Capítulo 3: Instalación y Configuración del Servidor LDAP
N- Way Multi-Master
Deviant Democracies
What if countries experience democratisation but lack the favourable structural conditions? A specialized body of literature addresses this issue, and improves our theoretical and empirical understanding of those countries, which have been called ‘deviant democracies’ or ‘anomalous democracies’ (see Bull and Newell 1993, 2009; Doorenspleet 2012; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008; Doorenspleet, Kopecký and Mudde 2008; Seeberg 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Veenendaal and Corbett 2015: 533-537). According to Seeberg (2014a), ‘Deviant democracies may be broadly defined as societies that have maintained electoral democracy despite the absence of factors conducive to democracy’ (p. 102). Similarly, Doorenspleet (2012) also defined deviant democracies as ‘countries that have seemingly beaten the odds and successfully democratized within an unfavourable structural setting’ (p. 190).
It is worth noting that the existence of deviant democracies is not a new phenomenon; it was simply overlooked by democratisation scholars. In the early 1990s, scholars were already aware of the existence of several Third World countries with low levels of economic development which nonetheless became democratic (see Fukuyama 1992: 104; Lipset 1994: 16). Nevertheless, these outliers have been largely ignored, and studies have not analysed such cases systematically.
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To address the issue of deviant democracies, a systematic, mixed method approach was used by Doorenspleet and Kopecký to examine Costa Rica, India, Botswana, Benin and Mongolia in a special issue of Democratization in 2008. Doorenspleet and Kopecký (2008) set a new research agenda for democratisation studies, and more importantly, they coined the term ‘deviant democracies’ to signifying the outliers. They suggested that
On the basis of such quantitative research, it appears that both economic development and democratic diffusion play a role during the phases of transition and consolidation… other factors such as class structure, economic dependency, and political culture explain processes of democratization to some extent as well… a small-N qualitative analysis, as will be done in each of the following country articles… each case analysis is geared towards detecting important variables that can explain the unexpected transition to and consolidation of democracy (p. 709).
In this project, Doorenspleet, Kopecký and Mudde (2008) found seven major factors contributing to democratic transitions among deviant democracies: 1) political elites (Booth 2008; Fritz 2008; Gisselquist 2008; Good and Taylor 2008; McMillan 2008); 2) the emergence of a middle class (Booth 2008); 3) the role of external powers (Booth 2008; Fritz 2008; Gisselquist 2008); 4) the absence of obstacles to transition, such as an ethnically non-homogenous population, lack of national identity, or the existence of a secession movement (Fritz 2008); 5) cultural factors, especially religious belief (Fritz 2008); 6) an economic crisis weakening the previous regime (Gisselquist 2008); 7) lack of military influence (Good and Taylor 2008; McMillan 2008). Doorenspleet (2012) summarises various domestic and external factors affecting deviant democracies. Domestic factors include the dynamics of elites (including political elites), the military, civil society and high ethnic fragmentation. External factors include former colonisers, regional hegemons and external shocks.
Yet scholars disagree about which cases are deviant democracies (see Seeberg 2014b: 635). In a small-N qualitative analysis, Costa Rica, India, Botswana, Benin and
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Mongolia have been identified as deviant democracies (see Doorenspleet 2012: 194- 198; Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008). A large-N analysis in contrast has given a list of deviant democracies that is slightly different. Seeberg (2010b) used structural variables of economic development to identify a list of outliers, using nested analysis to explain deviant democracies. In recent years, Seeberg (2014a) has conducted a quantitative study to map anomalous democracies in the Cold War period. Eleven cases have been identified as deviant democracies: Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey from 1975 to 1988. Seeberg (2014b: 635) then used neighbour diffusion, economic development and the modernisation thesis together with other structural variables (Muslim majority, resource reliance, ethnic fractionalisation and being a former British colony) to identify deviant democracies. He further maps 12 cases of deviant democracies from 1993 to 2008: Central Africa, Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey.
The factors and analyses developed to identify deviant democracies provide a good foundation for future studies of the other type of outlier, deviant autocracies: countries favourable structural settings which failed to make a transition to democracy. It is still unclear which countries can be classified as deviant autocracies, and hence that is one of the main tasks of the next chapter. The literature on deviant democracies provides important insights and methods for identifying deviant democracies, which can also help in identifying deviant autocracies (see Seeberg 2014a: 106-107). To explain deviant autocracies, however, the literature on deviant democracies is less useful, and hence I need a different theoretical framework (see Chapter 4).
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The Persistence of Autocracy
To understand deviant autocracies, it is also important to learn from studies on autocracy and how authoritarian leaders maintain their power. According to Gerschewaki (2013),
Broadly speaking, three research waves can be identified: the totalitarianism paradigm until the mid-1960s that highlighted ideology and terror; the rise of authoritarianism until the 1980s that placed more emphasis on socio-economic factors; and, starting with Geddes’ seminal article in 1999, a renaissance of autocracy research that centred mostly on strategic repression and co-optation (p. 14).
To sum up, it is commonly agreed that factors including legitimation, repression and co-optation can help us understand autocracies’ stability (see Anderson, Møller, Rørbæk and Skaaning 2014; Gerschewski 2013: 17; Köllner and Kailitz 2013: 1).
Autocratic leaders rely mainly on institutional arrangements and government performance to attain legitimacy. Existing studies of autocratic stability suggest that constitutions in authoritarian regimes usually establish some pseudo-democratic institutions, such as party politics and an electoral system, to enhance regime durability (see Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 2002; Wright 2008; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). Magaloni (2008) has clarified that ‘[a] reason why dictators aspire to win supermajorities is that this allows them to project an image of invincibility and strength… Citizens are likely to despise the autocrat who is not a benevolent dictator that can promote economic growth, invest in public goods, and make everyone prosper’ (p. 729). Indeed, autocratic regimes also make substantial expenditures on education and the public good to pacify citizens (see Gandhi 2002). Economic reform and performance can also help the ruling elite to attain legitimacy and protect their political power (see Breslin 1996: 692-693, 2008: 7).
In addition, studies also outline different legislative arrangements in authoritarian regimes, and their impact on economic growth in single-party, military, personalist and monarchical regimes (see Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). For
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example, ‘regimes which depend on domestic investment (or loans) to grow the economy create and maintain political institutions that not only help them rule, but do so by credibly binding their own power… Regimes that are largely dependent on “unearned” income from sources such as natural resource rents and foreign aid, however, do not necessarily have an incentive to create and maintain institutions that constrain their power, because they are less dependent on the productive resources of the economy’ (Wright 2008: 323). It is worth noting that dictators in electoral autocracies pay a price for introducing elections, as this increases the number of protests organised by the opposition before the election. In addition, members of the opposition may formulate socio-electoral coalitions with each other during social movements against the incumbent (Trejo 2014).
In any case, the literature on autocracy shows that autocratic rulers manipulate various channels to obtain legitimacy and consolidate power. It is thus important to study how professional elites come to power in the case of deviant autocracies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, establishing a political structure that includes a semblance of multi-party competition.
Another strategy commonly used by autocratic leaders to consolidate power is repression: the use of measures to control political parties, legislatures, and elections (see Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2009; Boix 2003; Gandhi 2002; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000). The opposition under these measures has difficulty fighting against the authoritarian regime. Greene (2010) for instance explains how the authoritarian party can dominate elections by monopolising public resources. The ‘dominant parties can transform public resources into patronage goods and illicit funds for partisan campaigning that allow them to buy votes, outspend the opposition at every turn, and make otherwise meaningful elections unfair’ (p. 828). In addition, ruling elites such as military leaders can be given veto power via manipulation of the constitution, effectively counteracting the opposition or civilian government (see North and Weingast 1989; Wright 2008).
The most effective factor in maintaining autocratic stability is co-optation between elites. Power sharing among the ruling coalition in autocratic regimes is vital
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for stability (Magaloni 2008). A coalition can also be formed between the dictator and potential opposition forces (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Power sharing can be political, social or economic. Political institutions can be used by the ruler to cater to the interests of different elites (see Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011: 284). According to Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), ‘[w]e focus on the ruler’s use of legislatures to solicit cooperation and to neutralize the threat of rebellion from forces within society’ (p. 1280). In the context of China, Breslin (2008) argues the new middle class are ‘civil servants who benefit from the continued existence of authoritarian state power’ (p. 9). In addition, Albertus and Menaldo (2012b) conduct a quantitative analysis to evaluate the situation in Latin America from 1950 to 2002. They find that regime durability is positively correlated to the introduction of a new constitution immediately after the autocratic leader seizes power. The new constitution serves to secure the political and economic interests of factions within the ruling elite.
In terms of social and economic interests, Wantchekon (2002) argues that in autocracy, economic cooperation between rulers and elites is common to secure their loyalty. In the same vein, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) state that the ‘spoils available for distribution—monetary rewards, perks, and privileges—increase when more people cooperate with the regime’ (p. 1281). This strategy is commonly used by autocratic rulers in different regions. Albertus and Menaldo (2012c) analyse competition between the ruling elites and economic elites in Mexico from 1911 to 2000. They find that expropriation was used to disempower the old economic elites, which in turn helped create a new economic elite loyal to the autocratic incumbent. In East Asia, crony capitalism is considered a key for economic success. According to Kang (2003), ‘[b]y examining corruption and cronyism through the lens of transition costs, it can be shown a particular set of government-business relations, although corrupt, also lowered transaction costs and made investment more credible’ (p. 439). The question of whether patronage and clientelism sustain autocracy has been extensively discussed in the studies of autocracy in different regions (see Barari 2015: 108; Bellin 2004; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Brownlee 2002; Charrad and Adams 2011; Seeberg 2013: 39).
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Autocratic diffusion is another factor often used to explain the persistence of autocracy. As with democratic diffusion, there are mixed arguments concerning autocratic diffusion (see von Soest 2015). Using the examples of China and Russia for illustration, ‘authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other autocratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity’ (Bader, Grävingholt and Kästner 2010: 96). However, the latest studies show that co-optation between autocratic regimes in the international community is difficult. Tansey (2016) has clarified the problem of autocracy promotion: ‘I have argued that in order for the idea of autocracy promotion to be useful, it must apply only to those cases where there is a clear intention to promote autocracy as a regime type, based in significant part on an ideological commitment to authoritarianism itself’ (p. 155). More importantly, the foreign policy of autocratic regimes is not currently ideologically driven for the most part. The foreign policy of Russia toward Ukraine, for example, is driven more by pragmatism rather than the desire to promote autocracy: the ruler and ruling coalition are more concerned about their interests in gas contracts (see Obydenkova and Libman 2014).
To sum up, autocratic leaders use multiple strategies to consolidate their power. I must clarify that the traditional way of understanding the emergence and maintenance of autocracies is useful and important, but additional tools are needed to explain deviant autocracies (see Chapter 4). The previous approaches described above mainly explain how authoritarian regimes justify their authoritarian ruling style with elections and high levels of government performance to attain legitimacy, and how they use certain strategies (e.g. oppression and co-optation of the opposition) to maintain their authoritarian power. In deviant autocracies, there is a significant group of professional and highly educated citizens who support democracy and embrace civil liberties (see Dahl 1973: 124 and Huntington 1991: 69). In addition, the structural approach would predict the emergence of democracy, as these countries have high levels of socio-economic development. The puzzle of deviant autocracies is therefore as follows: how do ruling elites monopolise power and prevent democratisation in a country with a relatively high level of socio-economic development? Chapters 5 and 6 focus on case studies of Singapore and Hong Kong; specifically, an analysis of empirical
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evidence shows how the internal and external elites’ co-optation and bargaining processes during the transitional period played a crucial role in preventing transitions to democracy.