another, however; the two natures are united in one another, retaining the attributes of each (ST, III.2.1 ad.3; III.16.5 ad.2). The divine nature existed first, and then the human nature was introduced through the Incarnation. Thus, it is evident that one person (suppositum) and two natures existed in Jesus even after the Incarnation. Therefore, it is true that the Son was “humanised”, and it is not true that He was deified, but His human nature was (ST, III.16.3 ad.2). In this regard, the man Jesus Christ is said to be “the Lord”, not a man “of the Lord”. On the other hand, the human nature of Jesus may not be said to be God essentially because it is “divinized”(deificata) (ST, III.16.3 co). The point is that the Son was essentially divine and then His human nature was deified for our sake. Consequently, for Aquinas, the statement “God was made a man” is true, but “a man was made God” is false (ST, III.16.7), in the relationship of the natures of Christ.

152

“(Which he had promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures) Concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh” (KJV).

153

“This assumption was such that it made God a man and made a man God” (De Trinitate I, 13).

154

As with a few Greek155 and Latin Fathers,156 the conception of participation in the divine nature through adoption is one of the distinctive images in Aquinas’ theology on deification, especially with regard to understanding deification in relation to the work of the Triune God.157 The adoptive sonship of human beings is “a participated likeness of natural sonship” (ST, III. 23.4 co.; cf. III.23.1 ad.2).158 The three divine Persons play specific roles for our adoption: the Father as the auctor, the Son as the

exemplar, and the Holy Spirit as the imprimens. Yet, at the same time, Aquinas distinguishes the

Sonship of Jesus Christ, who is the Son of the Father by nature from the adoptive sonship of human beings. We are adopted as sons of the Father through the Son in the grace of the Holy Spirit. As Marshall indicates, “we have the full likeness of his Sonship, of his own distinctive way of possessing the divine nature, though we do not, of course, have numerically the same filiatio” (Marshall 2004:27).

Williams also observes the Trinitarian perspective in Aquinas’ understanding of deification with the inner and outer relationship of the Triune God. In his observation, the Son plays the role as example, as Marshall proposed, for the outer relationship, viz. the economic Trinity. By the Incarnation of the Son, human beings are able to understand what being deified means to us; and it is the Holy Spirit who works between God and human beings to preserve and strengthen the relationship with love of God (Williams 1999:68). Human beings’ relationship with God is ontologically divine, which is “eternal and inviolable” as the relationship between the Father and the Son is, although not the same.

As with many other Church Fathers, the Sacrament is the locus of deification in a very practical way for Aquinas. He quotes Damascene on this matter: “The fire of that desire within us which is kindled by the burning coal, namely the sacrament, will consume our sins and enlighten our hearts, so

155

E.g. Irenaeus, Cyril of Alexandria, and Maximus the Confessor.

156

E.g. Ambrose and Augustine.

157

In Marshall’s estimation, however, this aspect of Aquinas’ theology is not properly acknowledged by Eastern Orthodox theologians or Western critics of Thomas (Marshall 2004:28).

158

“Dictum est autem supra quod filiatio adoptionis est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis”. Marshall (2004:26-27) reads this with the meaning of participation while the English translation reads it as “adoptive sonship has just been described as a partial likeness to sonship by nature” (my italics).

that we shall be enflamed (participatione) and made godlike (deificemur)” (ST, III.79.8 s.c.).159 Simply stated: by participation in the Sacrament we are deified. Thus, the Eucharist, for Aquinas, is a locus of union with and participation in God; more directly, a locus of deification (Williams 1999:93). Then he mentions “venial sins” that hamper the effect of the Sacrament (see also ST, III.79.4), it reminds of us the insufficiency of human deification in this life, as we have already seen.