Xilinx vs. Altera and FPGA market share historic

73. GODINEZ VS FONG GR NO. L-36731 JANUARY 27, 1983 FACTS:

The petitioner‘s parents acquired a parcel land which was sold, for valuable consideration, to the respondent who is a Chinese citizen. The respondent executed a power of attorney to another Chinese citizen who conveyed such land to Navata who, with full knowledge that Fong

is Chinese citizen and under the law is prohibited and disqualified to acquire a real property.

The petitioners filed a complaint before CFI praying to be adjudged as owners of the land. The petitioner contends that the TCT issued to Fong was null and void because the transaction constitutes a non-existent contract since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it

HELD:

he Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy.

Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely pro-exhibited.** It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of limitations.

From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property.

Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned.

In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.

74. GAN TINGCO VS PABINGUIT GR NO. 10439 OCTOBER 17, 1916 FACTS:

Acabo sold parcels of land to the petitioner. However, the land was in possession of the respondent alleges certain rights therein. Her claims o have purchased them from Faustino Abad; that Abad had become their owner through purchase from Henry Gardner; that the latter,

in turn, had owned them by reason of having purchased them for P555 at a public auction.

Gardner was a justice of peace at that time. CFI declared the petitioners as the owner of such lands and ordered the respondents to restore the former its possession. The respondent, however, appealed contending that notwithstanding the sale of the land at the public auction, Acabo did not ceased to be the owner of the properties because of the irregularities and defect in the auction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent‘s contention is correct HELD:

If under the law Gardner was prohibited from acquiring the ownership of Acabo's lands, then he could not have transmitted to Faustino Abad the right of ownership that he did not possess; nor could Abad, to whom this alleged ownership had not been transmitte, have conveyed the same to Pabinguit. What Gardner should have done in view of the fact that the sale, as he finally acknowledged, was void, was to claim the price that had been deposited in court, and the justice of the peace of Guijulngan should have declared the auction void and have ordered a new sale to be held, besides correcting the errors that had been committed in the proceedings.

To the reasons already stated, there is to be added the additional one, with respect to the sale made by Faustino Abad to Silvino Pabinguit, that Abad was a minor at the time — a circumstance that deprived him of capacity to sell (Civil Code, art. 1263). Abad had no ownership to transmit to anyone and, besides, he had no personality to enable him to contract by himself, on account of his lack of legal age.

Sanchez, the sheriff, the sole notary who certified all these deeds of conveyance in order that Pabinguit might become owner of those coconut lands with which his own lands adjoined, was in such a hurry that, as he testified at the trial, on the very same day of the auction he had already executed in behalf of Henry Gardner the final deed of sale of the said lands, without allowing time for their possible redemption. Section 466 of Act No. 190 prescribes that if redemption has not been requested, this deed is to be executed within the twelve months subsequent to the sale.

This court finds no reason whatever why it should not affirm the judgment appealed from. It is therefore hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

75. DISTAJO VS CA GR NO. 112954 AUGUST 25, 2000 FACTS:

Abiertas designated one of her sons, Rufu, to be the administrator of the parcels of land that she owned. She, then, sold portions of her lot to her children, one of which was sold to Rufu.

Likewise, Abiertra‘s brother sold some lot to Rufu. Upon Abietra‘s death, the latter‘s siblings demanded possession of the land owned by Rufu. Upon his refusal, they filed before RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and partition. RTC dismissed the complaint. But the

petitioners allege that Rufu cannot acquire the parcels of land because the Civil Code prohibits the administrator from acquiring the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioners are correct HELD:

Under paragraph (2) of 1491, the prohibition against agents purchasing property in their hands for sale or management is not absolute. It does not apply if the principal consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the agent or administrator. In this case, the deeds of sale signed by Iluminada Abiertas shows that she gave consent to the sale of the properties in favor of her son, Rufo, who was the administrator of the properties. Thus, the consent of the principal Iluminada Abiertas removes the transaction out of the prohibition contained in Article 1491(2).

Petitioner also alleges that Rufo Distajo employed fraudulent machinations to obtain the consent of Iluminada Abiertas to the sale of the parcels of land. However, petitioner failed to adduce convincing evidence to substantiate his allegations.

76. FEDERICO N. RAMOS VS PATRICIO A. NGASEO A.C. NO. 6210 DECEMBER 9, 2004 FACTS:

Ramos engaged the respondet‘s services as a counsel in a case involving a piece of land. After the CA rendered a favorable judgment ordering the land to be returned to Ramos, the respondent sent a demand letter asking for the delivery of such land which the former has allegedly promised as payment for her services. As a result, Ramos filed before IBP for violation the Code for Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of such land. Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant. Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the respondent is correct HELD:

Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.^[7] The prohibition on purchase is all

embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons.^[8] It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.^[9] However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client‘s property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent‘s act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.

77. WOLFSON VS ESTATE OF MARTINEZ 20 PHIL. 340 OCTOBER 13, 1911 FACTS:

On the 29th day of January, 1906, a judgment was entered in this court by Hon. John C.

Sweeney, one of the judges thereof, in favor of Mariano Yap-Tuangco against the deceased Francisco Martinez for the sum of twelve thousand pesos;

That there was a contract agreement between the plaintiff in that judgment and the above mentioned Joseph N. Wolfson and one Basilio Regalado y Mapa should have as their fees for prosecuting the case fifty per cent of whatever amount might be obtained;

That subsequently said Mapa assigned his interest in said contract to the said Wolfson; That subsequently and on the 18th day of June, 1907, the plaintiff Mariano Yap-Tuangco, for value received, sold and transferred and delivered to said Wolfson all his right, title and interest in and o the aforementioned judgment

ISSUE:

Whether or not under the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code the plaintiff, Joseph N.

Wolfson, was prohibited from purchasing the judgment of his client in such manner and to such extent that the contract of which such purchase was a part was absolutely null and void and could be attacked by a person not a party to the transaction

HELD:

The judgment appealed from in so far as it declares that the instrument of dissolution of the partnership between A and B was null and void for the reason that the plaintiff was not bound, either principally or subsidiarily, by the said instrument, is contrary to the provisions of article 1302 of the Civil Code.

Even if the sale of the judgment in question is found comprehended within the prohibition of article 1459, a question which we do not now decide, still the defendant is not entitled to invoke the terms of said article for the reason, above stated, that such prohibition is personal to the parties to the contract, being available only to them or their representatives

78. OLAGUER VS PURUNGGANAN JR. 515 SCRA 460 (2007) GR. NO. 158907 FACTS:

The respondent was the owner of shares of stocks of Business Day Corp. He was active in the political opposition against Marcos dictatorship. Anticipating the possibility of his arrest and detention by the military, he executed a SPS appointing his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of selling or transferring his shares of stocks with Business day.

During the trial, petitioner testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition. The parties acknowledge the SPA before Emilio Purugganan, the corporate Secretary and the notary public. Then, he was arrested. When he was released from detention, he discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder. He demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership , but they refused to do so. He filed a complaint before RTC against Purugganan and Locsin to declare as illegal the sale of the shares of stock. He alleged that respondent exceeded his authority under the SPA. SPA only applied in absence and incapacity .RTC dismissed and found the sale of shares between him and respondent Locsin was valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was perfected sale HELD:

Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the word ABSENCE to a condition wherein a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown without leaving an agent to administer his property. Incapacity for the petitioner would be limited to mean ―minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction. He claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the instances covered by the terms absence and incapacity as provided in the SPA in favor of Locsin. It is a general rule the SPA must be strictly construed, however, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. He already

authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court.

79. MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING CORP VS TAGLE GR NO. 65594 JULY 9, 1986 FACTS

GSIS owned a parcel of land with a building and printing equipment in Paco, Manila. It was sold to Maharlika in a Conditional Contract of Sale with the stipulation that if Maharlika failed to pay monthly installments in 90 days, the GSIS would automatically cancel the contract. Because Maharlika failed to pay several monthly installments, GSIS demanded that Maharlika vacate the premises. Even though Maharlika refused to do so, the GSIS published an advertisement inviting the public to bid in a public auction. A day before the scheduled bidding, Adolfo Calica, the President of Maharlika, gave the GSIS head office 2 checks worth 11,000 and a proposal for a compromise agreement. The GSIS General Manager Roman Cruz gave a not to Maharlika saying ―Hold Bidding. Discuss with me.‖ However, the public bidding took place as scheduled and the property was subsequently awarded to Luz Tagle, the wife of the GSIS Retirement Division Chief. Maharlika demanded that the sale be considered null and void, as Mrs. Tagle should have been disqualified from bidding for the GSIS property. RTC and CA both ruled that the Tagles were entitled to the property and Maharlika should vacate the premises.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the property HELD

NO. The sale to them was against public policy. First of all, the GSIS head office was stopped from claiming that they did not give the impression to Maharlika that they were accepting the proposal for a compromise agreement. The act of the general manager is binding on GSIS.

Second, Article 1491 (4) of the CC provides that public officers and employees are prohibited from purchasing the property of the state or any GOCC or institution, the administration of which has been entrusted to them cannot purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another. The SC held that as an employee of the GSIS, Edilberto Tagle and his wife are disqualified from bidding on the property belonging to the GSIS because it gives the impression that there was politics involved in the sale. It is not necessary that actual fraud be shown, for a contract which tends to injure the public service is void although the parties entered into it honestly and proceeded under it in good faith

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I. ASSIGNMENT OF CREDITS AND OTHER INCORPOREAL RIGHTS

A. ARTICLES 1624-1635 B. RA 3952

THE BULK SALES LAW (as amended)

AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE, TRANSFER, MORTGAGE OR ASSIGNMENT OF GOODS, WARES, MERCHANDISE, PROVISIONS OR MATERIALS, IN BULK, AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR THE