HD / WINDOWS 10 HOME

My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This is because they enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true inten- tions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3).

Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, but the participation of un- armed actors still set into motion an alternative causal mechanisms within the bargaining framework.73 _{As I have outlined in section 6.1, Nepalese civil so-} ciety played a particularly prominent rule during the 2006 Jana Andolan II that paved the way to end the monarchy and to start negotiations to a peace agreement (Shah, 2008). “The general public, led by professionals, civil society leaders, human rights leaders, and the civil service, formed the core of most demonstrations and marches; party cadres and leaders were initially rarely seen in the streets” (Freedom House, 2008). This means that “civil society had a very significant role” in the movement also because the political parties were “discredited” among protesters (INT-05, 24.09.2015, cf. INT-19, 09.10.2015).74

73_{The case of Nepal is in so far distinct as a rebel group fought against a divided government}

in which political parties controlled the police as one major opponent of the Maoists on the battlefield, while control over the RNA de facto remained with the king. This “sets a unique example for the world” (Shah, 2008, p. 24). Because of this role of the political parties during the war, I concentrate here on the participation of civil society in interim rule.

74_{One situation that is memorized by many Nepalis, that several interview partners de-}

scribed, and that illustrates the vital role of civil society in the early peace process is when during Jana Andolan II, SPA party leaders were sitting on the floor surrounded by civil soci- ety leaders, listening to their demands on political reforms, and promising to enshrine those reforms in the CPA (INT-04, 23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015).

In the CPA, the warring parties agreed to take “responsibility for resolving any problem arising ... with the support of all political parties, civil society and local organizations” and “sincerely” appealed to “civil society, the profes- sional groups, the class organizations, the media, the intellectuals and the entire Nepali people to actively participate and make successful the historic campaign of building a new democratic Nepal and establishing lasting peace” (Compre- hensive Peace Agreement, 2006). Also the subsequent Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007) called for the participation of civil society during the interim period. However, while the CPN (M) had originally suggested that civil society leaders would be broadly represented in the interim parliament – an idea was that the interim parliament was to be composed one-third each of the Maoists, the SPA, and civil society – this “was never going to be acceptable to the mainstream parties: it suggested that they were only on a par with the Maoists, and many suspected the civil society appointments would give the body a dangerously radical tint” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10).

Because of these concerns, the Interim Constitutions eventually included a compromise by which the interim parliament would reinstate all former mem- bers, but would additionally include 73 seats for the Maoists and 48 seats for “members nominated by consensus from ... people-based and professional orga- nizations, oppressed communities, backward regions, indigenous ethnic groups ... and from among women and various political personalities” (Government of Nepal, 2007, cf. section 6.2.1,). This thus represented a commitment for institu-

tionalized participation of civil society according to my conceptualization. This

commitment was also by and large implemented (INT-15, 04.10.2015, Interna- tional Crisis Group, 2006) – although “most of these seats were later divided among politicians, a few did go to civil society leaders who had played a promi- nent role in the April 2006 movement” (Shah, 2008, p. 11).75

In addition to the institutionalized participation of civil society in Nepal’s interim government, civil society was also received opportunities for what I termed ad hoc participation outside the formal interim government structures in Chapter 3. It was repeatedly reported that the leaders of the CPN (M), NC, and CPN-UML met with civil society members to consult on political reforms during the interim period. For instance, between late March and early April 2008, civil society leaders were invited by interim representatives and security staff (such as the chief of Nepal Police) to consult on how to prevent violence at the polling stations during the 2008 CA elections, and the parties and civil society eventually agreed on setting up monitoring committees comprised of civil society leaders during the polling process (Ekantipur, 2008a; Ekantipur,

75_{While this decrease of institutional participation for civil society was heavily criticized by}

some civil society leaders who demanded a broader representation of voices of unarmed actors in the interim government (cf. The Himalayan Times, 2007), others commented the demands “made in certain quarters to bring civil society representatives into the new government” with: “We civil society members do not join governments. It is an insult to ask us to become ministers or to allege that we work to become one” (in Shah, 2008, p. 12).

2008b; Ekantipur, 2008c). One civil society leader in that regard remembered that up until the first CA elections in 2008, he experienced the decision-making process of the interim government as very consultative, and he was regularly invited to voice his concerns and make suggestions for improvements in the constitutional committees (INT-07, 25.09.2015; cf. also INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT-18, 06.10.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015).

Some interview partners thereby did regard the participation of civil society in interim decision-making as a costly signal by the parties that created domestic audience costs; and argued that civil society came to represent “an unorthodox guarantor” for transparency in the peace process: When political reforms were debated in the interim government and discussions became polarized, civil soci- ety representatives – although “kind of symbolic in their role” were “guarantors for save landing” (INT-24, 13.10.2015).

Having said that, there is stronger evidence for an alternative causal mecha- nism within the bargaining framework, in that the participation of civil society in interim government was not so much a costly signal by the parties to create

audience costs, but instead strategically used by the warring parties to raise

their political and economic benefits and thus decrease any future uncertainty. This mechanism came into being because over the course of the interim period, civil society started becoming more and more aligned to and co-opted by the former warring parties. This means that all political and economic benefits that were supposed to go to civil society to create a domestic audience – such as re- ceiving a voice in changing and promulgating laws and institutional reforms in the interim government; or receiving funds by the international community – became benefits for the warring parties in the bargaining situation.

Without exception, all interview partners argued that while civil society had a strong momentum in the 2006 Jana Andolan II, this extraordinary role gradually diminished during the rule of the interim government until it was non-existent following the 2008 CA elections: “Civil society was unified and important during the April movement but since then group and individual in- terests have diverged” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). Instead, civil society became – with few exceptions – virtually indistinguishable from the par- ties represented in the interim government as well as “very politically charged” (INT-20, 09.10.2015, cf. also INT-01, 22.09.2015, INT-15, 04.10.2015), and thus its participation was merely to the benefit of the parties who all “used patronage to reward their civil society supporters” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). This is not least due to the fact that many previous political elites began to engage as civil society leaders during the interim period, and “like a revolving door, many now in civil society were in government positions in the past” (Shah, 2008, p. 11). As a development worker stated, civil so- ciety “is not so strong when it comes to doing things independently of the political parties ... There are very few NGOs that manage to stay free from political influence ... If you give funds to them you are basically funding po-

Table 6.2: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Nepal

Hypothesis Result

H1: Power-sharing interim govern-

ment, as opposed to any other in- terim government, increases the sta- bility of post-interim peace.

Supported. The causal mechanisms

on the warring parties’ political and economic security are most convinc- ing. Power-sharing also increased the costs of defection for the parties.

H2: International interim govern- ment, as opposed to any other in- terim government, increases the sta- bility of post-interim peace.

Not supported. Empirical evi- dence rather points to “local own- ership” on the elite and combatant level as an alternative explanation outside the bargaining framework.

H3: The more advanced the pro-

cess of integrating parallel political and military institutions into the au- thority of an interim government, the higher the stability of peace.

Supported. The causal mechanisms

on ex-combatants’ war-time mindsets and (to a lesser extent) on parallel financing through political structures are most convincing.

H4: The more advanced the oppor-

tunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace.

Weakly supported. There is yet no

evidence for the mechanism on audi- ence costs – evidence rather suggests participation reduced future uncer- tainty for the warring parties.

litical parties by proxy” (INT-02, 23.09.2015; cf. INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-04, 23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-11, 28.09.2015; INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT- 19, 09.10.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015; INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-25, 19.10.2015 INT-26, 19.10.2015).

6.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the question to what extent post-interim peace in Nepal can be attributed to properties of interim government mitigating the warring parties’ commitment problems. Throughout this chapter, I also attended to al- ternative explanatory variables or causal mechanisms, such as the role of demo- cratic history in negotiating and accepting power-sharing interim government, or of local ownership instead of international authority in interim governments. Concerning the independent variables proposed in Chapter 3, the chapter yields several interesting conclusions (cf. Table 6.2).

Hypothesis H1 on the role of power-sharing interim government for stable peace is supported. Particularly the mechanisms on the economic and politi-

cal security of warring parties account for empirical evidence. Power-sharing

interim government decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increasing its political security, as it enabled the party to negotiate a conceivably more fa-

vorable electoral law. More generally, it also enabled the Maoists to show the other political parties that it was capable of participating in national gover- nance, thus lending itself as a future coalition partner. Power-sharing interim government also decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increased its eco- nomic security, as it enabled party leaders to control and loot state resources through corruption. Power-sharing interim government also added to peace by increasing costs of defection, an alternative causal mechanism not envisioned in Chapter 3. For CPN (M) leaders, the corruption displayed in the interim govern- ment and beyond alienated them from increasingly disillusioned and frustrated ex-combatants. This increased the rebel leaders’ costs of remobilization. For the one party outside the agreement – the royal palace – power-sharing interim government added to the perception of the king and his subordinate army that the country was strongly united in the peace process. These increased costs are part of an explanation for why the king accepted his political marginalization and did not, for instance, repeat his actions of earlier years and stage a royal coup. The proposed mechanism on power-sharing increasing the physical secu-

rity of warring parties does not hold for Nepal, because I cannot establish the

necessary temporal precedence of cause to effect in that relationship.

Hypothesis H2 on the role of international interim government for stable peace is not supported. The international interim government variable does not correlate with the outcome in the theorized way in Nepal, and the absence of international authority did not exacerbate, but mitigate commitment problems. Firstly, on an elite level, it enabled cooperation in the power-sharing interim government without any nationalist rhetoric, and it provided particularly the CPN (M) with a sense of ownership over reforms. Secondly, on a combatant level, it contributed to perceptions that disarmament was a voluntary “sacrifice” for peace and the country – a term repeatedly used by my interview partners – rather than a forced process. Thus, local ownership emerges as an alternative explanation for peace.

Hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel political and military institu- tions is supported. Even though Maoist cadres often cheated the integration of parallel political institutions in the early days of the interim period and through continued parallel taxation and extortion, the Maoists eventually gave up on parallel political structures. Thereby, they also gradually became dependent on extracting future economic gain through controlling formal state institutions. This becomes visible by the growing corruption they displayed. Further, even though the integration of military institutions failed to truly strip ex-combatants of their arms or dismantle the Maoists’ command structures, the process still increased the costs of defection (as predicted in Chapter 3). This is because the process offered combatants a vision of alternative (1) professional and (2) pri- vate livelihoods, as well as (3) an improved legal and logistical situation inside cantonment.

rule is supported, although evidence suggests a different causal mechanism be- tween independent and dependent variables. Rather than affecting signalling behavior of the warring parties, the participation of civil society decreased fu-

ture uncertainty for the parties. This is because by co-opting and politicizing

civil society, all political and economic benefits that were supposed to go to civil society to create a domestic audience – such as receiving a voice in institu- tional reforms; or receiving funds by the international community – turned into benefits for the warring parties instead.

In sum, post-interim peace prevailed in Nepal. Although its surprising vic- tory in the 2008 elections was certainly among the reasons for why the CPN (M) successfully and peacefully integrated into the political scene, two aspects re- lated to institutional design and reform properties of the interim government are particularly relevant in explaining mitigated commitment problems and stable peace. Firstly, the Maoists could use their participation in the power-sharing in- terim government to secure both economic and political benefits that mitigated commitment problems by reducing future uncertainties about their survival in the post-interim state. It also made their weaker-growing position in the post- interim period – that culminated into their defeat in the 2013 elections – a very comfortable one (cf. INT-29, 03.11.2015). Secondly, at the end of the interim period and in the time thereafter, the costs of defection for the Maoist leader- ship had become so high that they lacked the opportunity to remobilize. This is not least because both the leadership’s behavior in the power-sharing interim government and the design of the integration of parallel military institutions process had changed intra-party dynamics between Maoist elites and combat- ants, had alienated many rank-and-file soldiers from the political leadership, and had provided ex-combatants with visions of alternative private and profes- sional livelihoods: “In 2008, they [the Maoists] had come so far that they did not want to fight the war anymore, especially the ex-combatants would not fight anymore” (INT-30, 13.11.2015). A NA lieutenant general remembers,

“Many people ask me if [ex-combatants] will take up their weapons again. My answer is that [they] will not ... because they were so badly used by their political leaders. They gave their lives, but they got nothing in return. Will they again go to war to make somebody rich, make somebody Prime Minister? No.” (INT-12, 29.09.2015).

Chapter 7

Interim Rule in Angola

In March 2016, José Eduardo dos Santos made international headlines by un- expectedly announcing that he would step down as President of Angola come 2018, a position that he has held since September 1979 as one of the longest- ruling leaders in the world (BBC, 2016). While dos Santos and his party – the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – issue a tight grip over politics in Angola today, their rule was bitterly contested by insurgents of the União Nacional para a

Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of

Angola (UNITA) until 2002 (Freedom House, 2015). That year, UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle. UNITA had started its violent campaign against the MPLA directly after Angola’s independence in 1975, and it took 26 years until a window for peace opened for the first time in 1991, when the war- ring parties signed the Bicesse Accords. In this peace agreement, they agreed on a 16-months interim period in which the MPLA would act as caretaker interim government until elections in September 1992 determined the future government of Angola. After all observers – including the warring parties themselves – had been certain that UNITA would stand as a winner of those elections, it was dos Santos and the MPLA that managed to gain most votes. Almost immediately, UNITA remobilized for war.

This chapter explores whether violence in Angola’s immediate post-interim period was the result of credible commitment problems; and to what extent properties of interim government in Angola failed to mitigate such commit- ment problems. I proceed in three steps. Section 7.1 gives a brief overview of Angola’s history, beginning with the war of independence against Portugal’s colonial regime and continuing with the ensuing civil war between the former independence movements. The section ends with a closer look at the negoti- ations leading up to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991, in which the warring parties agreed on the interim government under analysis. In section 7.2, I attend to each property of interim government as outlined in Chapter 3, and I investigate how the design of each property was linked to the re-intensification

of armed conflict following the 1992 election. In this section, I also study any alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms for armed conflict in Angola. Section 7.3 summarizes my findings and concludes this chapter.

7.1

Angola: Three Decades of War

When their warring parties signed the Bicesse Accords in May 1991, most citi- zens of Angola – among the countries with the lowest median age in the world – had known nothing but war. The younger history of armed conflict in An- gola can thereby be roughly divided into three phases. Firstly, Angola’s war of independence against the Portuguese colonial regime between 1961 and 1974 that resulted in the signing of the Alvor Accords and Angola’s ensuing indepen- dence in November 1975. Secondly, the first phase of Angola’s civil war fought between the former national liberation movements – MPLA, UNITA, and ini- tially also the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola or National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – between 1975 and 1991 that resulted in the Bicesse Accords, an interim government, and elections in September 1992. And thirdly, the second phase of Angola’s civil war between the re-escalation of violence following the 1992 elections and Savimbi’s death in 2002; a phase that was repeatedly broken up by several fragile periods of relative peace, for instance after the parties signed the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. As the case study